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Abstract
This research is concerned with the assessment of student nurses’ practice, 
implementation of which has been considered problematic since the move of 
initial training into higher education. It examines clinical nurses’ accounts of 
assessment, and rejects an approach based on identification of competencies 
as too rationalistic for a situated practice. Insights from, in particular, Foucault,
Deleuze, and Derrida were used to analyse practitioners’ alternative discourse 
of practice, and the processes of self-constitution and decision-making. 
Eighteen practitioners from different settings were interviewed in depth about 
how they determine acceptable performance. Three participants were 
interviewed twice to develop ideas arising from the first round of conversations. 
Practitioners’ accounts challenged the conventional understanding of 
assessment, and the construction of practice implicit in current policy. The 
analysis suggests a more fluid, un-predetermined understanding, characterised 
by hesitation and uncertainty, though without losing a concern with safe 
practice.
Several implications for policy and practice are presented. These require a shift 
of authority towards practitioners’ situated judgements and away from 
predetermined outcomes, both in respect of programme planning and policy 
guidelines on the specification of standards. A new alliance is proposed to 
encourage a more authentic engagement with the process from both clinical 
and educational practitioners.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
This study examines how clinical nurses account for their practices in the 
assessment of student nurses. The work challenges more conventional 
approaches to this problematic issue, and rejects the rationalistic explanations 
adopted in much previous work. Using insights from the work of Foucault 
(2002a), Deleuze (1994), Derrida (1995) and others, I will show how the 
practitioners in this study resisted the prevailing discourse of practice, and 
constructed an un-predetermined version in its place. Further, I will show how 
they built a more mobile model of themselves as nurses than is possible based 
on the technical-rational model promoted in current policy. This understanding 
of the process will be shown to present impossible dilemmas for participants; 
consequently, I will argue that practitioners’ situated judgements warrant 
authority in their own right when making decisions about student progress.
I had commenced this research with a view to identifying whether practitioners 
might have their own definition of competence, the dominant concept in current 
policy and training programmes. This could then be incorporated in assessment 
documentation as a more accurate representation. I eventually understood this 
as too rationalistic an approach for a situated practice, and saw the necessity of 
avoiding the assumption that this was capable of circumscription. As I will show, 
such assumptions have to date provided no effective answers. I was also aware 
that the interviews themselves were situated events, and my location as a 
teacher of nurses was a likely barrier to practitioners’ willingness to share with 
2me what they claimed to be looking for. At least some participants seemed to 
perceive their status in our relationship as subordinate, regardless of repeated 
assurances to the contrary. Accordingly the research is an analysis of 
practitioner accounts, rather than a claim to some fundamental truth, which I 
argue cannot be achieved.
Representing practice
The idea for the research emerged from my observation that there is 
sometimes a surprising discrepancy between the outcome of assessment of 
particular students, and what would have been expected, given prior knowledge 
of the same individuals. It occurred to me therefore that, when making their 
judgements, practitioners might be using something other than the given 
criteria, yet the latter claimed the support of all sectors of nursing. This was an 
important possibility since, if practitioners held another way of thinking about 
practice, this was likely to influence their judgements of it (Fish and Coles 
1998). That there were even occasional discrepancies in decisions reported 
implied an influence beyond the given understanding.
The reductionism of the recent policy emphasis on measurability has promoted 
a technical-rational view of practice and its assessment. This has been aimed 
at introducing precision, and a model of practice capability that can be 
universally and objectively applied, in the name of a new form of 
professionalism. As the general orientation to this approach grew, the practice-
learning component of programmes came to be referred to in terms of 
competencies (e.g. Phillips et al 1994). More recently policy statements 
3confirmed a competency-based approach as the preferred model for 
assessment of practice (UKCC 1999, 2001). In keeping with the changing 
model of professionalism more generally (cf. Perkin 1989), this has marked a 
significant change in the way nurses’ expertise in practice is represented. 
I will argue that this is an unacceptable, inappropriate way of thinking about 
practice, which should be rejected. This research recognises the situated, 
hence contingent, nature of nursing practice and its assessment; I will argue 
that the pursuit of an essential understanding is both inappropriate and 
unworkable.
Aim(s) of the research
The aim of this research was twofold. I wanted to expose any differences or 
discrepancies between practitioners’ claims about assessment of student 
performance and the view promoted through policy guidelines. This would, in 
turn, inform policy and practice in assessment, the better to promote an 
authentic engagement in the process by practitioners. The aims were 
formulated in this way to avoid assuming that the process would necessarily be 
straightforward and rationalistic, as was implied by my original thinking; I had 
come realise that I may have to take account of factors other than isolatable 
reference points. If claims varied from the prevailing view, I wanted this to 
emerge, whether or not the process was understood, for instance, as discrete 
concepts or narrative descriptions. Thus, the first question was, what do 
participants say counts as evidence in a student’s performance, and how is this 
deployed to determine acceptability? 
4Embedded within this were other questions: how do practitioners distinguish 
acceptable from unacceptable practice; is there any evidence of a hierarchical 
arrangement in the evidence they look for? The latter does not assume this as 
the case, but accepts accounts as presented; the former allowed that 
acceptability was not merely the mirror opposite of unacceptability, in a binary 
model of understanding. To assume a constant approach in this process would 
have implied a fixed understanding of practice, whereas I argue for a situated, 
hence variable, understanding. Indeed, variable judgements using 
predetermined criteria are difficult to explain otherwise. This led to the question 
of whether judgements varied over time or place; and, importantly, how was this 
explained by participants? This form of question was necessary to avoid limiting 
the options available to participants, or constraining them to an implicit fixed 
range of factors (cf Anderson et al 2001).
Claims for what is sought in students as aspiring registrants implies both a 
model of practice and of the observer as a registered practitioner; to seek 
characteristics of something other than this would be nonsensical. So, how do 
participants construe their practice and their nursing selves? How is each 
characterised? Through this, and, indeed, throughout the study I wanted to 
understand how participants positioned themselves in relation to the approved 
approach. What do they say, therefore, about how they deal with predetermined 
criteria in their assessments, particularly where there might be any conflict with 
their own claims? This introduced the question of their experience of the power-
relations operating between the educational and clinical sides of training. I 
5anticipated that answers to these questions would help understand the extent to 
which participants own, are dominated by, or resist external definitions.
The Participants
Practitioners with a minimum of one year’s experience as a mentor-assessor 
were asked to contribute from their experience of assessment. I wanted people 
with exposure to more than one student, to allow responses to be drawn from 
different personal experiences, in acknowledgement of variation between 
individual students. Eighteen practitioners volunteered, and were interviewed 
individually over a period of one year, a more extended period than originally 
anticipated. (This point will be addressed in chapter three.) Experience as 
qualified practitioners varied between three and over thirty years, and 
contributors were drawn deliberately from a variety of locations, organisational 
and geographical, to allow for the possibility of variation between settings. 
Three participants were invited for a second interview; their selection was 
based on points they had raised during our initial conversations, concerning 
what I saw as important emergent elements of the data as the analysis was 
developing, so that these could be explored more extensively. 
Structure of the thesis
Chapter two examines the literature concerned with assessment and the notion 
of competence/ies1 in the context of professional practice, taking account of the 
  
1 I will use this compound term where relevant in view of the increasing tendency evident in the 
literature to elide the two original terms (cf. for instance their varying use by authors such as 
Gerrish et al, 1997; Institute of Health and Care Development, 1998; Watson et al, 2002; Dolan, 
2003; MacMullan et al, 2003; Ormrod and Casey, 2004; NMC, 2004, 2005).
6interested nature of policy statements. Databases searched included Medline, 
CINAHL, PsychLit, BIDS, World of Science, OCLC; I also utilised the Google®
search engine for any open access internet sources. Search terms included, in 
various combinations, assessment, criteria, competence/y/ies, nurse/ing 
education/training, policy, practice, professional/ism. The relationship between 
policy and clinical or educational nursing practice will be examined, particularly 
in relation to the concepts of competence and competencies. I will demonstrate 
how this has developed a particular discourse of practice, which excludes 
alternative, less easily measured conceptions (cf. Foucault 2002a). 
Chapter three considers the methodology, and shows how the approach to data 
collection and analysis developed. I will illustrate the shift from a relatively 
rationalistic approach, based on attribution and correspondence theory (Jones 
and Davies 1965), to a more discursive understanding of participants’ talk, 
informed initially from the work of Potter (1996) and Anderson et al (2001). I will 
show how I developed this to a more open perspective overall, informed from 
my reading of Foucault (2002a) on discourse formation and the constitution of 
self; Deleuze and Guattari (1994) on knowledge and self; and Derrida (1995) on 
self, responsibility, and decision-making. 
Chapters four to seven explore the data utilising each of these perspectives in 
turn, starting with the process of attribution, inferring disposition from particular 
behaviours as a criterion for acceptability. Chapters five and six show how 
participants’ accounts, presented in this way, served to construct both an 
alternative to the prevailing discourse of practice, and a model of their nursing 
7selves, which are more mobile and flexible than is afforded by modernist 
approaches aimed at clarity and precision (cf. Fish and Coles 1998; Francis 
1999, 2000). Chapter seven demonstrates the undecidability of the task of 
assessment, arising from the complexity and particularity of each situation 
encountered, and participants’ obligation to the student as other (Derrida 1995).
My analysis challenges the current approach to assessment in policy and 
practice. It has important implications for practitioners’ engagement in decisions 
on assessment at national and local curriculum design levels. It points to a 
more open way of thinking and teaching about nursing as professional work. I 
will argue for a more egalitarian relationship between policy-makers, teachers 
and clinicians. The indeterminacy of clinical situations and participants’ nursing 
selves render judgements of performance incapable of prior specification, and 
invoke an un-predetermined approach to assessment. I will argue that a 
genuinely public debate is needed to reduce the distance between policy-
makers and practitioners, to make decisions relevant and consistent as well as 
accountable. The background to the focus of study will now be considered in 
detail. 
8CHAPTER 2: Review of Literature 
This chapter will review the background to the changes which have affected the 
manner of assessment of nursing students’ practice development. Issues 
deriving from a consideration of policy, professionalism, and the nature of 
practice – in particular its representation as competence/ies – will be examined 
in turn below. Nurse education policy development in the 1980s and ’90s 
sought to strike an uneasy balance between a number of competing influences. 
First, nurses needed to be trained to meet the future manpower needs of the
NHS (UKCC 1986). Second, there was a demand, from different sections of the 
nursing body, to raise the status of nursing knowledge (Payne 1997; White 
1986). Third, it was argued that this is tied to the need for a theoretically 
informed basis for practice; criticism had been levelled at the presence of ritual 
in nursing, based on custom and practice, and a more critical approach has 
been advocated (Ford and Walsh 1994; Walsh and Ford 1989; UKCC 1986). 
Finally, health care managers want nurses, like other occupational groups, to 
fulfil their obligations in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, issues which have 
grown in importance with the rise in managerialism and the concern with control 
and accountability (e.g. Stronach et al 2002; DoH 1999; UKCC 1999; Perkin 
1989). 
POLICY DEVELOPMENT: NEED FOR CHANGE
Calls for a different form of training and preparation go back several decades; 
reforms proposed by Briggs (1972), after a short delay, informed the proposals 
9made in Project 2000: A New Preparation for Practice (UKCC 1986), which 
placed emphasis on the need to make more explicit the knowledge base 
accessed by nurses in practice (UKCC 1986). Ryan (1989) characterised this 
as a profound change for the status of nursing students: they would now be 
seen as students per se rather than as apprentices, ergo employees. The 
subsequent move into higher education institutions (HEIs) was accompanied by 
profound changes in the way nursing knowledge and practice was articulated 
(Chandler 1991; Sutton 1996). Previously, practice was characterised by a 
technical-practical model, based on a system of apprenticeship learning (Ryan 
1989): students were assessed mainly on the basis of clinical activity in situ. 
This record and representation of the nurse’s abilities was supplemented by a 
relatively short written form of examination concerned with a range of clinical 
conditions or underpinning knowledge. This in turn focused primarily on disease 
and a range of common nursing interventions, at a time when nursing 
knowledge was subordinated to medicine, and characterised as low-status 
female work (Lorentzon 1990). 
With the introduction of the HE Diploma initial qualification programmes placed 
greater emphasis on assessment of academic achievement as a deliberate 
policy following Project 2000 guidelines. This has been judged to be an 
explicitly academic characterisation of practice (UKCC 1999; Gilmore 1998; 
Gerrish et al. 1997; Ryan 1989), using a wider set of criteria for success than its 
predecessor model. The intention of this new form of preparation was strongly 
supported in Government policy on the grounds that there was a need to 
ensure that practitioners were adequately prepared for the increasing and 
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changing demands of the health service of the future. However, it is a widely
held view that the format was more representative of how educationalists and 
theorists think about nursing work than of the views of practitioners, who, it has 
been claimed, regard them with some scepticism (UKCC 1999; Payne 1997; 
White 1986). Thus, the basis of further policy change was already erupting from 
this fundamental innovation.
It is also interesting to note that the change in the nature of nurse education 
occurred at a time when professions were being challenged to make their 
expertise more explicit and measurable, in the interest of greater public 
accountability (Chandler 1991). Universities were under pressure to make their 
programmes more vocationally relevant, and more obviously useful to the 
workplace. This meant, of course, that outcomes, intentions and practices 
needed to be made more measurable, while nursing education was about to 
become more academic. Following the alleged failure of the Project 2000 model 
of training (UKCC 1999), policy has been further modified, to install an explicitly 
outcomes-led, competency-based approach to curriculum development, more 
in keeping with the prevailing discourse of accountability and utility. 
Policy: consensus or imposition?
However, views on the nature of policy formation are divided. Colebatch (1998) 
and Freidson (1994) take the view that, rather than ever being definitive, it is 
constantly being re-formed, ultimately determined by the interactions between 
interested parties. According to Colebatch (1998), for instance, policy is a 
dynamic process in which statements are made, reacted to, and modified over 
11
time. From this perspective it involves statements of preference emanating from 
multiple sources, so that, though presented in more or less definitive terms, it 
eventually comprises and accommodates multiple perspectives. As an 
example, reviews of nurse education provision (UKCC 1986, 1999) took 
soundings from anyone termed a stakeholder, professional or otherwise. Thus, 
it could be said that dissatisfaction with the format for training, combined in the 
case of Project 2000 with the incongruity of the timing of the move into HE, led 
to change which was representative of, or a compromise between, the interests 
of all parties. Policy was then formulated, leading to guidelines for curriculum 
development and awards (NHSE 1999; WNB 1995a), or to standards for health 
care delivery by newly qualified practitioners (DoH 1999; NAW 1999) agreeable 
to all. 
This is, however, a benign view of the process, which ignores the effect of 
power relations amongst those involved. The culture of nursing has been 
characterised as one of surveillance (Pask 1995: reviewed in more detail 
below), in which dissent has been actively discouraged. It is therefore unlikely 
that beliefs at odds with the prevailing view will be aired publicly for fear of 
punitive sanctions. In exploring this problem I found Bauman’s (1999) model of 
the policy process useful as a way of conceptualising it. He describes an 
ancient model composed of the Ecclesia, or policy-making body, the Oikos, the 
private individual or household, and the Agora, the market place or public 
forum. Policy is formulated to provide direction for individual social action, and 
to maintain order and social cohesion (Colebatch 1998). Bauman (1999) argues 
that there has always been an acknowledged and proper place in this process 
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for public discussion and debate – the Agora – in which differences with, and 
challenges to, policy could be worked out. However, he considers that the latter 
has been lost in the current climate, suggesting that it has been attacked from 
the site of the Oikos. In the context of the system and traditions of governance 
in nursing the Agora can be seen to be absent, but in this case, I suggest, the 
primary influence comes from the site of the Ecclesia, and this has implications 
for the representativeness of published policy.
Following an argument presented by Heiskala (2001) the balance of the effects 
of power will depend on the possession, or belief in the possession, of a 
winning strategy by one or other in the relationship. Heiskala draws on 
Foucault’s concept of power to develop a model which moves away from a 
conventional zero-sum game, adopting the argument that several conditions 
apply in a power relation. There is always a game or strategic analysis of a 
given problem present; there is an absence of violence, though constraints on 
action still operate; relations are institutionalised and rationalised, that is, there 
are (discursively) established means of interaction; and a power relation is not 
the only type of relation between those involved. There is always the option 
(freedom) for those involved to resist the desires of the other, even though the 
actions of a will re-order the actions or possibilities for b. Without the freedom to 
resist, Foucault argues that the relation is one of mere domination (Hindess 
1996).
Thus, although extensive consultation is undertaken with practitioners prior to 
the introduction of new requirements, this is unlikely to generate substantial 
13
dissent. Where any new policy direction appears to satisfy the interests of one 
or other faction of the group, it will be welcomed; where it is otherwise, it is 
unlikely to meet overt sustained resistance. This is not, however, to say there 
will be no resistance at all in these circumstances (Foucault 1977b, 2002a), and 
more will said about this shortly. Crucially, the effect of the power relations 
between nurses in practice and their managers and governing bodies would 
impede any open discussion or dissent. This has the consequence that a 
genuinely open debate is unlikely to occur, and policy could be imposed as if
generally accepted, since nursing lacks a de facto forum for open debate. The 
traditional governance of nursing seems to fit well with Bauman’s (1999) model 
of the policy formation process.
Nicoll (1999) offers a further critique of conventional policy analysis; on her 
account this has commonly underplayed the interested stance of policy-makers. 
It tends, she considers, to adopt a positivist-realist approach, as though the 
conclusions expressed in policy statements simply reflect how things are, or 
should be. Also taking support from Foucault (e.g. Foucault 2002b), her critique 
makes the important point that those who occupy more powerful positions in the 
hierarchy of influence are consequently more able to influence the dominant 
discourse of need, and are thus more likely to prevail. For my own study, 
changes in the pattern of nurse education are held to have had considerable 
appeal to NHS managers, in the form of a more knowledgeable, ergo skilled, 
workforce; increased reference to competence/ies appeals to the prevailing 
concern with measurability and accountability. The achievement of particular 
goals and the means of their identification are presented in policy as though 
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these were straightforward, self-evident choices. It is interesting that, despite 
the apparently benign tussle suggested by Colebatch (1998), he nonetheless 
argues that policy development normally shows a number of structural features, 
for instance coherence, instrumentality, and hierarchy, concerned respectively 
with organised, goal-orientated implementation, and authority to impose goals 
and actions, a view more in keeping with Heiskala and Nicoll. 
In this respect, Gerrish and colleagues (1997) undertook a review of related 
literature, and an analysis of documentation from nursing and midwifery 
programmes at different levels. This was against the background in which, 
though guided by the same overall policy outcomes, some freedom was 
allowed for each provider institution to interpret requirements in its own way. 
Their study examined programme documents to compare outcomes, and the 
detail of assessment protocols. Not surprisingly they found that there was 
considerable variation in the way each institution had interpreted official 
requirements, so that what was presented to practitioners by way of a guide for 
assessment of practice showed considerable variation. The conclusion drawn 
was that such variability meant that one centre’s programme could not easily be 
compared, or judged equivalent to, another’s. This was considered a flaw in 
provision, since all programmes operate under the same regulatory framework 
(UKCC 1989). 
There is here an explicit expectation that the outcome of each programme 
should be directly comparable. This may be desirable and common enough as 
a policy goal, as Colebatch (1998) suggests, representing coherence, or unity, 
15
in planning and delivery. But, as Barnett (1997) argues, such totalitarian – to 
borrow a term from Bauman (1999) – standardisation is hardly in the interest of 
provoking critical debate as a central part of professional practice; yet this is an 
established principle of higher education, which nursing ostensibly wants to 
embrace. Importantly, in the Gerrish study, the possibility that each institution 
had simply maintained some theoretical consistency with its own interpretation 
of the meaning and implications of the outcomes specified in regulations is 
demoted to a secondary issue at best.
Constructing the policy discourse
The managerialistic characterisation of practice, then, allowed the UKCC’s 
Commission of Enquiry (UKCC 1999) to claim that 1990s nurse education was 
ineffective, through claims that newly qualified practitioners were not competent 
at the point of registration. Concern with technically-defined effectiveness was 
expressed in the context of a general concern with the assessment of 
competence applied to most professions (MacAleer and Hamill 1997). The use 
of the term competence (used almost interchangeably with its more reductionist 
plural form, competencies) in reference to the outcomes of initial training 
programmes, and as a way of characterising nursing practice, grew throughout 
the 1990s (e.g. Chapman 1999; DoH 1999; NHSE 1999; Milligan 1998; 
MacAleer and Hamill 1997; Phillips et al 1994; Bedford et al 1993). Much of 
what was written over the decade prior to publication of the Peach report 
(UKCC 1999) was concerned with the definition and measurement of 
competence, the primary driver in measuring effectiveness.
16
The choice of terminology in nursing seems to have been influenced by the 
publication of Benner’s influential text From Novice To Expert (Benner 1984). In 
what she characterises as a phenomenological approach to studying nursing –
hence in a search for the essence of excellence in practice – she used self-
reported exemplars in which the individual practitioner had, by her own account, 
made a difference. Through this Benner sought to illustrate how nursing 
expertise develops following initial qualification, differentiating between the rule-
bound judgements made by junior clinicians and a more intuitive – embodied –
form of knowledge utilised by experienced practitioners. She applied the term 
competence to the stage of development when the application of rules to 
situations becomes less stilted, and action therefore more fluent. 
As initially adopted in nursing in the UK, the term referred loosely to the thirteen 
learning outcomes specified in regulations by the UKCC (1989), even though 
the term does not actually appear in these. That Benner’s research used 
qualified nurses as respondents has been forgotten – or, from a Foucauldian 
perspective (e.g. Foucault 2002a), excluded – in the construction of the 
discourse of practice. Similarly, the point that novice practitioners, according to 
Benner, still access and utilise rules to guide action has been overlooked. In a 
rare enough example from the wider literature, acknowledging initial 
qualification as the starting point for Benner’s characterisation, Daley (1998) 
comments, 
In studies with nurses and pilots it was found that novice 
professionals tend to govern their practice with rule-oriented behavior 
… Since novices have little experience with real situations they must 
rely on the rules they have learned in their prepatory [sic] education 
to function. (www.edst.educ.ubc.ca/aerc/1998/98daley.htm)
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Daley recognises that Benner’s work has implications for post-registration 
educational programmes, but UK policy on nurse education failed to identify 
(ignored) this, and simply adopted the novice to expert model of progression as 
the basis of design for pre-registration programmes. In this sense at least the 
term is out of place. Its use has led gradually to more prescriptive guidelines for 
pre-registration programmes (e.g. WNB 1995a, 1995b; UKCC 1999; DoH 1999; 
NAW 2001) with a requirement that educational institutions ensure that 
students are achieving required competencies, implying that these are clearly 
enough defined and essential to good nursing practice, at the point of 
qualification.
Control and the discipline of nursing
The increasing orientation to technical descriptors to specify training outcomes 
serves potentially two functions. First, it articulates practice in an apparently 
rational way, making practice knowledge both explicit and measurable. It also 
produces a greater degree of control over the workforce – rendered more 
predictable, with variation and risk reduced – than the more open, flexible 
approach espoused by the contemporary (viz. higher education) model for 
training. It might be argued that the increase in criticality promoted in the newer 
model of nursing courses had produced a less compliant practitioner (though 
not necessarily a less competent one) in need of containment. Technical 
specifications (understood as more explicitly rule governed behaviour) take on 
the appearance of disciplinary (ergo professional, in its contemporary usage) 
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knowledge, while allowing the exercise of greater control, as Foucault illustrates 
in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1977a).
Thus, the growing emphasis on competencies throughout the 1990s, and the 
subsequent consultation prior to the introduction of a new curriculum, are 
arguably only superficially an example of interactive policy development, 
implying that an agreed understanding of what is involved has been achieved. 
Given the dissatisfaction expressed, formally and anecdotally, about Project 
2000 programmes (UKCC 1999; Payne 1997), these policy developments show 
a subtle form of coercion (cf. Nixon et al. 1997). Much of what is taken as 
agreement simply ignores the possibility that power relations play a part in how 
or whether views are expressed, and in the relative influence that these 
different views might have in determining policy. Unless practitioners are 
genuinely signed up to current requirements, it is possible that there will be no 
change in individual practices during assessment, regardless of what is 
recorded on paper; variability in performance is likely to persist.
The policy development process becomes more invidious when seen from this 
point of view: members of a group are encouraged to internalise such 
specifications and values, ostensibly as a part of their professional being
(Fournier 1999; Lorentzon 1990; Foucault 1977a, 2000). On this account, the 
responsible practitioner will come to monitor her or his own practices using 
imposed criteria for acceptability: policing a self defined by others. 
Responsibility for others’ development is undertaken on behalf of those 
hierarchically superior, rather than in the interest of the student per se, with the 
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purpose of reproducing the externally defined good self. Foucault (1977a) 
illustrates this point in his account of the surveillance of prisoners: being 
watched without being able to determine whether or not this is the case. Rules 
are given, expectations are set, and subjects adopt others’ requirements to 
govern their behaviour. Action outside these parameters is problematic (though,
as I shall argue later, not impossible). While Foucault’s examples come from 
penal and militaristic sources, the point sits easily within nursing – as a formal 
occupational body grown out of military adventure, and adopting many of its 
hierarchical mores – where, traditionally, strong disciplinary controls have been 
in place since its inception as a formally trained workforce.
An interesting example of this is available in work undertaken by Pask (1995), 
who illustrated that the self-monitoring tendency still applies, whereby 
practitioners give priority to the potential risk to themselves of disciplinary 
action, if their clinical decisions are not accepted by senior colleagues. Pask 
explored clinical practitioners’ ways of making clinical decisions, through a 
combination of observation and follow-up interview, asking to what extent their 
decisions were a response to their interpretation of individual clinical problems 
(i.e. based on professional judgement), and how the decision to act in a given 
way was reached. Another way of understanding this is that she was interested 
in the kind of knowledge accessed in decision-making. She found that in 
practice they did not always do what they thought would be the right thing in the 
circumstances, if, for example, this involved significant variation from stated 
protocols. Instead, they would comply with a written protocol, in a manner 
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described as looking over their shoulder: being called upon to justify variation 
was considered too threatening. 
So whose knowledge counts?
Pask is clearly allowing that there are different versions of knowledge at work 
here, and that different readings of the whole situation will influence how an 
individual acts: that is, action is not undertaken without reference to context. 
The disturbing (though perhaps not entirely unexpected) conclusion was that 
practitioners operate within official guidelines even though they consider them 
restrictive. This creates the appearance of professional behaviour, managerially 
defined (Fournier 1999; Shain and Gleeson 1999), yet their reasons, invisible to 
simple observation, reflect mere compliance rather than internalisation or 
conviction. This understanding of Pask’s findings shows similarities with the 
discourse analytic perspective advocated by Anderson et al. (2001) and Potter 
(1996), in which attributions made by observers are influenced by their 
awareness of the implications of their statements for their own status. (See 
below for a more detailed consideration of Anderson et al.’s study.)
There are some similarities here with Giddens’ notions of practical and 
discursive consciousness: awareness of what the situation demands, arising 
from individual experience, and awareness of what is discursively permitted 
(Giddens 1984). The strength of the discursive presence can be seen in Pask’s 
analysis. On the one hand, practitioners make clinical judgements by reference 
to criteria different from those presented in protocols; on the other, they choose 
not to display these openly. That is, their actions are governed by the dominant 
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play of another – the winning strategy (sanctions against the practitioner), as 
Heiskala (2001) might say. Thus, decisions for action come from practitioners’ 
situated understanding weighed against their discursive consciousness, and the 
potential cost to them of non-compliance. Hence, their understanding of the 
situations they encounter encourages transgression of the boundaries of 
accepted wisdom (Foucault 1997b); but their desire not to be constrained by 
the prevailing view in this case remains a private affair. Having covertly 
explored the possibilities of transgression, they move back within the given 
boundaries, since they will be unable to make their case stick. Such a move 
sustains the prevailing view of knowledge in a process reminiscent of Giddens’ 
duality in structuration. 
So it seems that here, practice from a practitioner point of view needs to be 
understood by reference to different criteria than the publicly stated inscriptions 
of good professional behaviour (cf. Fournier 1999). This invokes a less 
universal understanding of the kind of knowledge accessed by practitioners, an 
understanding more akin to traditionally defined professionalism (cf. Ohlen and 
Segesten 1998; Banks 1996; Freidson 1994). If organisationally defined 
protocols are understood as examples of the thing to do in given circumstances 
– that is, they represent the clinical application of competencies – then they are 
problematic for Pask’s practitioners. Indeed, it is notable that one service 
provider (though not the only respondent expressing difficulty in this respect) 
cited by Peach in his final report to UKCC, comments that
Competence at registration will change over time as roles and 
functions develop in response to many drivers affecting the provision 
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of health care. It is not the nature of professional work to define it by 
tasks and skills. (UKCC 1999, para. 4.63, p. 44)
Interest and representation 
A Foucauldian analysis of policy development in nurse education points to 
domination by those whose interest is managerialist in nature (Foucault 2002a). 
Managers and other policy-makers – both government, and a governing body 
whose remit is set by statute – can direct the public discourse of practice 
through a greater opportunity to influence the language in which it is expressed. 
Thus, good practice has come to be associated, or is even synonymous, with 
the terminology of a new form of professionalism, concerned with 
accountability, measurability, effectiveness, and efficiency, ostensibly 
encapsulated in the term competence/y, established through repetition and the 
exclusion of other terminology. However, in this usage, as Shain and Gleeson 
(1999, p. 450) so eloquently put it in their critique of changes within further 
education, “ ‘professional’ is used as a[n] … adjective that is uncoupled 
semantically from professionalism …” to indicate an efficient, business-like 
approach to work. Delivery-focused ability is easier to identify than client-
centred professional judgement, for instance. The juxtaposition of Benner’s 
terminology – which confers credibility – and the increasing focus on 
competencies as the managerialist movement took hold (Barnett 1997; Wolf 
1995; Perkin 1989) brought the terminology of competence fully into the 
language of nursing, as a taken for granted, legitimate entity.
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Foucault (1977a) has shown how this approach can be understood as 
operating in the interest of those who wish to obtain control over others, through 
his analysis of the historical application of ‘discipline’. The potential of the 
multiple meanings of discipline, even in its English translation, is worth keeping 
in mind here: discipline as (self-)control; discipline as punishment; discipline as 
a discrete defined body of knowledge. He has shown how individuals are 
shaped and constituted by influential others: good practice is captured by 
detailed prescriptions of action, just as competent practice is held to be 
captured in the present context by competencies. Appropriation of the definition 
of a body of knowledge and practice effects control of one group by another, 
and brings the potential for the application of sanctions. In this sense, at least, 
influential groups can obtain control over others, including how they define 
themselves.
Since the adoption by the NHS, in 1997, of funding responsibility for all pre-
registration nursing programmes, the NHS has not only an interest in 
programme outcomes, but the opportunity, through control of finances for the 
whole nurse education project, to dominate debates about the nature of 
practice for which its trainees are to be prepared. In formulating policy which 
claims the support of the more traditionalist body of practitioners (managers 
and clinicians: Payne 1997) it strengthens its authority in demanding change, 
and leads the construction of a more technical-rational discourse of practice to 
replace the more academic version promoted through Project 2000. In the 
guise of a negotiated solution, and using the language of a redefined 
professionalism, it imposes its plans for the nursing workforce. Thus, where 
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Nixon et al. (1997) point optimistically to a version of professionalism in which 
activity is characterised as interactional and negotiative, Colebatch’s (1998) 
suggestion seems more accurate: that hierarchy is often invoked when creating 
the strategy for action, and combines powerfully in the present context with the 
appropriated authority of the dominant players to shape professional activity, 
through a coercive, rather than negotiative, process. 
That the term competency/ies – hence the technicised version of nursing 
practice – was becoming established in the language of practice was signalled 
most clearly by a major study commissioned by the English National Board for 
Nursing Midwifery and Health Visiting (ENB) in 1991. Undertaken by Bedford 
and colleagues, it explored assessment of practice within the new Project 2000 
programmes (Bedford et al 1993); the research report was published 2 years 
later, and followed in 1994 by a further report making recommendations for 
practice assessment (Phillips et al 1994). The study will be reviewed in more 
detail in the next section. However, its importance in the present discussion is 
evident in the title of the project: “Assessment of Competencies in Nursing and 
Midwifery Education and Training (the ACE Project)” (italics added). The study 
is one of the first explicitly to refer to the outcomes of nurse educational 
programmes as competencies, even though UKCC regulations at this time had 
only set down a number of learning outcomes (UKCC 1989). It is notable that 
these were considerably broader than the generally understood concept of 
competencies (e.g. Wolf 1995), and only three of the thirteen were actually 
based in practical application (Whittington and Boore 1989).
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The adoption of this technicised, ostensibly measurable, model of practice has 
implications for both nurse teachers and clinical practitioners. It is not merely a 
convenient way of expressing the manifestation of nursing knowledge and 
practice; it delimits what needs to be known or shown by restricting it to the 
ostensibly measurable. A focus on competencies as a representation of 
practice, as I will show below, is an impoverished and weak way of 
characterising nursing practice, and runs counter to its claims to be a complex, 
holistic kind of work. For teachers, it has the potential to render them little more 
than production engineers; clinical practitioners become technicians, working 
with a technical-rational model which underestimates and decontextualises their 
work. 
COMPETENCE AND PROFESSIONALISM
Girot (1993) would have it that the concept of competence is over-defined; the 
plethora of investigations, to define it better, would suggest that it is ill-defined. 
Both cases are likely to lead to contradiction and confusion in use, as Gerrish et 
al and others have testified. Nevertheless, it is now interwoven with discussions 
of professionalism and accountability, and so we find the organisational 
priorities of the DoH to be highly visible in key policy-informing documents 
(UKCC 1999; DoH 1999; NHSE 1999): explicit references to job capability, 
standardised outcomes, practice-relevant material, transferability, differentiated 
levels of training, and production of better health outcomes. These notions are 
subsumed within the concept of competence, which is then claimed as the 
visible representation of the core of practice, rendering practice publicly 
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accountable, and making its essence explicit. The approach transforms 
professional practice into a collection of ways of deploying predetermined 
knowledge and procedures. By implication, since competence/y is the visible 
representation of acceptable practice, then it must be capable of being found.
However, the use of the competency model to represent professional work has 
been strongly criticised by Fournier (1999), who argues that competency 
statements instead, and within a discourse of professionalism, function as 
inscriptions of appropriate professional conduct, defined within organisationally 
determined boundaries. Practitioner autonomy is thus circumscribed through 
behavioural specification. Fournier’s argument is based on a study of the way 
professional practice (in a business context) is identified through competencies. 
She found that competency statements were derived predominantly from 
personal attributes, not actions, but were then presented as specifications of 
professional behaviour. In this section I will examine definitions of competence 
as representations of capability, and review a number of studies examining the 
process of assessing competence in the context of nursing education.
The problem of definition
The final report of the Commission of Enquiry (UKCC 1999) distinguished 3 
types of capability. It referred to fitness for practice (as suitability for admission 
to the professional register); fitness for purpose (that is, to undertake the role 
expected of them by the NHS as the major sponsor of nurse training, and 
employer of its graduands); and fitness for award (as the academic judgement 
warranting the award of a particular qualification). These are interesting 
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distinctions when viewed against a background of increasing concern with 
competence. It is not entirely clear how the first two differ, other than 
superficially, since the purpose of the first is to enable the second, while the 
third is part and parcel of the process of registration and recognition as a nurse. 
It also applies at two levels while still allowing access to the register and to 
employment. Thus the categories are unavoidably intertwined, and the notion of 
competence must apply to all three: to be considered competent is to be 
considered acceptable as a nurse (or, for the student, as a becoming-nurse). 
Without competence, an applicant cannot be admitted to the register; and 
without registration a person cannot be employed as a nurse. Without the 
award, neither of these is an issue. Hence, the assessment of competence 
applies in effect to the combined interest of practice and purpose and award 
with equal emphasis, and anticipates a more global judgement than is implied 
by its presentation in competencies; the latter has merely been euphemistically 
renamed fitness for practice.
Attempts to bring precision and consistency to the concept have singularly 
failed, yet over time the term has come to be used as though it has a clear, 
shared understanding, is visible in measurable activity, and it is only the poverty 
of our attempts to describe it that gets in the way. Pursuit of this holy grail has 
been undertaken despite Wolf’s conclusion (Wolf 1995), that competencies 
have come to be acknowledged as profoundly problematic when converted into 
action statements. She observes that, given the exponential way that criteria 
developed over the preceding two decades to specify competencies more and 
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more completely, the “arbitrary quality of many decisions about [original 
statements of] content and standards” is revealed (ibid. p.106). 
In the context of nursing practice the term also presents a contradiction: to 
claim that nursing is holistic (a good but possibly unpredictable thing) is 
incompatible with defining its practices in self-limiting competency statements 
(better for accountability). Close specifications contradict the self-critical goal of 
reform in nurse education. It is worth emphasising that current training is 
concerned with developing the ability to problem-solve, not simply to reproduce 
responses. As Purdey (1997) comments, 
... the competency model is geared to the 'reproduction' of competent 
nurses (sic), rather than the development of critically minded and 
potentially disruptive thinkers, who might choose to question the said 
qualities of 'competent' nurses (p. 199). 
Disallowing practitioners the flexibility to make situated judgements implies that 
they cannot justify their actions, or determine what range of possibilities is 
available, a position reminiscent of Pask’s comments on trust as an essential 
component of practice. Training people for competence in this narrower way 
appears to liberate learners from the burden of putatively irrelevant material, but 
actually increases control over them (Usher and Edwards 1994). Flexibility in 
defining acceptability for practice – whether publicly declared or not – both 
acknowledges the context-dependent nature of nursing more authentically, and 
possibly provides a covert means of wresting some degree of control back to 
the practitioner. Close specifications of competence exclude the possibility of 
imaginative responding and thinking. There are links here to Foucault’s ideas 
on transgression of the boundaries of knowledge (Foucault 1977b), and to 
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Deleuze’s metaphor of lines of flight (Deleuze and Guattari 1988): there are no 
ties to a fixed location when making sense of the social (clinical) world. 
Chasing rainbows (1): the pursuit of nursing competence/ies
To date, attempts to tie down practice competence/ies have been akin to trying 
to capture rainbows. Studies of practice assessment on this basis have 
generally fallen into two camps. There are those that focus on the problems of 
interpreting and applying existing protocols based on interpretations of UKCC 
learning outcomes (e.g. Gilmore 1998; Gerrish et al. 1997; Bedford et al 1993). 
Then there are those that have sought to develop solutions, either in the form of 
better competency schedules (e.g. DoH 1999; ICHD 1998; Cox et al 1998), or 
in the manner of their application (e.g. Neary 2001; MacAleer and Hamill 1997;
Fox-Young 1995; Phillips et al 1994). There is another strand of literature which 
has addressed itself to the appropriateness or otherwise of competency-based 
practice assessment. Indeed, the problems highlighted by this latter strand 
seem to be confirmed (even if retrospectively) by the investigations of 
effectiveness, consistency, and attempts at clarification. The arguments against 
competency-based assessment are consistent: they are based on the 
difficulties inherent in a technical-rational understanding of practice (Milligan 
1998; Purdey 1997), which deploys narrow, static, acontextual descriptors of 
ability (Chapman 1999; Wolf 1995) in order to capture a complex practice with 
precision.
Bedford et al (1993), in the suggestively titled ACE Project, undertook a wide-
ranging investigation over a period of 2 years, to examine whether current tools 
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and practices were effective in the assessment of the integration of theory 
learned with practice undertaken. To do this they explored the collection of 
evidence of assessment of learning, and reflection upon it. They used a range 
of strategies, including observation of practice and interview, acknowledging 
both the given elements of assessment, and those which implicated more 
interactive parts of the process. However, it is not clear whether this 
acknowledgement was of the possibility that practitioners involved in an 
interactive, dialogic process might have their own constructions of what counted 
as the focus of judgement; or whether they were simply negotiating an outcome 
based on given criteria. This study, as with most others exploring learner 
assessment in clinical settings, appears to accept the documentary givens, 
statements of what is to be achieved, as valid. Hence the study is primarily 
aimed at identifying the complexities of interpretation at the point of determining 
whether a student had achieved a satisfactory level of practice. Amongst the 
findings was the apparently greater effectiveness of assessment when the 
process involved dialogue between assessor and student, and when the 
opportunity for this was built into the programme and its assessment 
documentation. However, they also concluded – and this is a potentially crucial 
issue given the centrality of the clinical practitioner’s role in student assessment 
(WNB 1997) – that preparation of assessors of practice did not commonly offer 
the opportunity to engage in the kind of critical, reflective process expected of 
students within these new forms of training.
There is a number of implications here. First, as MacAleer and Hamill (1997) 
rightly comment in their own study (reviewed below), dialogue involves 
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negotiation between (at least) two standpoints. What appears to be the case in 
Bedford et al’s findings is that this dialogue is based on the given formulation of 
what will be taken to represent an acceptable level of practice development. 
This does not obviously take into account the more personal model of 
acceptability possibly operated by the practitioner, but relates only to his or her 
interpretation of what is already written. Second, dialogic engagement is 
necessary for the assessment of competence in cognitive skills, as well as 
more general clinical skills, and for the assessment of students’ ability to 
critique their own practices. Importantly, as MacAleer and Hamill recognise, 
practitioners who have learned their own nursing practice in programmes 
established predominantly at (higher education’s) level one will not necessarily
take a broader perspective automatically, even with experience, despite the 
practical problem-solving expertise to be gained as a result of time in practice. 
Third, if this critical faculty is missing, it is possible that judgements applied by 
individual practitioners will be informed by their own preferred (i.e. personal) 
models of practice, rather than by official guidelines, particularly when at least 
some of the official values – the technical-rational or academic characterisation 
of practice – are not shared by practitioners (cf. UKCC 1999; Payne 1997), and 
will thus be informed by interests other than those of official intentions.
The research team followed up their study a year later by a series of 
recommendations for the improvement of practice-based assessment (Phillips 
et al 1994). Based on their findings, the final conclusions highlighted the 
inevitable intrusion of subjectivity into assessment judgements, and that two 
assessors are rarely looking for exactly the same thing when judging student 
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competence. It is recognised that people will always draw on their own 
experience as well as on official guidelines and assessment schedules in such 
circumstances. Phillips et al acknowledged this as an inherent part of 
professional judgement, and consequently advocated accepting it, given the 
context-dependent nature of judgements of appropriate responding in care 
delivery. To enhance the robustness of judgements multiple sources of 
subjective perceptions should be accommodated, they suggest. However, this 
subjectivity applies, it appears, to the interpretation of the givens of assessment 
documentation only. It does not necessarily allow that, if practitioners have their 
own internal model of what constitutes acceptable practice in an aspiring nurse, 
then, regardless of what official requirements stipulate, this may be what leads 
the judgement. In light of Pask’s (1995) study of clinical decision-making, and 
Fish and Coles’ (1998) work on professional judgement (see below) this is more 
likely to be the case, although it will not actually be recorded. Personal 
perceptions are unlikely to be exposed to public scrutiny, and so judgements 
will merely be recorded in language taken from official guidelines, yet actual 
performance may vary across individuals so described.
Subsequently, Neary has proposed a model of ‘responsive assessment’ to 
accommodate the fluid nature of clinical situations, and the dissatisfaction with 
existing protocols (Neary 2001). Her work spans the 1990s and culminates in 
this model for assessment, adopting both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to data collection and analysis. She contrasts the two approaches 
by reference to the need to understand problems, not simply provide a tool for 
testing or prediction. Amongst the findings reported from her earlier work is the 
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not unpredictable revelation that many practitioners colluded with students in 
simply ticking boxes to satisfy the training colleges. Outside this requirement, 
there was evidence that they engaged in some (to them) more meaningful 
dialogue about actual performance. Hence the students’ records had neither 
validity nor reliability in their application – neither in the conventional sense 
attaching to positivistic enquiry, nor in terms of, for example, Hammersley’s 
(1989) criteria for qualitative enquiry – despite their being based on explicit 
outcomes. Students also felt that they encountered a definite discrepancy 
between “practice reality and college ideals” (p.5), remarkably reminiscent of 
Melia’s (1987) study of occupational socialisation. Unfortunately there is no way 
of knowing exactly what the content of the unrecorded discussions had been, 
nor where the discrepancy might come from, other than what are reported as 
“the use of arbitrary criteria and inappropriate personal opinions” (p.6). An 
important problem here, not addressed in Neary’s paper, is that what 
constitutes “inappropriate personal opinions” to an uninformed outsider (or 
perhaps novice) may be a situated and informed judgement to the experienced 
observer. She rightly points to the control exercised by practitioners over the 
assessment process and outcomes, but apparently without recognising the 
influential part played by personal beliefs and values even within a professional 
context.
That this is influential is demonstrated by Fish and Coles (1998), who explored 
clinicians’ decision-making in relation to clinical actions. They invited qualified 
experienced practitioners from a variety of clinical backgrounds to explore and 
write about how they did this. They offer a comparison of the features of what 
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they describe as the technical-rational and the professional artistry approaches 
to characterising practice, and point out that technical-rational descriptions 
(ergo competencies as representing this) ignore (hence, dismiss, devalue, 
exclude) any moral dimension to what is done in practice, or in how judgements 
are made. They are explicit about the orientation they adopt, rejecting 
techniques associated with technical rationalism, and adopt what they describe 
as “critical appreciation” (p.204) as their approach to data analysis. They 
explicitly reject approaches such as content analysis, frequency counts, theme 
identification, choosing instead an ethnomethodological approach, to gain an 
understanding of how their participants use the ‘knowledge tools’ available to 
them (Crotty 1998). Their conclusions were in some ways surprising – not least 
to the participants themselves – inasmuch as their respondents tended to defer 
to what Fish and Coles call personal theory (amalgams of propositional and 
experiential understandings) in preference to the formalised, propositional 
knowledge to which they had been introduced during training. Interestingly, this 
apparently applied across the group of occupations, regardless of specific 
professional orientations.
The exploration is interesting and relevant here for other reasons. While nursing 
practice includes routinised skills and procedures, this is not the totality of its 
nature. In the context of what has been called new public management, and 
policies couched in terms of technical-rational accountability and economic 
efficiency, non-measurable elements will not be counted, since they belong to 
the domain of professional mystery or mythology. But Fish and Coles make an 
important point: that simply because, to date, expertise has not been fashioned 
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in explicit terms, does not mean that it is fictitious. As they comment, it is only 
relatively recently that practitioners have been called upon to articulate their 
practices in this manner; failure in doing this may be due to lack of practice 
rather than absence of knowing. 
Another study, from outside the nursing arena, is instructive in understanding 
how people make judgements about others. Anderson et al (2001) used a 
discursive psychological approach to analysis in an investigation of attributions 
of blame to rape victims. Their study differed from previous studies of 
attribution, in that it avoided the simplistic question and answer format 
associated with this type of investigation. Normally, a brief scenario is 
presented to individual observers, who are asked to make an assessment of 
the extent to which one of the characters in the scenario (the victim) is 
responsible for his/her fate. By contrast, Anderson et al suggest that the 
manner of presentation of questions to be answered potentially limits the range 
of answers considered possible (or permissible) by the experimental subjects. 
Their study therefore presented a series of dyads (always male-female) with the
same scenario, and asked them to discuss it rather than answer questions, with 
their discussion (knowingly) being recorded on audio-tape. They were simply 
asked to try to reach a conclusion about the scenario, rather than to say 
whether the victim was to blame for the outcome.
Their findings were striking in that participants were found to show a high level 
of awareness of the fact that the situation had been set up; that it probably had 
a particular purpose, including to show whether the participants used any 
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stereotyping, for instance, in their attributions; and that there was a tendency (i) 
to compare themselves to the person in the scenario, and (ii) to make 
allowances, by invoking bad luck rather than responsibility, as factors in 
explaining the outcome. While many of the points derived from conventional 
attribution theory were present, these were more actively processed than had 
previously been acknowledged. Thus, what has traditionally been taken as a 
straightforwardly logical matter of adducing obvious evidence, and drawing 
uncomplicated conclusions from this in the manner of the naïve scientist, was 
shown here to be much more sophisticated, and invoked the observer’s own 
interest deliberately prior to stating a conclusion. This understanding concurs
with Potter’s (1996) explanation of the significance of actors’ statements: prior 
to enunciating any claim or position, actors frequently engage in setting 
themselves up as innocent of malevolent intent, or as being only inadvertently 
guilty of such an allegation. In Representing Reality, Potter (1996) is concerned 
to have us understand that individuals are active in constructing themselves as 
having certain roles, rights, and responsibilities, for instance. 
There are two crucial points here, first about how the social world is 
understood, and second, about how we make decisions in the social world. The 
modernist assumption that knowledge of the world can be reduced to a set of 
universal principles, or that a rationalistic form of logic will apply to judgement 
and decision-making within it, is problematic. It is clear that the subjects of Fish 
and Coles’ study were aware of the formal and the personal versions of 
knowledge to which they refer in practice. While superficially, and on entry to 
the study, they stated that they used the theoretical knowledge that was given 
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to them in training, they eventually came to recognise that they had modified 
this in the light of their own experience, and now had to accommodate this 
alongside a more personal understanding. Similarly, Anderson et al’s study 
illustrates that how their subjects made their decisions depended to a large 
extent on who was listening. They were aware of the fact that different 
possibilities are available, and that there may be some consequence for them –
how they would be judged, for instance, by the observer – if they were seen to 
decide on a particular outcome. Finally, they were mindful of the similarity 
between themselves and the fictitious person in the given scenarios, and that 
their judgements might say something about their own culpability or innocence 
in certain circumstances. Once again Giddens’ notion of a practical and a 
discursive consciousness is useful here, but clearly at the level of conscious
awareness: different possibilities are available, but are accessed differently 
according to circumstances. 
Another approach to the identification of competence was undertaken by 
MacAleer and Hamill (1997), who were concerned with teachers’ understanding 
of what they call higher order competence. Their approach differs from most 
others’ in that they recognise at the outset that assessment decisions are 
necessarily the outcome of a dialogue between the assessor and the student; 
that is, assessment is a fluid, socially constructed phenomenon. Using tape-
recorded individual interviews they set out to engage nurse teachers, rather 
than clinical practitioners, in a discussion of how they understood what they 
were looking for, and how this informed their judgement of students. From this 
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they constructed a text through which they came to understand the teachers’ 
conceptions of assessment in this area.
The authors are careful to point out that higher order competence is concerned 
with those “features of professional practice which are deemed to be central to 
the identity of action as nursing action” (p.38), and that this “does not appear to 
be readily reducible to any single set of tasks or skills” (p.37). They also explain 
that they
did not in the first instance endorse any specific definition of the word 
competence but merely gave recognition to the growing use of the 
term competence (p.37).
However, although they make explicit the reason for their use of the term, this 
evades part of the problem. Importantly they fail to consider the possibility that
increased use of the term is a central factor in the development of a new 
discourse of, ergo way of thinking about, practice. Foucault (2002a) has shown 
how hegemonic interests come to be privileged over others through what he 
calls regularities in the dispersion of statements – key references, similar 
claims. The regular appearance and adoption of particular terms to characterise 
ideas builds a dominant view, which legitimises some understandings while de-
legitimising others. Curiously, MacAleer and Hamill acknowledge the impact of 
a changed approach to assessment on future practitioners’ understanding of 
their role, while appearing to acquiesce in the use of this managerialist 
terminology. Unfortunately, by close association with “the concept of 
competence in relation to a national framework for vocational qualifications 
[NVQ]” (p.37) it is difficult to separate their use of the term from the now 
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common reference to cognitive skills (by implication, therefore, measurable) 
underlying practice decisions. 
They report that their teachers expressed their ideas in language which was 
significantly different from that used in official documents. Overall their 
interviewees identified that technical and managerial factors had influenced the 
way nursing is undertaken, but that these were not considered to characterise 
nursing practice. Much of what was said related to the difficulty of describing 
and assessing its relational aspect. Many made statements implicating a more 
personal understanding of practice (cf. Fish and Coles 1998), and the notion of 
gut feeling was introduced with reference to the subjective nature of 
assessment of performance. Their respondents were evidently uncomfortable 
with this, having apparently accepted the need for objectivity without having
identified with it – at least on the basis of their commentaries. They conclude 
that teachers construed higher order competence as more than cognitive skills, 
and incorporated a moral dimension into their understanding of practice. They 
suggest that for this group this kind of competence is “not simply a way of 
knowing but a way of being” (p.99), implying that whatever is being sought 
necessarily involves subjective judgement, not merely technical measurement. 
In this they were uneasy, resulting, the authors suggest, from “a misplaced 
acceptance of the concept of ‘objectivity’”, linked to “the absence of a fully 
developed and respected body of language” (p.100), which would enable these 
teachers to express their judgements in a manner that accords with their 
understanding of practice, a central issue in the context of my own study.
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Chasing rainbows (2): the pursuit of essence
Pursuing an understanding of competence to facilitate its identification and 
measurement accurately and consistently across situations and people has to 
be understood as a search for the essence of practice: the pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow. Foucault (2002a, b) has criticised the search for essence on 
the grounds that the continual regression to some notional point of origin is a 
fruitless task. The process serves to privilege some, and exclude other, 
versions of knowledge, in favour of those who control its production (Potter 
1996). The notion of competence/ies – a reduction to component elements – is 
privileged in the current discourse of practice. It is presented in the guise of 
revealing the elements of good practice, but operates through inclusion of the 
desired (the measurable, e.g. care delivery) and exclusion of the undesired (the 
invisible, e.g. care), because, as Potter tells us, such language does certain 
work for the commentator – in this case, increasing control and predictability. 
According to Foucault, instead of looking for the essence or point of origin of 
our understanding,
We must be ready to receive every moment of discourse in its 
sudden irruption; in that punctuality in which it appears, and in that 
temporal dispersion that enables it to be repeated… Discourse must 
not be referred to the distant presence of the origin, but must be 
treated as and when it occurs (Foucault, 2002a, p.28).
That is, a particular view arises in its particular time and conditions for particular 
purposes. I suggest, given the difficulty of definition rehearsed above, that the 
concept of competence suffers from the same problem. Caring is recognised 
from within its situated operation, rather than being amenable to reductive 
analysis; and the same may be true for competence. At best the term 
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competence in a nursing context remains global, and the term competencies (or 
competences: McMullan et al, 2003) vacillates between the specification of 
activity or performance (e.g. Cox et al 1998) and personal attributes (e.g. IHCD 
1998), but always fails in its purpose. Assessment of competence should not, 
according to published guidelines, become "unduly complex and bureaucratic" 
but should remain "a reliable measure" (WNB 1997, p.1). However, given the 
variability in clinical situations it is difficult to see how, without a considerable 
degree of specification, this aids reliability, unless reliability in turn takes its 
definition from another source than conventional positivistic reasoning.
One might also ask, if Neary’s (2001) “responsive assessment” (p.3) is 
appropriate, why does it need the concept of competencies? Allowing rather 
than resisting its entry into our understanding of competent practice merely 
concedes the territory; allowing practitioners the right to judge according to the 
situation undermines the (assumed) value of prior prescription, shifting the 
locus of control away from managers. If nursing activity is to be specified by a 
series of closely defined competencies, the list is potentially endless – what will 
be included; what distinguishes nursing from other activities? Since the term 
cannot adequately be represented in written statements; since each 
competency cannot be described with sufficient precision to guarantee 
equivalence between individuals and across situations; since its use within a 
nurse education context does not accord with the wider discourse of 
competence (e.g. Jessup 1989) – that is, it does not demonstrate the same 
degree of precision (cf. Winter 1995) – then different interpretations of 
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acceptable performance, determined according to some other criterion than has 
so far been assumed, must be allowed.
That the continued pursuit of precise definition in this context is misdirected is 
well illustrated by Paley (2001). Taking his approach from Foucault’s 
archaeology (Foucault 2002b) he examined a comprehensive bank of literature 
exploring the idea of caring, generally held to be at the core of nursing practice. 
For my own purpose, if caring is the core of nursing, then it must be implicated 
in any discussion of competence. Paley examined the success or otherwise of 
the numerous endeavours to identify the components of caring, including 
studies concerned with concept clarification, or practitioners’ definitions, for 
example. The most striking conclusion, unearthed repeatedly in the works 
reviewed, was the need for further research into the problem! This result, 
though more frankly stated, does not differ significantly from the findings of 
more recent publications on competence. Paley argues that the vigour with 
which the project of clarification has been pursued (ergo our ability to specify 
what exactly we should look for when breaking practice down into its 
component elements for training purposes) was matched only by its 
fruitlessness. Thus, any special claim for the nurse to be the carer par 
excellence founders in a sea of uncertainty, so that others can seek to render it 
more visible, at the same time serving their own interest to gain control of the 
event.
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Chasing rainbows (3): missing the pot of gold
That the problem has lived on throughout the period of the present study is well 
illustrated in a number of recent publications, including more recent proposals 
from NMC. A number of authors have confirmed the problem (e.g. Dolan 2003; 
Watson et al 2002). In a wide-ranging literature review, McMullan et al (2003) 
set out to provide the justification for an ENB commissioned study concerning 
the development of practice portfolios. These are seen as a way of making 
competency-based assessment work. Despite this, the authors demonstrate the 
concept’s inappropriateness as a yardstick, given that there is large-scale lack 
of agreement amongst all who have written about it. Any attempt to capture 
what is meant by an acceptable standard of practice must, they conclude, 
necessarily be more than competencies can represent; yet, somewhat 
bizarrely, they suggest that it be included in any portfolio of work which may 
subsequently be developed – rather than reject it on the basis of its 
demonstrated ineptitude. If its nature cannot be defined, its inclusion cannot be 
any more meaningful than the numerous previous attempts, which have 
patently failed to solve the problem. 
The same point can be taken from other recent work; Dolan (2003) was 
concerned with assessment of competencies using criteria modified from an 
earlier assessment tool in a South Wales university. She comments, rather 
inconsistently with the evidence contained in the body of the paper, that the use 
of competency-based assessment is “reinforced” by the Peach report (UKCC 
1999). This may simply be an unfortunate choice of words, but it would be more 
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accurate to state that the approach was imposed, despite the evidence 
available even at the time of publication of the report itself, and that adduced by 
Dolan, suggesting that agreement on its nature, definition, and implementation 
is far from established. Again, bizarrely, she proposes that it form an important 
part of a practice assessment strategy. 
Ormrod and Casey (2004) examine the educational preparation of qualified 
staff for a particular area of practice, and repeatedly refer to the notion of 
competencies. Their purpose is “to inform the development of a competency 
framework…”, and they include a “review of the nature of competence and 
some of the different models” available (p.256). Again, they show that there is a 
general lack of agreement on its meaning; and (inadvertently or otherwise) that 
the notion is fluid, potentially defined by each individual practitioner (e.g. 
according to circumstances); and that there is a tendency to vacillate between 
personal attributes and task-based skills or performance. Interestingly, the 
uncritical acceptance of prevailing terminology is nicely illustrated in the 
authors’ repeated use of the terms competence and competency/ies 
interchangeably, apparently assuming the same meaning for both; yet for 
McMullan et al (2003) this is not the case, nor is it for several of the authors 
reviewed in their own study.
The inadequacy of available definitions and usage of the term competence/ies 
is summarised by Watson et al (2002), who undertook a systematic literature 
review of work concerned with its definition, clarification, and application. They 
examined an extensive body of literature, both within and without nursing, 
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concerning issues such as validity and reliability, content specificity, its 
distinction from alternative terms such as performance or capability, and its 
utility in practical application; they found the concept wanting, and their 
conclusion is unequivocal. While they found some examples of rigour in 
competency-based assessments, they nonetheless questioned the validity of 
the approach with respect to everyday nursing practice.
Nursing, which has adopted a competence-based training system 
and which has affirmed its affinity for this approach to producing 
nurses, has apparently learned little from the other areas in which 
competence has been tried, tested and to a large extent failed. All of 
the problems of definition, lack of rigour in assessment and tension 
between competence-based training and other educational 
approaches are apparent in the nursing literature. (p.429)
It is encouraging to note that, on the face of it at least, NMC (2004) has chosen 
to replace the terminology of competencies by reference to proficiency; 
however, a glance at the proposal reveals that only the term has changed. 
Statements of achievement remain in place, an identical list of pre-determined 
outcomes. What were previously presented as standards for the achievement 
of competence are now simply reconvened as standards for proficiency, and 
the new term serves only to shift attention away from the failure of its 
predecessor. Regulation remains focused on the endeavour to quantify what 
has consistently eluded quantification (cf. Paley 2001). Changing terminology 
without changing the way of thinking the event of nursing promotes the political 
not the professional interest.
More recently NMC (2005) refers to new registrants’ level of competence, and 
is concerned with specific, so far undefined, practical skills, though the search 
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is on for these. Students’ skills “vary considerably depending upon the 
opportunities they have in training” (ibid. p.3), in which case the intention can 
only be to make something explicit, rather than to make the most of individual 
opportunities in practice, or to capture its complexity. Despite the arguments 
against it, the search for precision looks set to continue: “clearer expectations 
[…] and more effective assessment of competence may reduce the need for the 
performance of specific skills…” (ibid. p.6); and “by adding detailed 
competencies to some proficiencies, we can make clearer the level of 
performance required for safe and effective practice” (ibid. p.9). Such claims do 
not help the problem, as terminology is now thoroughly muddled: skills are 
separated from competence, yet are surely inherent in competencies; 
competence is part of proficiency, yet the terms are not distinguished, and 
outcomes are identical for both. The fruitlessness of the project is shown up. As 
one of Peach’s respondents commented (UKCC 1999), it is inappropriate to 
define professional work in terms of tasks and procedures.
PROFESSIONALISM AND EXPERT KNOWLEDGE
Changing conceptions
The term professionalism has developed a changed emphasis in recent 
decades, as demonstrated by Perkin (1989), such that to talk of professionalism 
now is to talk of how to behave professionally, with practice inscribed in an 
array of competencies or protocols (Fournier 1999). As indicated above, Nixon 
et al (1997) have written more optimistically of a new form of professionalism, 
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based explicitly on negotiated, rather than imposed (even if bona fide) 
agreements between practitioner and client, or between practitioners and 
managers; but this is very different from the historical understanding of the 
term. This section will highlight some aspects of professionalism, and examine 
some of the arguments pertaining to conceptions of it.
Freidson (1994) holds that at the core of professional work is a fiduciary 
relationship with the client, whose interest is held at the centre of practice 
considerations. By buying into a professional interaction, clients enter a 
condition of trust – the element notably absent between nurses and their 
managers, according to Pask (1995) – whereby they defer to the professional’s 
expertise, developed through specialised training, education, and subsequent 
experience, and which marks him or her out from the client. The claim to 
specialised knowledge is highlighted by Freidson in Professional Powers
(Freidson 1986), and much earlier by Etzioni (1969), as key to this 
understanding of professionalism, bringing with it claims to insights not 
possessed by the client. It is important to understand that from this perspective 
professional work is characterised less by references to “tasks and procedures” 
(a description offered by a NHS manager cited by Peach: UKCC 1999, p. 44) 
than by claims to expert understanding of problems, hence needs of the client. 
However, this special status, and its associated autonomy, has become 
problematic with the rise of the demand for greater accountability. As Ozga 
(1988) observed, in relation to the work of schoolteachers, changes in policy, 
while using the rhetoric of greater professionalism, served effectively to 
increase central (government) control over their work.
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Accountability and the requirement to make expert knowledge explicit have 
rendered the power base of the professions much less unassailable. Claims to 
specialist knowledge are especially problematic in nursing, since there is no 
universal agreement on the distinctiveness of nursing knowledge or work. That 
this trend is not simply limited to the UK (or indeed to nursing education) is 
illustrated by McWilliam et al (1999), who have argued, in relation to Australian 
HE, that excellence in teaching is being replaced by an emphasis on enterprise 
and enterprising organisations, such that the excellent academic is the 
enterprising one, in the sense traditionally associated with corporate business 
activity. They comment, for instance, that 
The new curriculum for identity formation is…a radical departure from 
orthodoxy in terms of what knowledge is to be valued, where this 
knowledge comes from and how this knowledge is to be 
disseminated (ibid., p.55).
When activities are driven by business values, it is no accident that 
competencies come to represent practice, in stark contrast with other 
characterisations of professional or higher education (e.g. Barnett 1995). 
McWilliam et al illustrate the change in the dominant discourse away from 
client-centred service (in the sense of emancipation in education, caring in 
health services) in favour of an emphasis on economic and functional values. 
The shift by government from a position of patron to that of buyer of education’s 
products, with the emphasis on economic efficiency, seeks to reconfigure the 
nature of the activity of both teachers and healthcare workers. They comment 
that
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The precise means of doing this is not an open question, but is 
framed within the dominant rationality for constituting best practice 
(McWilliam et al, 1999, p.61). 
This reformulation of professional practice illustrates a particular discourse in 
construction, the elements of which are identifiable as the frequent and 
prominent lauding of the visible and the economic; the association of these with 
the terminology of professionalism; the exclusion of traditional, less easily 
measured notions of care or emancipation; and the redefinition of these 
concepts in terms of delivery and measurement. Its intrusion into everyday 
practice is illustrated by Stronach and colleagues (2002), who have described 
teachers’ and nurses’ reported working experiences in terms of a conflict 
between what they call an ecology – concerns holding priority for practitioners –
and an economy – measurability, efficiency, output – of practice. While the 
latter dominates organisational concerns, the former fits better with 
practitioners’ views of what they are trying to do.
The increasing emphasis on a competency-based version of practice reflects 
the increasing association of managerialism and professionalism, wherein 
professional managers can claim expertise in the deployment of resources, 
human and otherwise, as Perkin (1989) has shown. Two things happen here. 
First, the close association of terms (manager, professional, effectiveness, 
efficiency) constructs a discourse of expertise, which omits or plays down less 
measurable (ergo less accountable) elements of practice. Second, the 
simplification of complex practices by professional managers seeks to make the 
invisible visible (cf. Foucault 1973), allowing greater control and predictability of 
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individual action, an example of what Strathern (2000) calls the “tyranny of 
transparency” (p.309).
Predictability and control, then, come to dominate considerations of practice 
activity in the interest, ostensibly, of consistency and public expectation. A 
central concern expressed by Peach (UKCC 1999) was the inconsistency, at 
completion, of programmes from different institutions, despite centrally defined 
outcomes. Such untidiness is characteristically rejected in rationalist 
conceptions of the social world, but others (e.g. Usher and Edwards 1994) have 
argued that variability is not mere untidiness: it is fundamental to human 
representations of reality. Alternative versions are inevitable, indeed desirable, 
in the panoply of human experience and action. In nurse education policy, 
variability is not seen as inevitable, but as inconvenient misunderstanding, or, 
worse, as non-compliance. In the context of day-to-day practice difference 
operates as a source of strength (Usher and Edwards 1994), since it 
acknowledges the contextual dependence of practice, a view which sits more 
easily with the purpose of nurse educational reform, introduced to produce 
more critically aware practitioners (cf. Barnett 1997; Carr 1995; UKCC 1986).
Thus, the characterisation of practice has become once more dependent on a 
technical-practical understanding (Milligan 1998; Purdey 1997), based on 
narrow, static, acontextual ability (Chapman 1999; Wolf 1995). This 
development uses the rhetoric of professionalism while claiming support from 
clinical (as opposed to educational) practitioners. According nursing 
professional status, and appealing to professional standards and performance 
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in this way, conflates the articulation of nursing knowledge, viewed as an 
emancipatory project, with the ideology and discourse of reductionist scientific 
rationality (Francis 2000), which does not sit easily with the situated nature of 
clinical work.
Nurses’ conceptions of professionalism
Conceptions of professional work in nursing vary from the ability to carry out 
specific procedures efficiently to a concern with shared values and attitudes 
(Wade 1999; Ohlen and Segesten 1998). For instance, Ohlen and Segesten 
(1998) explore the notion of professional identity – that is, how do nurses 
characterise their work and their nursing self – through a comparison of data 
derived from selected respondents and related literature. Their work focuses on 
clinical practitioners, and draws out a distinction between values-based views, 
evidently acquired within an educational setting, and more traditional, task-
orientated views which saw nurses as medical assistants, more consistent with 
practice-as-competencies. The former conception involved characteristics 
widely supported by others, both within and outside nursing. These include
confidence and criticality in pursuing the public interest (Barnett 1997, on higher 
education); recognition of the need to work with others rather than act 
territorially (Nixon et al. 1997, on teaching; Freidson 1994); mutuality in 
occupational decision-making (Morrall 1997, on nurse-doctor co-operation); 
values-based education (Banks 1996, on youth and community education); 
freedom from externally imposed rules (Davies and Lampel 1998, on further 
education; Hodkinson and Issitt 1995, on the problem of competencies); and a 
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high level of specialised education (UKCC 1986, on status and specialist 
knowledge; Peach 1999).
Wade (1999) undertook an examination of nursing literature focusing on 
autonomy as a key element of professional practice, premised on a claim to 
specialist understanding through which it is warranted. While Wade does not 
offer a detailed insight into her assumptions in this, it is consistent with the 
historical perspective on professional work, and with the theorising of others 
(Etzioni 1969; Freidson 1986). Her conclusions bear some comparison with 
Ohlen and Segesten’s study in that discretionary decision-making – freedom to 
vary decisions according to their reading of the situation – was identified as 
crucial; but she also found that collegial interdependence (cf. Nixon et al. 1997, 
Morrall 1997) and affiliative relationships with clients (cf. Freidson 1994, Pask 
1995) were important. Wade found that a lesser degree of autonomy was 
associated with initial training programmes with a practical skills focus – closer 
to a competency-based approach. It is possible to suggest that if autonomy (as 
the right to influence practice through negotiation: Nixon et al. 1997) is 
espoused as a professional goal, then nursing must resist a return to skills-
dominated programmes, since this reduces autonomy and narrows the 
definition of practice. 
So what’s the problem?
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) provide a useful way of thinking about this 
problem. In What is Philosophy? they construct a view of knowledge which 
distinguishes purely philosophical concepts from their functive counterparts in 
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the world of science. Philosophical concepts are defined as abstract events, 
constructions to which we will aspire in understanding the world; these are 
never true or false, they simply exist as attempts to describe possibilities. By 
contrast functive concepts have consequences: they are testable against 
particular criteria; they operate as states of affairs and can be declared true or 
false. Drummond (2002) provides a pertinent example of this distinction. Citing 
Paley’s (2001) archaeology of caring knowledge he argues that care, as the 
characterisation of nursing, operates at the level of the virtual or philosophical, 
and defies actualisation. Caring, as its functive counterpart refers to the delivery 
of procedures, which, as a state of affairs, is measurable. Deleuze’s distinction 
allows us, in this instance, to think the event called nursing, and recognise our 
practical, empirical, consequential attempts to translate the virtual into a state of 
affairs. 
The problem is that the two – the philosophical concept and the functive – are 
often conflated. Care, as virtual, releases – deterritorialises in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1988) terms – the event from attempts at containment by others – in 
this instance, by managers, organisations, policy-makers. The tension between 
these two interests can be understood as 
the plane of a struggle for different ways of thinking the event we call 
nursing, where different parties seek to introduce different elements 
onto the plane of the concept to gain control of that event. 
(Drummond 2002, p. 232, emphasis added). 
Similarly, competence, understood as a global concept, a virtual through which 
we try to think the event of (acceptable) nursing practice, is subject to a struggle 
for control. Attempting to make explicit the kind of thing to be sought is not the 
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same as following a prior specification of what is assumed to be there. The one 
looks for evidence of a type; the other asks whether x has been found, not 
something of the type x.
CONCLUSION 
The concept of competence is at best contested. Its value as evidence of safe 
practice is spurious, since it fails to capture complexity in an integrated form: 
isolated procedural performance cannot equate to judgement or generalised 
capability. It has become strongly associated with notions of measurement, 
through a shift in the discourse of professional practice; at worst it 
misrepresents a complex, situated practice. As Foucault (2002a) would have us 
understand, such a discourse is an irruption of its time and circumstances. It 
seeks to reduce difference and operates in others’ interest. Measurability 
masquerading as professionalism is a function of its time, intended to render 
control to others. Hence, as a means to capture the detail of practice the 
concept is rejected as having no worthwhile substance; analysts and policy-
makers have sought to give it substance, but nothing appears to stick. 
Consequently, it fits better with Deleuze’s notion of a virtual: a concept on a 
plane of immanence, with an indefinite number of elements attaching to it to 
give it its consistency. It remains something to which people aspire without ever 
being able completely to actualise it in a state of affairs (Drummond 2002; 
Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 1988). 
Conceptions of nursing practice vary too much to be adequately captured by 
competency-based models. Policy-makers and the managerial interest have 
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simply sought to territorialize the field to which it belongs, in order to convert it 
to a functive. In the process something has gone missing. All attempts to define 
competence/ies on behalf of policy, and to redefine the nature of professional 
practice, have failed to provide the clarity desired despite increases in their 
detail (cf. Paley 2001; Wolf 1995; Hodkinson and Issitt 1995). Paradoxically 
nurses are trained to care for people in vulnerable situations involving complex 
judgements (UKCC 1999), yet there is a lack of trust in their ability to judge 
students’ actions in situ: in how they deploy what they know, or how they 
extend and develop it. Concern with accountability and measurability, the 
redefining of professionalism (Nixon et al 1997; Perkin 1989; Ozga 1988), and 
inscriptions of professional behaviour in competency statements (Fournier 
1999) seem only to have placed limitations on the identity of nurses and 
nursing. 
The absence of an articulated body of distinctive knowledge to which nursing 
can lay claim makes it easier for the concept of nursing to be defined by others, 
though this does not mean that this will be owned by individual practitioners. As 
Drummond (2002) has argued, attempts to define precisely the concept of care 
as the core of practice treats it as a functive rather than a virtual concept 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994). Similarly, using competence as a functive concept 
limits its potential. Rejecting the reductionist approach to the ascription of 
acceptability to students’ practice means that we can ask instead how 
practitioners make sense of the situation (cf. St Clair 1997). The issue is then 
how they constitute themselves as nurses, and thus what they look for in 
others. 
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Recognising the relationships of power, authority, and control between nurses 
and their managers, their employing organisations, and their governing bodies 
– hence with teachers as trainers – what is said may, in the end, be only that: 
what is said about assessment practices. This research will ask practitioners to 
talk about, and illustrate from experience, how they make their decisions on 
acceptability; it will not look for yet another definition of competence in practice. 
The study seeks to expose practitioners' criteria for ascribing acceptability, why 
these are considered important, and how they are applied or varied, without 
reference to externally defined options. From this it is intended to explore how 
they use what they know; how they think what they do, what sense of identity 
they hold as nurses; and from this whence assessment of practice may be led 
to enjoy a greater sense of ownership than appears to be the case currently. 
Why and how alternative criteria may be used will be important for two reasons. 
First, since assessors are situated in the world within which future registrants 
will be required to practise, they may be locked into a particular perspective on 
it (cf. Carr 1995). Second, given the balance of power in nursing, justifications 
at this level can be dismissed as simply misinformed: in light of the difficulties 
rehearsed above official versions of competence may, in the end, be both 
impracticable for and alien to practitioners. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Orientation and 
Methodology
This study grew from the idea that, whatever practitioners were doing when 
assessing students, it did not seem to be entirely based on the given notion of 
competencies. Sometimes apparently very capable students would receive 
poor practice reports, while others, apparently less able, would receive very 
positive reports. Previous attempts to understand and subsequently address 
the problem of apparent inconsistencies in assessment have generally focused 
on structural factors as barriers to the implementation of given protocols. These 
have included organisational demands, pressures, and constraints on 
practitioners, insufficient clarity in the definition of outcomes provided by 
educational institutions, or inadequate preparation of practitioners for the role, 
for example. Accordingly I had thought it would be useful to obtain a clearer 
understanding of how practitioners themselves defined competence, since 
definitions to date were driven predominantly by policy or professional 
gatekeepers. From this it might be possible to develop a better definition of the 
competencies everyone was looking for, which could be incorporated in 
assessment documents. However, as Chapter 2 has illustrated, a unifying 
definition of this kind is extremely problematic; attempts at clarification have 
conspicuously failed to provide an effective remedy. Additionally, as the 
difficulties identified to date imply, nursing is a socially situated practice, and 
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thus necessarily subject to different influences and interests, and resisting a 
singular construction of its working. 
These considerations led me to an approach which foregrounds localised 
understanding, and allows for differences in the way practitioners identify and 
use their knowledge. This is not to imply a chronic indecision in the assessment 
process, but rather to allow that there may be different versions of knowledge 
and understanding operating according to context. As Andersen (2003) has 
observed, such differences may form a relatively orderly pattern, with the 
important caveat that order should not be conflated with unity. The concept of 
competence as a focus for the study was rejected in favour of the notion of 
acceptability, implying a more open judgement, and leading to a more open 
form of question: what account do practitioners give of acceptability in practice; 
how do they account for any variations? This revised approach will be outlined 
below, along with key points from theories informing the analysis as it 
developed.
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
In summary I set out to try to understand how practitioners accounted for their 
decisions about students’ practice development – why the situation is as it is for 
them (St Clair 1997) – and what this might say about their position vis-à-vis
nursing practice. Associated with this were questions of how they saw 
themselves as nurses; what sense of identity did they claim; how did they 
position themselves within the prevailing discourse of practice, and the 
associated power relations? I do not claim to have revealed some fundamental, 
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phenomenological essence of practice for these practitioners (Johnson 1997; 
Crotty 1996). Instead, what is presented is an account of how they constructed 
their own discourse, accessing different reference points when making 
judgements, constructing and reconstructing themselves according to the 
demands of changing circumstances. In short, the approach to data collection 
and analysis developed to allow that they operated within their own localised 
understanding of nursing practice. This was achieved through an examination 
of their accounts of the decision-making processes involved, which revealed 
differences between the public discourse of nursing and the private practices of 
its members. 
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION AND ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW
It is recognised that assumptions about the nature of the knowledge sought will 
influence the formulation of explanations (e.g. Huberman and Miles 1998). 
Having embarked on the study with the idea that practitioners’ definition of 
competence/ies may simply be more useful than formalised versions, this was 
found to be too positivistic, in that it anticipated a concept that could be 
circumscribed. While the initial analysis drew on correspondence and attribution 
theory (Jones and Davies 1965), as though a straightforward process was 
operating, the discourse analytic perspective adopted subsequently (Anderson 
et al 2001; Edwards and Potter 1995) showed that practitioners’ attributions 
served as a means of articulating their understanding of practice, of themselves 
as nurses, and also as a form of self-defence (Foucault 2000, 2002a). 
Additionally, it revealed what was often experienced as the impossibility of 
decision-making (Derrida 1995). I came to understand that the way practitioners 
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determined students’ acceptability, whilst initially appearing as a rational 
process, was not a fixed entity in all situations, nor indeed the same entity for all 
practitioners: any pattern identified would not necessarily hold for all individuals 
or all situations. Their fluid accounts of knowledge and understanding could be 
understood by reference to the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari (1988, 1994; 
Deleuze 1994). Practitioners and students operate in varying settings; hence, 
they may interact with local conditions in ways which differentiate their actions 
from others’ while maintaining a professionally appropriate approach. Each of 
these aspects will be considered further in the following sections.
To assume that the problem of assessment lies in practitioners’ ability to make 
appropriate judgements implies that practitioners do not understand the nature 
of practice, despite their immersion in it. Similarly, to assume that the problem 
lies in the way criteria are presented implies both that practitioners are not 
capable of recognising increasingly explicit guidelines, and that more detailed 
written criteria will identify the essence of what is sought. Unfortunately, neither 
of these options questions the legitimacy of what is written. Even where 
recommendations have moved towards a dialogical basis for assessment (e.g. 
Neary 2001; MacAleer and Hamill 1997; Phillips et al 1994), the focus of 
dialogue is always ultimately some definable notion of competence/ies to be 
adopted by all. However, given the variability of student-practitioner encounters, 
combined with the problems identified in the last chapter, a third possibility is 
thrown up: that the problem lies in the assumptions behind standardised 
statements in assessment protocols. The source of difficulty may be 
misattributed, and different understandings of practice knowledge may be 
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operating. At the very least there may be factors not so far accounted for which 
influence practitioners’ ascriptions of acceptability. What matters then is how 
they account for their practices, not a search for a fundamental essence.
A dynamic analysis
In the spirit characterised by Schatzman and Strauss (1973) I wanted an open 
stance to whatever data might arise, in trying to understand how practitioners 
made sense of, or accounted for, their practices (St Clair 1997). Stronach and 
MacLure’s (1998) analogy of surfaces folded in on themselves proved useful in 
thinking about this: a continuous surface – smoothly connected reasoning, for 
instance – is often apparent, yet closer examination reveals elements normally 
hidden from view, so that the eventual understanding becomes less obvious. In 
my analysis the initial use of attribution theory revealed what might be seen as 
the smooth surface; subsequent analysis revealed the folds and concealed 
aspects of participants’ stories.
As Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Schatzman and Strauss (1973) point out, 
choices at the various stages of analysis are the researcher’s – my – own, 
based on interpretation of the similarities, differences, and apparent 
significance of elements as they were presented by participants. Given the fluid 
world of clinical practice it was important to allow for the possibility that 
unexpected or inconvenient elements may emerge. Thus, the generalising 
tendency was reversed: such responses were held to be offering something 
alternative, but no less legitimate for that. Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) 
observe that in analysis there is a tendency to assume that elements falling 
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outside the predominant pattern are considered ‘not cases’ (or at least not 
typical) of what is sought. In Western thinking patterning is often accompanied 
by the examination of atypical examples of data to explain their (temporary) 
non-fit with the dominant pattern. This relegates potentially legitimate 
knowledge claims to inferior significance, simply on the basis that they are 
different. Such a tendency was initially evident in my own analysis: a focus on 
apparently privileged criteria, and their linking together as relatively discrete 
categories. Subsequent re-focusing led me to see such elements as examples 
of particular interpretations for particular practitioners usually for particular 
circumstances.
Furthermore, researcher-as-insider assumptions about practitioners’ activities in 
assessment provided a source of potential bias (cf. Goodman 1998). Because 
the enquiry was based on the assumption that practitioners may not be doing 
what official directives require them to do, the questioning style may have 
shown weaknesses not immediately evident in the process of interviewing. To 
help overcome this all interviews were transcribed personally to encourage a 
better appreciation of the nuances of participants’ meaning and implications 
(Fish and Coles 1998; Huberman and Miles 1998). However, Denscombe 
(1998) usefully distinguishes an open mind from a blank mind, implying that 
there is considerable background psychological noise at work. As issues of 
interest appeared in participants’ responses, clarification was sought there and 
then. Again, these decisions were my choice as researcher, based on the 
perception of something as interesting (to me), rather than on the assumption 
that those elements were inherent in some immutable definition of assessment. 
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Initially practitioners’ accounts, in which they appeared to access a particular 
model of the good nurse, could be explained by reference to theories of 
attribution and correspondence (Kelley 1967; Jones and Davies 1965). Viewed 
retrospectively, this assumed that these would be static and discretely held; but 
it subsequently became apparent that practitioners had an interest in utilising a 
certain kind of criteria, a point not entirely evident from the more traditional 
attribution analysis. Thus, it was more useful to take a discourse analytic 
approach to participants’ explanations (Anderson et al 2001; Edwards and 
Potter 1995). 
Later again practitioners’ identification with different, frequently competing, and 
potentially incommensurate, understandings of practice emerged. They 
appeared to construct their own discourse (Foucault 2002a), and engaged in 
what Foucault (1977b) refers to as transgression when articulating their 
understanding. Foucault’s approach to self-constitution (Foucault 2000; 
Rabinow 1984) was drawn on in looking at how practitioners constructed their 
professional selves – what it means to claim to be a nurse – from within this 
discourse. Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas on the nature of knowledge, and their 
distinction between philosophical and functive concepts (Drummond 2002; 
Deleuze and Guattari 1994), were also helpful here. Consequently, the 
profound difficulty of the task at hand – making decisions about students’ 
performances – was revealed when practitioners encountered conflict between 
the general rule and the particular situation or student, and Derrida’s notion of 
undecidability and justice (Derrida 1995; Edgoose 2001) was utilised in 
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examining this. More will be said below about each of the approaches and their 
relevance to the study.
ATTRIBUTION AND CORRESPONDENCE
The analysis commenced with a search for the kind of concepts or criteria 
accessed as characteristic of an acceptable level of student performance, 
following broadly the model of content analysis described by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). In the very early stages this proceeded as though decisions 
about student performance were a straightforward matter, untouched by any 
personal or contextual agenda on the part of the participant. While this initially 
seemed to point to the kind of criteria accessed by individual practitioners, I 
rapidly came to view it as an inappropriately low level of analysis: it simply 
provided a list of things sought as discrete entities, without reference to why 
they might be included. What was needed was a means of understanding how 
they were utilised or varied. Miles and Huberman’s illustration of the technique 
lists some 300 identified items from one of their own studies. These elements 
are subsequently re-formulated into a series of broader categories, as related 
elements in a patterned whole. In the context of my own study, this technique 
presented an unacceptable paradox: in seeking to understand how practitioners 
accounted for what is regarded as a complex and integrated process, its 
reduction to elements isolated from the context in which they are found seemed 
to miss the point. Whether practitioners actually use these elements is always a 
moot point; what was held as important was how practitioners accounted for 
their deployment of such criteria in dealing with complex problems.
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It became evident that practitioners were pointing to the dispositional qualities 
of the student. It was therefore more useful, in explaining this process, to make 
reference to theories of attribution and correspondence (Kelley 1967; Jones 
and Davies 1965). Attribution theory developed from Heider's (1958) work in 
social perception. He proposed a set of rules by which ordinary people attribute 
responsibility to another person for an observed action. Characterised as naïve 
or lay psychology this was subsequently re-worked by Jones and Davies (1965) 
and Kelley (1967). Heider distinguished between internal and external causes 
of actions; both personal and environmental factors are influential, and the 
balance of these leads observers to attribute the cause of an action to the 
individual or to the situation. Kelley (1967) further developed the theory, 
hypothesising other factors that affect the formation of attributions: consistency, 
distinctiveness, and consensus. Jones and Davies (1965) sought to strengthen 
it through their theory of correspondence: the degree of match between choices 
and available options, actions, outcomes, and dispositions, and it is this 
development that was relevant here.
Jones and Davies argue that when an action is out of role, or expectation (e.g. 
when a student nurse adopts what is viewed as disinterested behaviour vis-à-
vis learning about nursing), it is more likely that this corresponds to a personal 
disposition than to role-consistent behaviour. It is to be expected that a student 
nurse would take steps to pursue understanding, skills development, or to 
demonstrate an interest in people. In this situation the display of such highly 
approved actions would not tell much about the individual, since they are 
explained by reference directly to the role’s norms. In short, ‘S/he would do that, 
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wouldn’t s/he?’ However, where apparent disinterest is displayed, the perceiver 
has to take account of other possible explanations, prior to applying an 
unfavourable judgement about the individual’s practice. Otherwise such 
attributions may be deemed unfair or unwarranted. Non-favourable actions – by 
implication, non-favourable dispositions – bring about what Jones and Davies 
(1965) refer to as non-common effects, and thus would seem to have more 
personal meaning if they are undertaken deliberately. This is especially relevant 
in the context of this study, since unfavourable judgements of development may 
affect continuation on the training programme. Only when alternative 
explanations – clinical, educational, or personal – are found unsatisfactory is a 
final judgement applied.
Such reference points as emerged from this approach led briefly to 
consideration of the possibility of sorting criteria into a number of (fairly 
discrete) categories, characteristic of the rationalistic assumptions of traditional 
attribution analysis. However, sorting and categorising became problematic, 
since elements were used in combination and not always consistently, and so 
did not fit discrete categories. Thus a greater complexity than had been 
assumed was revealed. While initially there appeared to be an order of priority 
in the criteria cited, it became evident even at this stage that there was some 
variability in this ordering between participants and between the situations they 
described. The problem of categorising elements gave a new, continuously 
developing direction to my approach to the data.
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Attribution: rationalistic ascription vs deliberative pronouncement
Attribution theory has been criticised latterly for its failure to take into account 
the possibility that individual actors, as observers of others’ behaviours, may 
engage in a more active process than originally thought (Potter and Wetherell 
1987). Typically, experiments illustrating attribution theory have involved a 
number of subjects being asked to ascribe responsibility for a given set of 
events, commonly presented as a scripted scenario accompanied by a set of 
predetermined questions. The outcome of this design was taken to demonstrate 
a system of causal attribution, in which someone was judged responsible for a 
set of events, based on balance of probability that any discrepancies between 
what was expected and what was found must be attributable to an individual 
quality. 
However, it is now held, as Anderson et al (2001) and Edwards and Potter 
(1995) have shown, that this work failed to take into account the possibility that 
people operate as knowledgeable agents. Hence, any conclusions expressed 
by individual subjects are likely to be at least influenced, if not determined, by 
their pre-existing understanding of what is going on, by the conditions under 
which they are reporting their findings, and by the similarity between the 
situation described and their own circumstances. Potter and a number of his co-
workers (e.g. Edwards and Potter 1995; Potter and Wetherell 1987) have been 
particularly vehement in this respect. Potter argues that it is important to look at 
what work is being done by particular formulations when statements are made; 
individuals do not simply report what is there, but will actively position 
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themselves in any given storyline. The relevance of this understanding to my 
own study arises from just these considerations: participants’ awareness of 
their situation in the research process; their relationship with students 
undergoing assessment; their place in the education and training project 
overall; and the implications of their judgements for their own status as 
competent practitioners. This more interest-laden perspective, contrasting with 
the assumption that some fixed truth is being sought, informed the next phase 
of the analysis, and anticipated the subsequent discourse analytic approach.
LOCAL VS. UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE
It is characteristic of a rationalistic view of the world that entities are identifiable, 
controllable, and essentially the same regardless of time and place (Wainwright 
1997), or can be developed to be so. Untidiness, ambiguity, or potential 
randomness are not well tolerated in rationalist conceptions of the social world, 
and are characteristically rejected in favour of clarity (Bauman 1995). Current 
policy in nurse education has promoted such an approach to characterising 
practice, but this approach necessarily assumes – or, more accurately, claims –
that assessment is a rational process, or can be devised as such, as though 
situations and the people in them remain constant. The degree of variability in 
practitioner judgements does not convincingly support this view. Practitioners 
are knowledgeable actors in their world, and necessarily, either individually or 
collectively, already have an understanding of what constitutes a claim to 
acceptable practice (Fish and Coles 1998). 
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One of the core ideas in Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration, in which he 
argues for the interdependence of structure and agency, may throw some light 
on the problem. Giddens argues that individuals act with a certain knowledge of 
situations by virtue of their intimate engagement with and experience of them, 
an idea borrowed and adapted from psychoanalytic theory. This form of 
knowledge, referred to as practical consciousness, is said to operate at a level 
which is not necessarily available to full awareness: it is the resource that 
people call on to make sense of, and solve, day-to-day problems. However, 
individuals also have access to what he refers to as discursive consciousness: 
what is known by individuals about what they ought to say or do, that is, where 
the contemporary discourse of social life lies. Individuals negotiate between 
these two understandings when called on to decide how to respond to a given 
situation; and importantly, Giddens proposes that such a condition does not 
dictate action, but merely influences it. There are striking similarities between 
this view and the situation facing practitioners in the assessment process. 
Similarly, Pask’s (1995) study showed that practitioners access both types of 
awareness in their day-to-day clinical decision-making.
Suspicion of the application of fixed, universal rules to determine or explain 
social action is a central feature of postmodernism, and I have subsequently 
adopted this stance in examining practitioners’ assessment decisions. Derrida, 
for instance, encourages us to look beyond what is said or written, to uncover 
what is not said, with respect to claims for what counts as knowledge (Derrida 
and Caputo 1997). Though speaking in the following comment about the 
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concept of deconstruction, his point can be applied to the postmodern 
perspective generally; what gives it its moment is
… constantly to suspect, to criticize, the given determinations of 
culture, of institutions, of legal systems, not in order to destroy them 
or simply to cancel them, but to be just with justice, to respect this 
relation to the other as justice. (ibid., p.18)
An important point here is that he is concerned “to be just with justice”, that is, 
to avoid or overturn attempts artificially, or in the interest of others, to exclude 
certain troublesome (though nevertheless legitimate) possibilities. The key thing 
in this definition is to “suspect, to criticize, the given determinations…”.  It 
became clear as I developed the analysis that judgements are made by 
particular people in particular situations, and are not necessarily governed by 
the “given determinations” of assessment protocols. Different individuals may 
have different ways of understanding their situations. St Clair (1997) captures 
the point nicely when he comments that what is needed is
… [to] be open to understanding why the whole situation is the way 
that it is. In what way is it understood by those people who participate 
in the situation every day, and how do they make sense of it? (p.398).
Francis (1999, 2000) makes a similar point, when she argues that the nursing 
project  takes a largely modernist approach to knowledge, inasmuch as it is 
searching for rationalist and essentialising explanations of nursing issues (cf.
Paley 2001 on the concept of caring). She suggests that postmodernism and 
nursing research are therefore “uncomfortable bedfellows” (p.20), but makes 
the useful point that, while a postmodern approach may offer no immediate 
alternative, it seeks to expose the non-rationalistic nature of such practice, and 
thus encourages the researcher to look into the meanings of practices and 
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claims to knowledge. As chapter two has shown, practitioners vary in their 
approaches to assessment; the analysis offered here will move beyond a 
rationalist conception of assessment practices, but does not try to define the 
absolute essence of what is sought.
Discourse vs. essence
Discourse, in contrast to the search for essence, is predicated on acceptance of 
“anti-essentialism and indeterminacy” (McAnulla 1998, p.6). It is concerned with 
things said, done, included or excluded in the expression of ideas, so that 
privileged status as knowledge or truth can be claimed for some, while others 
lose legitimacy as topics for debate. In The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault 
(2002a) has shown how hegemonic interests come to be privileged over others 
through the formation of discourses, which legitimise some understandings 
while de-legitimising others. The shift to competencies in policy provides an 
example of this, raising the possibility that practitioners’ own understanding 
becomes marginalised. 
Foucault wants us to understand that discourses are formed through 
regularities in the dispersion of statements. This does not say that the same 
terms are always used, but that particular understandings are implied and 
promoted – here, notions of visibility and measurability, for instance. His 
analysis demonstrates an enunciative function, in which the warrant for 
particular claims is established, not following rationalistic, reductive analysis, 
but as a result of particular interests coming to the fore – the need for 
predictability and control in managing nursing, for example. Control over the 
72
means of dissemination by powerful groups (e.g. policy-makers) then allows 
particular views to be sustained, while others are excluded, played down, so 
that an interested view comes to dominate thinking. Foucault comments that 
“the manifest discourse, therefore, is really no more that the repressive 
presence of what it does not say…” (Foucault 2002a, p.28). The “repressive 
presence” of things not said is understood as a deliberate exclusion, or 
underplaying, of one way of thinking in favour of another, preferred and 
determined by powerful others. For nursing, there is a tension between the 
interest of those who would control and direct practice and the interest of those 
who are immersed in it from day to day (Drummond 2002; Fish and Coles 1998; 
Payne 1997; White 1986). 
Thus, discourse implies a struggle for influence, involving competing strategies 
(Heiskala 2001) and reference points in the expression of knowledge (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994). This struggle implicates a conception of power 
distinguished from power as a possession of one party wielded over the other 
(Hindess 1996; Foucault 1980). Although nursing appears to operate with the 
latter version, Foucault’s alternative conception provides a less sterile 
understanding of practices in context. He has it that power is a productive 
rather than oppressive force, and so we might understand it as the energy of 
the struggle between those involved. Indeed, he distinguishes power from 
domination – the absence of freedom to resist – a sterile and unproductive 
condition, limiting the creative possibilities of human activity. Chapter two 
showed that attempts to control practitioners’ decision-making in assessment 
have patently failed. This may be explained by reference to lack of clarity in the 
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rules to be applied; but I want to suggest that it may be seen as an attempt to 
influence outcomes, through a covert form of action in response to the 
impositions of powerful others. 
Heiskala (2001) provides a useful account of this view of power, outlined in the 
last chapter, for the present study. The notion of a strategic analysis of the 
presenting problem can be seen as the difference between what the practitioner 
sees, and what s/he is expected to see. Constraints on action can be found in 
the form of nursing’s regulatory norms to be followed, or in the fear of sanctions 
which can be applied. Relations are clearly institutionalised and rationalised: in 
nursing these have traditionally been hierarchically sanctioned. There is always 
the option, at the level of individual practice if nowhere else, to resist the 
desires of the other, though there may be sanctions if this shows (public) non-
compliance (cf. Pask 1995). 
Crucially, for Foucault, this more productive understanding of power presumes 
resistance (Foucault 2002a), created by the presence of different interests. 
Practitioners are concerned with situated problems in the here and now, while 
powerful others want to control, predict, and direct action. Where individuals 
resist the prevailing discourse – where they choose to vary from it, as shown in 
the variability of their assessments discussed in chapter two – this may be 
understood as what Foucault (1977b) calls transgression. That is, they are 
pushing at the edge of what is discursively permitted, testing the boundaries of 
accepted knowledge. However, Foucault also tells us that when the boundary 
has been breached, we are keen to return within it, since the territory outside is 
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uncertain ground. Thus, we appear to acquiesce to the dominant view, and 
come to occupy a space close to the edge. My analysis will show practitioners 
performing in this territory.
Competing for the plane of practice
While hegemonic interest, then, comes to determine what counts, at least 
publicly, as knowledge, this does not mean that more than one version of 
knowledge will not operate in practice. Foucault tells us (Andersen 2003; 
Foucault 2002a) that more than one discourse is possible; indeed, several may 
run in parallel. A technical-rational discourse does certain work for the 
managerial interest, in the context of accountability and cost-efficiency; but it 
does not necessarily describe the practice that practitioners, privately, might 
claim or carry out. My study will show how these practitioners dealt with this 
problem.
Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 1988) also argue against the validity of a singular 
way of thinking and being, also concerned that this limits rather than aids 
human possibilities. They argue that knowledge occupies a plane, an always 
expanding space containing all related possibilities in a field of understanding, 
not arranged hierarchically, but with each element connected to every other, 
and always available for selection according to particular situations (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994; Drummond 2002). In their understanding knowledge forms 
rhizomes: that is, aspects or elements of knowledge reappear over time and 
space, apparently new, but always connected. Deleuze applied this idea to 
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Foucault’s work, suggesting that knowledge develops along lines of flight, 
whereby 
thinkers are always, so to speak, shooting arrows into the air, and 
other thinkers pick them up and shoot them in another direction (cited 
by Katz 2001, p.117). 
The arrow has the same origin, hence the same idea is involved, but is 
adapted, viewed from another angle to look different, and is put to different use. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988) talk of planes being “territorialized” (sic) by others 
– that is, concepts can be captured, redefined, and put to work for purposes 
other than those to which they more naturally belong. They provide an 
extensive critique of the way in which modernism has sought to impose a 
singular view of knowledge and practice, and so deny legitimate, creative 
difference. This, they argue, leads to an impoverishment of human potential 
and action, by removing difference, hence creativity, and constrains everyone 
to an artificial show of unity. From this perspective, policy can be said to have 
appropriated, or territorialized, the plane of practice for managerialist purposes. 
I will show in my analysis how practitioners dealt with the differing elements on 
the plane as they saw it.
Deleuze and Guattari make another helpful point for examining the data in this 
study, when they propose that concepts exist at two levels, virtual and actual 
(Drummond 2002; Deleuze and Guattari 1994). The virtual operates at the pure 
philosophical level, being something to which we aspire; as such it is neither 
true nor false, but simply is. The actual exists as what they call a functive, and 
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is an attempt to translate ideas into reality, into a state of affairs. As such they 
can be measured, taken as true or false, concretised. The problem, they 
explain, is that the two are conflated and dealt with as though they are the 
same. I want to suggest that the notion of competence is a virtual, to which 
nurses aspire; its functive counterpart, competency, is a flawed attempt to 
actualise this (cf. Drummond 2002), but has been conflated with the former. 
The extensive evidence of inconsistency in assessment to date lends support to 
this understanding. Hence, we have a useful way of thinking about the problem, 
and the tension between the practitioner and the managerialist interest can be 
understood as 
the plane of a struggle for different ways of thinking the event we call 
nursing, where different parties seek to introduce different elements 
onto the plane of the concept to gain control of that event. (ibid. p. 
232). 
Attempting to make explicit the kind of thing to be sought is not the same as 
following a prior specification of what is assumed to be there. The one looks for 
evidence of a type; the other asks whether x has been found, not something of 
the type x.
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE KNOWLEDGE
I have argued that practitioners operate within a culture of surveillance (Pask 
1995), and that they are resistant to the formalisation of knowledge for practice 
(Stronach et al 2002; Payne 1997; White 1986). It is possible, therefore, that 
two versions of practice operate in parallel, the publicly acknowledged 
managerialist version and the privately held practitioner version. In exploring 
this I have made use of Potter’s (1996, 1997) and Anderson et al’s (2001) 
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discursive analytic approach to things said. This moves beyond the assumption 
that statements are mere representation of fact, and combines well with 
Foucault’s approach to discourse in the wider context (Foucault 2002a). Where 
limits are imposed on the expression of knowledge, Foucault argues that these 
are in the interest of powerful or influential groups, and arise from a 
combination of power interests and conditions prevailing at any given time. 
His point is that the dominant way of looking at the world is a product of its time 
and circumstances, rather than the linear, logical development from some 
preceding phenomenon. Thus, no single version of knowledge is necessarily 
more valid than another. He offers two linked approaches, archaeology and 
genealogy, in establishing the development of the prevailing discourse. 
Archaeology looks for the regularities in the dispersion of statements, the key 
characteristic of discourse (Foucault 2002a); genealogy looks for the conditions 
which lead to or permit the formation, and maintenance or discontinuity, of 
particular versions of knowledge (Andersen 2003). This means the presence of 
discourse(s) can be revealed: what is said and by whom; using what reference 
points; for what purpose; under what combination of conditions? 
I have argued that policy makers have appropriated the understanding of what 
counts as practice knowledge, and lauded a version of professional practice 
according to managerialist priorities. I will show how practitioners in this study 
dealt with the prevailing discourse, and countered this with their own, through 
the regularity of their own statements about what counts and why. While the 
legitimate interest of less powerful individuals is, at best, played down by the 
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more influential strategy of managers and policy-makers (Heiskala 2001),
participants developed an interesting strategy through which to retain it. This 
jostling is captured in the notion of power relations, illustrated earlier – the 
strategic struggle for influence. On this account compliance with a standardised 
approach to reporting acceptability will be seen merely to disguise the content 
of, rather than represent, private judgements.
CONSTRUCTING IDENTITIES
It became evident through the process of interviewing that participants in the 
study were constructing themselves as they had not done previously. In order 
to understand this aspect of the data, I have drawn on Foucault’s writings on 
the constitution of the self. His early work focuses on discursive and disciplinary 
mechanisms determined by powerful figures or organisations as a means of 
defining the individual (Foucault 1977a). His analysis shows how, over time, the 
specification of how to behave in different settings became more and more 
specific; individuals were encouraged to internalise and adhere to prescribed 
procedures, in order to obtain approval. The production of competency 
statements has an obvious parallel with this, as shown in Fournier’s (1999) 
study.
Lorentzon (1990) has drawn attention to the centrality of internalisation in 
contemporary training practices in health care and education occupations. The 
outcome of the process is that individuals will become good nurses or teachers 
as defined by others, acting to the benefit of the social manager to reduce 
variability, difference, unpredictability, randomness (Bauman 1995). Thus, such 
79
specifications implicate characterisations of a given discipline, influenced by the 
power relations to be found in it. As will be discussed below, some authors, e.g. 
Giddens (1984), have criticised Foucault’s use of the prison or the military to 
illustrate and support his argument, implying that limitations on certain actions 
are legitimate, since they follow from certain legitimate life choices, whereas 
entry into prison is not. However, Bauman counters this by explaining that, 
while Bentham’s intention as a reformer was the better integration of individuals 
into society, achieved through his model prison design, Foucault’s use of the 
image simply draws attention to its potential as a means of social control. In this 
case it operates in the interest of the powerful other, denying the individual full 
freedom to be or become him or herself. 
One consequence of such a process is that it produces resistance – overt 
compliance for fear of punitive sanctions, but without internalisation (cf. Pask 
1995) – and attempts subsequently to circumvent the required response. 
Somewhat to my own surprise practitioners in this study showed reluctance to 
align themselves with the technical-rational model of practice, moving to and fro 
at the boundary between the official view and their own understanding of what it 
means to be a nurse. They seemed to want to identify a space in which they 
could exercise freedom, resist or influence the dominant view, and write 
themselves differently. However, as will be shown, the discomfort produced by 
this activity led many frequently to turn back to the discursively permitted. 
Practitioners – as other individuals – experienced considerable uncertainty 
once they move outside defined territory, since there was nowhere familiar to 
move into. 
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Foucault replaces his earlier disciplinary approach to self-constitution, criticised 
as too structurally driven, in his later work when he talks about the process of 
ascesis, self-writing, which arises from self-examination (Foucault 2000). While 
societal prescription seeks to define and contain the individual, the process of 
ascesis is central to individuals’ own self-determination in Foucault’s argument, 
since it reveals to the individual what, how, and why s/he thinks or acts as s/he 
does. The process of interviewing, with questions posed to clarify practitioners’ 
understandings of what they were doing, had marked similarities with this 
process: many participants commented that they had not previously indulged in 
this act of self-writing. As a result individuals determine their own identity – or 
identities, since the notion of a singular self, unvarying, unchanging, enduring 
regardless of circumstances, is untenable for Foucault. An important aspect of 
ascesis is that it resists a fixed or singular version of the self. Indeed, any 
attempts to pigeonhole participants’ statements were resisted during the 
interviews, although it has to be acknowledged that this may simply have been 
a performance for the researcher as audience; I could not ignore the possibility 
that each interview was perceived as an encounter between potentially 
conflicting interests, and for each, I posed the initial questions. 
This more mobile view resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988, 1994) 
perspective on knowledge planes and conceptions of self as more fluid than is 
permitted by static models. For them, self is always in a state of becoming other 
than it is now. To impose a singular identity is to limit the possibilities for 
humankind; in effect this is no more than a form of domination – there is no pre-
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given self. In this respect Scott (1990) usefully points out that Foucault avoids 
references to any notion of liberation from the domination of others, on the 
grounds that that would imply a pre-given concept of self, to which the 
individual returns once freed from the constraints of power-invested relations. 
This would run counter to his own argument: self is formed and re-formed more 
or less constantly through the struggles encountered in everyday life. Scott 
records Foucault’s view that freedom “is found in part as the historical and 
optional development of self-constitution” (ibid. p.91). My analysis will show 
how practitioners constructed a fluid self, orientated to the particularity of the 
situation (Derrida 1995). Further, it will draw out a counter-discourse of practice 
mobilised in the search for evidence of acceptability. I will show how 
practitioners, through their multiple nursing selves, sought to position 
themselves in relation to the official discourse.
DECISION-MAKING
A central problem for assessors is to ensure that criteria are applied fairly and 
equitably across the student population: judgements are intended as equivalent 
and constant regardless of time or place (cf. Edgoose 2001). For Derrida, there 
is an ever-present problem here. To make a decision based on judgement is 
not merely to apply some given principle mechanistically (Reynolds 2001; 
Derrida and Caputo 1997; Derrida 1995); this would be mere computation, not 
judgement, or, for Derrida, a genuine decision. The particular nature of the 
situation leads to a problem within which, as Reynolds puts it, “the demands of 
the singular other … are importantly distinct from the ethical demands of our 
society” (Reynolds 2001, p.39). Derrida points to the dilemma that to be just to 
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the other in this situation may conflict with justice to all others who are 
implicated in the same general principle. It is a consideration of the distance 
between conditions of mere conformity and the particularity of a given situation 
that creates both the problem and the possibility of a just decision (Derrida 
1995). The problem arises in part because of the face-to-face encounter 
involved in this kind of relationship (Edgoose 2001; Reynolds 2001), and the 
responsibility which arises from this.
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other, with the gaze, look, 
request, love, command, or call of the other, I know that I can 
respond only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever 
obliges me to also respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to 
all of the others (Derrida 1995, p. 68).
However, the problem is compounded by the nature of this other. Derrida 
argues that the individual is always “tout autre”, or completely different, as a 
function of freedom (Reynolds 2001; Derrida 1995). However, this 
conceptualisation presents difficulties in relation to self: relations with the other, 
if the other is always “tout autre”, would be impossible. What is important in 
Derrida’s construction is that the other can never be known completely. Hence 
the other can be viewed as both known and unknown to the observer: known 
inasmuch as s/he is there, and displays characteristics similar to the observer 
(by virtue of her/his humanity or nursing aspirations); unknown in that one can 
never know the other in her/his entirety on the grounds of one’s separateness. 
Indeed, there is a notable similarity here between what Derrida is proposing 
and what Anderson et al (2001) found in their study into attributions of blame to 
rape victims: it will be recalled that their subjects sought to consider the victim’s 
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characteristics and behaviour vis-à-vis themselves prior to coming to a decision 
about responsibility for the outcome. 
Working with Levinas’ thought, Derrida suggests that, precisely by virtue of 
having engaged with the other, one acquires a moral responsibility towards 
her/him such that decision-making, in order to be entirely just, becomes 
impossible. Derrida calls this condition undecidability, a term not simply 
indicating indecision on the part of the observer, but a reference to the 
dilemmas inherent in any situation in which it is necessary to obtain justice 
rather than simply follow some programmatic path to a conclusion (Derrida and 
Caputo 1997). In an example cited by Edgoose (2001) application of the 
universal rule – standardised assessment criteria – may lead to possible 
deleterious consequences for a weak but improving student. To vary from the 
rule implies different judgements for different people, although all ostensibly 
occupy the same learning space, and are subject to the same standards for 
judgement. So the particular decision has implications for everyone else. 
Derrida (1995) holds that dealing with such dilemmas necessarily involves, first, 
an acknowledgement of the universal rule – a given set of outcomes, for 
instance – so that we know what we are concerned with; but this must 
immediately be suspended, in order to allow a proper consideration of the 
presenting problem. Second, we have to recognise the undecidability of the 
present situation, precisely because of its particularity, its difference from the 
general. This is not to be understood as a deflection of responsibility, or as 
indecision; as Caputo states, “the opposite of ‘undecidability’ is not 
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‘decisiveness’ but programmability, calculability, computerizability, or 
formalizability” (Derrida and Caputo 1997, p. 137). 
Third, there is urgency: we cannot escape from the need for a decision. 
Practitioners are obliged professionally to make a judgement. Derrida refers to 
the moment of decision-making as one in which the impossibility of 
accommodating both the universal and the particular is seen. It is worth noting 
that Derrida is emphatic in pointing out that this does not mean that there is no 
call for the programmable, that is simple, straightforward decisions: the carrying 
out of specific procedures, for example, can be judged in this light. Derrida 
merely advises that there are limits to the calculability of more fluid situations if 
one is to achieve justice. The removal of judgement from such problems would 
lose the humanness of the objects of judgement. Absolute adherence to the 
universal rule would deny the possibility of alterity, future change, and 
possibility, and this would make it unjust. Again, my analysis will show how 
participants managed this problem.
RELEVANCE TO THE PRESENT STUDY 
There are important links between these views which resonate with the purpose 
of this study. For Derrida, difference is important because it recognises the 
particularity of each situation; without this recognition human action is reduced 
to a set of computations. For Foucault it is important because it resists 
interestedness in the formation and legitimisation of knowledge claims, 
highlighting the suppression of otherness, and the strategic and political nature 
of claims to knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari see difference as crucial to the 
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creativity of humankind; universalising knowledge claims reduce human 
potential and seek to gain control of troublesome otherness. Difference, 
variability, unpredictability are the key to productive human action. The 
universalising, essentialising tendency is concerned with control, predictability, 
and the elimination of what is seen as randomness, whereas ambiguity – rather 
than randomness – and lack of absolutes are necessary to creative, hence 
productive, human responding.
Given the evidence reviewed in the last chapter, what appears to count for one 
practitioner (or set of practitioners) does not necessarily hold for others. This is 
despite the fact that all are concerned with the practice of nursing, with the 
assessment of others’ developing practice, and are using rationally determined, 
comparable criteria taken from official (ergo ostensibly well informed) 
guidelines, under broadly the same conditions. Such variability challenges the 
idea of structures and systems which operate to direct individual action: in the 
present context, a common set of values, a common understanding of the goals 
to be achieved (safe, competent practice), and of the means of their 
recognition. Widespread evidence of disagreement and inconsistency in what 
counts as acceptable practice leads to the need for a more relativist 
understanding of the knowledge accessed by practitioners.
Cromby and Nightingale (1999) claim that real structures exist independently of 
our representation of them. Similarly, Wainwright (1997) suggests that these 
necessarily constrain the actor’s range of options in a cause-effect relationship 
with social activity, the evidence for which is to be found in their consequences. 
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It follows that the values and obligations of nursing, made explicit through 
agreed documentary guidelines, and independent of any individual nurse’s 
representation of them, should reliably direct judgements of practice 
development, and lead to orderly, consistent judgements of students’ 
performances. It has been shown that this is patently not the case; such widely 
reported variation points to the possibility of another kind of explanation.
I want to suggest that, while we may agree readily that ‘real’ problems – real, 
that is, to those experiencing them – are encountered and responded to in 
clinical settings (e.g. that people have health difficulties; that psychological and 
social factors influence the achievement, restoration, or maintenance of health; 
that the presence or absence of resources affects what is done; or that 
procedural skills are necessary for delivery of appropriate care), the world of 
nursing practice, and judgements about it, are more fluid than can be captured 
by a single over-arching representation. The stealthy introduction of 
competencies as a measure of acceptable practice has more to do with political 
interests (cf. Foucault 2002a, 1977a; Potter 1996) than with epistemology or 
ontology, yet it has come to dominate representations of nursing work through a 
managerialist discourse which promotes an economic model of practice 
(Stronach et al 2002). 
Variation in response, the failure of pre-programmed decision-making (cf. 
Derrida and Caputo 1997), implies that different points of reference, of what 
counts, operate according to the characteristics of particular situations. In effect 
knowledge and judgements of practice are better thought of as contingent. To 
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impose a definition of nursing practice – ergo the version of knowledge brought 
to bear on clinical situations – based on technicised descriptors smacks of 
subjectivism, leaving practitioners no opportunity to define their activity more 
authentically for themselves. In these circumstances it is the relative power and 
status in the social relations amongst nurses, which results in the apparent
acceptance of the notion of competence/ies by practitioners. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1988) notion of “territorialization” in the interests of another can be 
seen. As Usher and Edwards (1994) argue, variability is far from mere 
untidiness: it is fundamental to human representations of the social world. 
Alternative, contingent versions are inevitable and, indeed, desirable in the 
panoply of human experience and action. Hence, difference operates as a 
source of strength not weakness, since it acknowledges the contextual 
dependence of practice.
Accordingly, I have adopted a perspective from which localised understanding 
is valued, rather than subsumed by overarching frames of reference (Sarup, 
1989). I will suggest that individuals move about within a field of knowledge, 
understanding situations on their own terms, defining and redefining 
themselves more freely than is allowed by universal conceptions of the self or 
the world at large. To paraphrase Milovanovic (1995) this allows for the 
productive use of localised difference, through fluid understandings, 
spontaneity, indeterminacy, and what he calls orderly disorder. Such a 
characterisation, while it also involves negative possibility, suggests that some 
kind of order will still be evident, but not the fixed, rigid order implied by a 
modernist view. Variability and flux are desirable, as is tolerance of difference, 
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since it is from these that creativity and change will result. Knowledge fields are 
constantly reworked and redefined, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 1988) 
argue. Individuals, too, are constantly reworked and reconstructed, as Foucault 
has proposed (Foucault 2000). Practitioners are not merely incompetent in 
applying assessment criteria; they are making situated judgements. 
CRITICISMS OF POSTMODERNISM 
The postmodern perspective is not without its problems or critics. It has been 
read as a position in which anything goes (e.g. Archer 2000): if difference and 
contingency is to be wholly accepted, then whose values, if any, are to be used 
to regulate social life? Without a unified understanding, a universal ethic, life is 
fragmented and in chaos. Bauman (1995) offers a powerful riposte to this 
possibility. He argues that difference paradoxically lays more responsibility on 
the individual to act morally, since choice is now wide open, not restricted to a 
single given view. This resonates with Derrida’s concerns about otherness and 
justice in decision-making (Reynolds 2001), and with Foucault’s view that lack 
of freedom and the absence of resistance leads to sterile domination and 
compliance. The latter position has something in common with the historical 
characterisation of nursing as an occupation (cf. Pask 1995; Lorentzon 1990), 
while the former recognises the fluid nature of the situations in which 
practitioners find themselves as assessors of student performance. 
From within the movement Deleuze and Guattari (1988) have drawn attention 
to the need for individuals to make morally defensible choices, even though the 
knowledge planes to which they have access contain all possibilities, desirable 
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and undesirable, and are the targets of territorialization by others: individuals 
have a responsibility to choose, rather than simply comply with a predetermined 
view. Indeed, postmodernist writers tend to recognise the ever-present danger 
of the harmful choices, rather than support the suggestion that anything goes. 
There are instead frequent references to morality and justice (Bauman 1999, 
1992; Derrida and Caputo 1997; Deleuze and Guattari 1988; Foucault 1980), 
but based in the situated world of the everyday not the idealised. 
Much criticism is aimed at the destructive tendency of postmodernism, or at 
best its lack of commitment (Francis 1999; St Clair 1997), claiming that it seeks 
to undermine, offers frequent criticism of claims for what has been achieved, 
but puts little or nothing in its place. In a counter to this Johnson (1981) points 
out that, for instance, the technique of deconstruction is closer etymologically to 
analysis, in the sense of undoing something. It is not about destroying what is 
there, but understanding the conditions in which certain claims have arisen. The 
relevance of this position to the context of the present study is clear. It is 
already well established that prescriptive approaches to assessment do not 
work, so I am asking how practitioners account for their decisions in practice, 
not trying to reveal why they are incapable of following a predetermined order. 
The challenge is to the unequivocal claim for one version of truth or reality over 
others. Potter (1996) has demonstrated that claims to truth are influenced by 
more than scientific objectivity, and that they frequently operate less in the 
interest of cohesion than of domination. Paradoxically, it is the claim to absolute 
understanding which raises the greatest danger: truth is truth as long as it is 
defined and controlled by, and working in the interest of, the powerful. 
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Deleuze and Guattari (1988) show themselves to be very aware of undesirable 
possibilities, when they describe their un-predetermined Body without Organs 
(BwO): a notion that knowledge or identity is always in a state of flux, of 
becoming something other than what it is. There is a clear parallel between this 
and how participants in this study appeared to view their assessment decisions: 
they anticipated future development and situational demands. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that choice, not constraint, is crucial, but always with regard to 
the consequences for others. For instance, in respect of the masochist’s search 
for pleasure and self-expression, they make the following observation. 
That there are other ways, other procedures than masochism, and 
certainly better ones, is beside the point; it is enough that some find 
this procedure suitable for them. (ibid. p.155, my emphasis)
Their hesitation clearly recognises the implications of this statement, a point 
reiterated a little later, indeed on numerous occasions in their writing. In the 
forming of these so-called BwOs they tell us that we must 
[take] charge of desires, of assuring their continuous connections and 
transversal tie-ins. Otherwise, the BwO’s [sic] of the plane will remain 
separated by genus, marginalized, reduced to means of bordering, 
while on the “other plane” the emptied or cancerous doubles will 
triumph. (ibid. p.166)
In this more fluid way of viewing the world, then, humankind is not to be seen 
as mere flotsam in a sea of possibilities. Instead individuals must take an active 
part in making the best of the possibilities presented to them through 
experience. Similarly, practitioners must be allowed to take ownership of their 
actions in context, whereas the content of assessment packages to date has 
been other-defined. In Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of knowledge 
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undesirable possibilities are always present. Fields of immanence, planes of 
consistency are constructed under different conditions, and result in different 
formations, but, while there will be aberrations, “the question, rather, is whether 
the pieces can fit together, and at what price” (ibid. p.157). They are here 
recognising that there will be different results according to the complex of 
conditions under which any solution (the outcome of interaction) is built, so 
there can be no one fixed way of acting, knowing, or being. The play of moral 
responsibility in choice comes to the fore. 
In another critique Giddens (1984) has challenged Foucault’s analysis of the 
division of space and time, as the means of gaining greater efficiency through 
control of the human resource. Giddens complains that, since the examples are 
taken from closed institutions such as prisons, hospitals, schools, military 
camps, then, as a model for wider society, this is inapplicable, since, on 
entering these places, individuals lose the right to act individually, or to engage 
in the activities accorded to ordinary subjects. Such organisations operate 
through a corporate, not individual, identity; so, since people are freer in society 
than in these settings, social control through disciplinary discourses fails as an 
explanation. 
However, Giddens’ argument appears to ignore other ways in which social 
division can occur. For instance, any occupational group over whom some 
degree of control is required (especially, perhaps, professional ones, where the 
limits are difficult to prescribe), whether for economic or political reasons, will be 
subject to the kind of limitation with which Foucault is concerned. Against the 
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background of my own study, this understanding holds up well: practice is 
constrained by managerialist considerations of accountability, now well 
established in the language of nursing practice and training. Indeed substantial 
change has occurred in the way most professional occupational groups are 
increasingly tightly described and defined over recent decades (cf. Perkin 
1989). While Giddens concedes that Foucault’s notion of discipline can work if 
there is a trade off against other aspects of life, the argument fails to address 
the point that, by virtue of their entry into a particular professional group, 
individuals concede some of their own freedoms, at least while acting within 
that role. Thus he moves Foucault’s analysis closer to his own notion of duality 
and interdependence in structuration. 
This is then suggestive of the more mobile notion of self found in Foucault’s 
later ideas concerning the ascetic constitution of the self (Foucault 2000), as 
well as implicating resistance to and transgression of discursive boundaries. 
However, Giddens rather evades the question of the possibility of internalisation 
of disciplinary ways of knowing and acting, when powerful groups invade (or, in 
Deleuzian terms, territorialize) training systems. For the purpose of this study a 
model of competent practice which privileges performativity (Lyotard 1984) 
over, say, compassion or discretion (Wade 1998), undermines more open, 
more responsive ways of thinking and acting. As Lorentzon (1990) has 
observed, training encourages practitioners to become proficient at self-
monitoring: competencies, once having acquired widespread approval, 
determine what counts as acting or thinking professionally (cf. Fournier 1999), 
and add to the armoury of self-control mechanisms. The functioning of closed 
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or disciplinary systems differs little in principle from the panopticon; I examined 
participants’ accounts of their work while allowing for this possibility. 
Archer (2000) is more hostile to postmodernism, condemning it for its concern 
with destruction of the self as agent, and for placing mankind unhelpfully at the 
mercy of circumstances. For her, it is the mutual interaction between humans 
and their world that constitutes “the transcendental conditions of human 
development” (p.17). She sees humankind as active in this relationship, and 
holds that, since such relations are universal, they anchor and limit the 
variability of human development. Archer is concerned that, if there is no 
fundamental self which can be captured, then humanity is lost; indeed, she 
seems to imply that postmodernism has the power to transform humankind into 
something other than human: “Humanity, as a natural kind, defies transmutation 
into another and different kind” (p.17). Our interactive relationship with the world 
underpins our moral and political responsibility to others. 
However, this would appear to constitute human selves in terms of moral 
responsibility to others, a view with a striking similarity to Levinas’ (1969) 
concern with responsibility to the other; or Derrida’s (1995) concern with justice 
to others. Indeed, Archer’s argument is countered by Bauman’s observation 
that it is by virtue of postmodernism’s rejection of the universal that 
responsibility and morality come to the fore, since there is no predetermined 
guide for action (Bauman 1995). From my reading of her argument Archer 
(2000) overstates postmodernism’s mischievousness, while playing down the 
serious project of challenging the universalising preference. It could, in fact, be 
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argued that the vigour of her commentary paradoxically provides an example of 
how discourse might be constructed: through the selective inclusion and 
exclusion of particular viewpoints and claims. While she complains that 
postmodernism itself is selective, her commentary fails to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the challenge to more conventional thinking as a given. By 
contrast, both St Clair’s (1997) and Francis’ (2000) critiques draw attention to 
the lack of a definitive worldview within postmodernism, but see the need to 
question claims and assumptions arising from other perspectives.
Finally, power – hence power relations and the idea of resistance – is a difficult 
concept in Foucault’s writing (Hindess 1996). If individuals are controlled 
through the power of discourses, then it would seem, according to Heiskala 
(2001), that power is no different for Foucault than in other conceptions of it: 
powerful a applies it to b, unless b has some means of acquiring a block of it, 
thus reducing a’s relative power. Hence, power remains the structural force of 
more rationalistic views of it, and the individual a passive target of power-driven 
interests. From this point of view, Foucault’s account of discourse is said to be 
too restrictive, and so not fundamentally different from other approaches. In this 
light, his later writings are seen somewhat sceptically as a response to such 
earlier critiques, and as an attempt to reintroduce the actively self-constituting 
agent. However, by introducing a conception of power as a dynamic, 
strategically deployed force between different interests vying for influence, 
combined with the notion of the self-constituting agent, Foucault presents a 
more productive, less sterile, more optimistic view. Katz (2001) adds that while 
Foucault’s case studies might be criticised for their historical oversights, 
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nonetheless, they “illustrate how specific problems arose in particular historical 
conjunctures” (p.125). The perspective I have adopted in this study increases 
the possibility of a greater sense of justice, since it allows for the contingent 
nature of practitioners’ judgements. The site of interest remains the territory 
inhabited by individual practitioners, their construction and use of knowledge, 
and the problems of decision-making and fairness.
DATA COLLECTION
Following this line of thinking, too structured an approach to enquiry would have 
limited the possibilities for understanding participants’ responses; the form of 
the question may determine the range of possible answers (cf. Anderson et al 
2001). Conversely, too loose an approach would lose direction in the study; the 
enquiry is set up for a purpose, for all that this was my own. Mindful of this, I 
sought to avoid the intrusion of personal preconceptions into participants’ 
explanations, in the manner of Schutz’s stranger (Schutz 1964). This was 
intended to allow practitioners to give their own accounts of events, and avoid 
undue assumptions arising from my position as an insider-researcher; many of 
the eventual participants were known to me, and therefore likely to assume a 
shared understanding existed between us. On occasions this resulted in a 
rather crass formulation of questions; for example, why is safeness in a 
student’s practice considered important? However, while this issue was 
understandably always responded to as self-evident, the intention was to avoid 
any assumptions about how they would know this. Such questions were 
followed up with an invitation to explain how they construed safeness, a much 
more interesting question.
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Spradley (1979) has described an approach to enquiry which accommodates 
these concerns: the ethnographic interview. He compares this to a 
conversation, in which the participants engage in an exploration of a topic of 
mutual interest. However, he also distinguishes interview and conversation 
through other characteristics – explicit purpose, inherent explanations (of 
purpose, for example), and particular forms of questions, especially from the 
researcher. These fall into three main categories – descriptive, structural, and 
contrasting – intended to bring out, respectively, terminology, knowledge 
organisation, and distinctions in the meanings of terms used. Initially 
participants were asked to describe the criteria they used, through a focus on 
familiar experiences: how were good and poor students identified; what kind of 
description was offered and how were distinctions drawn? Participants were 
then invited to articulate how this understanding was organised and deployed: 
why, whether or how criteria were varied; what counted as evidence; whether 
judgements were presented for public consumption, or disguised through 
approved terminology? Following this, questions focused on uncertain 
performance: whether, for example, subtler judgements were invoked, hence 
fine distinctions drawn, in such cases in the way criteria were understood or 
applied. In effect, the process was intended to encourage practitioners to 
convey meaning in their own language prior to invoking what Spradley (1979, 
p.59) calls their “translation competence” – its conversion into official 
terminology. An outline of the questions and prompts used can be found in 
Appendix A.
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Denscombe (1998) suggests the possibility of triangulation in order to obtain a 
more robust understanding; for instance, students might provide an additional 
source of data on assessment processes. The intention would be to provide an 
intersubjective perspective, to confirm or refute the researcher’s interpretations 
of data (Adelman 1985). However, it would also assume that the meaning 
offered by practitioners for their choice of criteria is also portrayed to students, 
untainted by the student’s interest. Johnson (1999) rightly comments that this 
kind of strategy in qualitative research is inappropriate, since its purpose is to 
obtain verification of the underlying truth of any claims made. Thus, it shifts the 
approach towards positivism and undermines the meaning taken from 
practitioners’ utterances, whereas what mattered was how they accounted for 
what they do. The student’s view of assessment processes belongs to the 
student, and is coloured by her or his pre-existing biases and expectations. Any 
conflict between these two perspectives would form the focus of another 
enquiry. 
Recruiting the participants
In qualitative enquiry it is accepted that sampling needs to be purposive and 
linked to the nature of the enquiry (Miles and Huberman 1998; Andrew 1985). 
Practitioners who had acted as assessors for a minimum of one year, were 
invited to participate; this allowed for differences to have occurred in their
experiences of individual students. Given the different clinical contexts in which 
practitioners and students work, the sample drew on practitioners from different 
clinical areas, since there may be differences according to the general setting 
as well as specific (clinical) situations. It is reported anecdotally that different 
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climates operate in different clinical settings; this was taken into account, so 
that participants were included from different institutional and geographical 
areas. In the end eighteen practitioners were recruited, whose experience 
ranged from 3 to over 30 years in practice, from a range of settings: NHS 
district general hospitals, community hospitals, community nursing services, 
and a private nursing home. Brief pen pictures of participants are shown in 
Appendix B. Each volunteer was interviewed for approximately one hour, with 
interviews spread over a period of one year, with three contributors asked to 
participate in a second interview. They were invited on the basis of points they
had made during our initial conversations, which were emerging as potentially 
important and influential factors. These included the way nursing knowledge 
was characterised; the conflict between the nurse’s varying roles and what this 
implied about where final responsibility lay; and power and influence in 
decision-making.
The experience of obtaining participants – and the consequent time span of the 
interviews – warrants some comment here. The initial invitation, circulated via a 
colleague in a local hospital – a gatekeeper, as recommended by Denscombe 
(2000), for the purpose of validating the researcher’s position and authentic 
intention – resulted in no responses at all. In my field notes I commented on my 
puzzlement at the time, since day-to-day experience indicated that everyone 
had something to say about the nature of practice assessment in current 
programmes. I was unsure whether a direct approach would have been more 
successful; a face to face request would potentially have led to people feeling 
coerced into participating, whereas I wanted people to contribute without feeling 
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that they were under duress. I decided to persist with written invitations, and 
reworded the invitation to be less self-interested, couching it more explicitly in 
terms of the individuals’ experience of undertaking assessment, rather than as 
an investigation of the assessment of students. I was mindful of the impression 
being given that the purpose was to monitor how well practitioners were doing 
the job. In this case, primary data could be hidden from view in the same way 
as I have argued it may be hidden from official surveillance. 
However, circulation of a second NHS Trust area failed again to produce any 
participants, leading to a growing concern that the study could fail even to get 
started. Questions began to occur; for instance, are practitioners so worried 
about talking; if recruits are so difficult to obtain, where does nursing research 
derive from? The continuing lack of volunteers could be confirming either the 
sense of surveillance and vulnerability amongst practitioners; possibly a lack of 
concern with research (interesting in itself in light of the emphasis on evidence 
for practice); or possibly lack of belief in their power to influence events. The 
lack of response so far was very striking; indeed, it eventually merged with the 
original intention to ask how practitioners claimed to know acceptable practice, 
and offered additional possibilities for analysis (e.g. on the relationship between 
clinical and educational colleagues), which I had not directly considered prior to 
this stage. In the end the possibility of utilising personal contacts, either 
amongst known clinicians or colleagues with clinical contacts, began to look 
more attractive. The negative aspect to this was that, while Denscombe’s 
gatekeepers may provide access, this could simply result in conversations 
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between friends, therefore only mobilising already shared perspectives, and 
thus contributing nothing further to the debate. 
A colleague, who offered to utilise some personal contacts, suggested that the 
difficulty could be lack of time to engage in interviews, so that they would have 
no option but to take time at the end of a normal shift. Organisational pressures 
meant that they were unable to take time out within working hours. Many 
clinicians also work part-time, and have family commitments; accordingly their 
hours of work are chosen deliberately. This explanation seemed validated 
when, following an approach to community teams, using the written invitation, 
there was a relative flurry of volunteers! Community practitioners have the 
comparative luxury of being able to organise their own working schedule to 
some extent, and to arrange colleague cover for their absence. Additionally, as 
one participant actually suggested, there is a high proportion of community 
practitioners who have studied to honours degree level in Wales, raising the 
possibility that their appreciation of the nature and possibilities of research may 
be enhanced. 
Subsequent contacts were made more directly or through work colleagues’ 
contacts; but this always had the possibility of being a response to a known 
individual. It would be more difficult to turn down a known face, a situation 
which bears some comparison with the Levinasian responsibility to the other 
arising from the face-to-face encounter (Levinas 1969). Given the construction 
of the encounter, it moved closer to covert coercion, in which power relations –
between (perceived) educational authority and practitioner inferiority (Payne 
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1997) – might play a part. Nonetheless, the majority of eventual participants, 
while apprehensive about their ability to talk about their ideas and practices, 
appeared to be doing so voluntarily; two in particular appeared to be working 
with the possibility that they were under inspection, and these will be 
highlighted in the analysis.
Conditions for interviewing
To facilitate participants’ comfort with the researcher (Fontana and Frey 1994; 
Adelman 1985), and to reduce possible contamination further the choice of 
location for interviewing was left to the participant. Following the spirit of 
Spradley’s (1979) “ethnographic explanations” (p. 59), the purpose of the 
research was made explicit at the outset. The use of an audio-tape for 
recording the conversation was also agreed at this stage, with assurances that 
data were not attributable, nor available in their raw form. Consistent with 
Shipman’s (1985) recommendation, that participants have the right to choose 
what they will ultimately make public, they were also assured that they had the 
right to withdraw at any time if they wished. It was critical that an assurance of 
absolute anonymity be given; nurses tend to be looking over their shoulder to 
protect themselves against threats of retribution (Pask 1995). 
Notwithstanding such assurances there was a tendency on the part of some 
participants to suspect my declared intentions, at least initially: several asked 
spontaneously if what they were saying was what I wanted. Resisting this had 
to be an active process throughout the interviews; and, of course, the problem 
is exacerbated, as Spradley (1979) acknowledges, by the need to revisit given 
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responses to clarify meanings, or to understand variations according to context 
– easily interpreted as checking up rather than clarification. This awareness had 
to continue into the analysis; it was always possible that I would be seduced by 
some neat but misleading definition lurking in the data. 
The chosen technique for data gathering helped me stay with practitioners’ 
accounts of their practices. Even so, I was aware that the enquiry would always 
be influenced by my own interest as researcher, since choices about what 
issues to pursue from amongst those offered were my own (cf. Schatzman and 
Strauss 1973). In moving away from the idea that there might be something 
there to be captured and bottled, as it were, I was able to see my work as an 
analysis of situated accounts. I was not, as I might formerly have assumed –
given that I saw myself as unthreatening, and my interest as genuine and 
unbiased – revealing some so far undiscovered phenomenological truth. 
SUMMARY
This study, then, aims to explore practitioners’ accounts of their judgements, 
and of how they interact with official representations of competent practice. It is 
assumed that this is contingent, fluid knowledge. Bauman’s (1999) model of the 
process of policy formation, particularly its emphasis on the importance of the 
agora, has value in the context of nursing. It highlights the importance of a 
mediating opportunity for discussion, and thus the impact of its absence on any 
debate about what matters amongst all concerned with the education of nurses. 
Indeed, on first discovering Bauman’s idea, it presented an ideal match for my 
own perception of nursing’s modus operandi. Practitioners and others seem 
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constantly to be at odds, lauding competing and apparently incompatible 
models of practice. Consequently their actions in assessment may show only 
superficial agreement, while substantive, potentially important differences 
persist unacknowledged, leaving students to experience ambivalence, possibly 
cynicism, towards their learning. Similarly, it has led to the public exhibition of 
inconsistency and apparent disarray in the knowledge base. 
I wanted to explore the wider possibilities for assessment, without the 
constraints imposed by the modernist tendency vis-à-vis nursing practice and 
knowledge evident in current policy. This meant offering practitioners space and 
opportunity to present their own accounts of their practices in assessment of 
others. Chapter four commences the analysis with an exploration of the data 
using attribution and correspondence, but, as will become evident, this takes a 
more discursive turn as it develops. Subsequent chapters take an explicitly 
postmodern perspective to examine the complexity of practitioners’ stories in a 
way which, for me, made better sense of their understanding of their situation 
both as clinicians and as assessors of practice.
104
Chapter 4: Jigsaws and Acceptability
I started this project having in mind the possibility of identifying how 
practitioners view developing competence in student performance; however, 
this was rejected in chapter two as inappropriate. This chapter explores the way 
practitioners explained their decisions on student performance, showing how 
their practices were initially understood by reference to attribution theory, in 
particular by drawing on the notion of correspondence (Jones and Davies 
1965). While this appeared to be a relatively straightforward process, it became 
clear subsequently that there was more to this than first examination revealed. 
Hence, the analysis presented in this chapter proceeded as though decisions 
about student performance were made without reference to any influence from 
a personal or contextual agenda on the part of the participant. On the face of it, 
dispositional characteristics underlay all other requirements, such as knowledge 
or procedural skills, explained by reference to students’ future status, when they 
would be responsible for their own development. Acceptability in students’ 
practice was said to be made up of different elements in combination, for 
example, willingness to engage with learning opportunities; self- and situational 
awareness; safeness – all articulated as dispositional rather than technical 
qualities. 
However, although they identified the pieces of the acceptability jigsaw with 
apparent clarity, whenever the pieces did not easily fit together, participants 
arranged and rearranged these to form something of which they approved, 
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occasionally finding that the puzzle was not readily resolved into a 
predetermined picture. Subsequently, following Potter and others (Potter 1997; 
Potter and Wetherell 1987), I came to see that practitioners’ statements were 
doing a certain kind of work for them. This also took support from work by 
Anderson et al (2001), whose study of attributions of blame to rape victims 
shows how participants operated as active agents rather than detached 
observers. This perspective helped provide a bridge to the analysis presented 
in chapters five, six and seven. 
ASCRIBING ACCEPTABILITY
At the outset of the analysis participants appeared to be seeking dispositions 
rather than explicit knowledge or skills as the basis of their judgements. 
Attributions of appropriate disposition were derived from the individual’s range 
of behaviours, from which suitable disposition was inferred (cf. Jones and 
Davies 1965). Acquisition of, and increases in, knowledge and skills were taken 
as evidence of appropriate actions, arising from and demonstrating acceptable 
disposition. Participants identified numerous examples of behaviours to indicate 
that a student was meeting expectations, apparently starting from the idea that, 
since they want to be nurses, they would do that, wouldn’t they? Where the 
desired characteristic was judged to be present in a given individual, 
practitioners were generally content with their own judgement. Where it was 
absent, then allowance was made for individual circumstances. Whenever an 
observed behaviour did not fit with expectation, or whenever some increase in 
knowledge or skill was deemed not to have occurred as expected, alternative 
explanations were actively sought prior to the ascription of unacceptability. The 
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process conformed to an assumption that inappropriate action may be 
attributable either to circumstances (including the student’s experience to date) 
or to the individual, when answering the question: what is the intent of such 
action?
This view fits well with Jones and Davies’ theory of correspondence, in which 
expected actions tell us little about individuals, other than that their actions are 
congruent with their goals. However, despite their claim to have a clear idea of 
what made a student’s practice acceptable, participants would go out of their 
way to find, or even suggest, alternative explanations, since the expectation of 
engagement was held very strongly. Consideration was given to a wide range 
of other possibilities such as shyness, lack of opportunity or guidance, or to the 
mere strangeness of a situation; participants would even speculate about a 
student’s personal circumstances before ascribing non-acceptability. While the 
initial process of attribution seemed to fit with an almost algorithmic procedure 
leading to predetermined answers, the extent of their desire to make 
allowances pointed to an alternative explanation, and this will be considered in 
subsequent chapters. 
Disposition vs technical achievement
With very few exceptions participants did not use managerialist terms such as 
standard or competence, which would imply some fixed target. They looked for 
evidence of appropriate disposition for (learning about) nursing, in the form of 
engagement with opportunity, necessarily leading to increased knowledge 
and/or skills according to opportunity. The attribution of a particular disposition, 
107
derived from observed actions, was said to lie behind the judgements made. 
Most participants made this explicit, and those who initially focused on 
acquisition of technical knowledge and skills rather than disposition per se
shifted their positions as they explored the thinking behind their judgements. 
The disposition sought, commonly linked to a notion of a caring individual, was 
presented as crucial to the judgement that someone was a good (potential) 
nurse, and distinguished these students from those considered merely 
adequate. Where it was used at all, the term competent commonly indicated 
only a minimally acceptable level of performance. For instance, in response to a 
question about what she meant by it, Nan said,
Nan: Yeh, it’s just something that they have to … they have to reach, to 
perform to – you know, they could be a robot doing the job…[It’s] a 
mechanistic approach…
Participants consistently emphasised the humanistic nature of nursing – even 
those who had the greater concern to ensure technically correct practice – and 
this contrasted markedly with the growing emphasis on competencies as the 
absolute means of measuring practice and training outcomes. Several 
participants expressly cited anticipation of future good practice – construed as 
actively pursuing continued development – as part of the rationale for looking 
for this quality in the first place.
It was noticeable that the most immediate attribute identified by the majority of 
participants was a positive and active disposition to learning. This was 
characterised as interest, enthusiasm, keenness to learn, wanting to be there, 
personal engagement with the situation and with available learning 
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opportunities. No definitive list of knowledge or procedural skill was said to be 
expected; indeed all participants declared this to be impossible, and so it was 
deemed an inappropriate criterion for judging acceptability. This kind of claim 
already anticipated Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) knowledge planes, in which 
knowledge reappears across time and space according to need. Participants 
claimed no other significance for particular elements than as examples of skill 
which a student might be expected to demonstrate in particular situations 
following exposure to particular opportunities. It was much more common for 
participants to look for evidence of incremental change in knowledge or skill, 
rather than a definitive bank of either. 
Overall, three general aspects of disposition were spoken of: engagement, self-
or situational awareness, and safeness. Engagement was explained as the 
visible action consequence of appropriate disposition; self-awareness and 
safeness were described as functions of disposition, rather than of particular 
knowledge or skill levels. Self- and situation awareness only carried weight if 
accompanied by the tendency to act appropriately. Safeness in practice was 
based on a judgement of the individual’s willingness and inclination to seek 
guidance, or to check understanding or skill, prior to acting, particularly in new 
situations. These concerns were described as illustrated in the extracts below. 
The picture that develops anticipates the Deleuzian notion (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994, 1988) of fields and rhizomes, in which elements of knowledge 
are interconnected, rather than found in discrete, unified, and linear patterns: 
participants were clearly picking up ideas, concepts, considerations, and using 
them for their own purposes.
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One participant in particular summarised the attributes apparently sought by all 
in the first few lines of her response, and these were consistent with those 
identified in others’ accounts of their activity. This was possibly the most 
comprehensive and succinct statement of the criteria apparently sought to be 
presented in any of the interviews, and so is reproduced here at length. 
Toni: Right, if I'm looking for a good student, I would look first at their attitude 
towards their own self-development. Erm, I would look at their attitude, 
whether they were eager, whether they would, had looked at what the 
placement was about; whether they understood what was expected 
from them. I would look for somebody who identifies their weaknesses, 
and is confident in themselves to ask you to help them develop as a 
nurse. So, they, that, if somebody says to me, “I don’t know how to do 
that,” I would be more happy with that student, because I know they’re 
not going to put the patient in danger. They’re aware of their limitations. 
Toni, a hospital based nurse, was evidently orientated to student 
characteristics, rather than to technically discrete criteria; in her comments she 
has raised, in quick succession, the issues of engagement, self-awareness, and 
safeness, the latter two points arising from an appropriate disposition to 
learning. Stella, a community-based nurse, initially, and unusually amongst the 
group, set out by describing at length how she demonstrated to students what 
she expected of them, but again pointed to her expectation that a student
should show observable signs of active engagement with learning – following 
which the good student would move towards the kind of performance she had 
outlined in her extensive opening comments about standards. She concluded,
Stella: It would be somebody that, at, at the end of everything that I’d, I 
performed with them, that, that, when we’re reflecting, that they’d 
picked up on key things; or they said, “Well, I”, perhaps, “don’t agree 
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with that”; or… 
Another community-based view was expressed by Rena, who indicated that 
students were to some extent pre-judged according to their response when 
invited to visit the placement base prior to commencement, although she 
claimed that she remained beyond this. Students always had the option not to 
take up this offer, but
Rena: I have had students who say, “Oh, no, well I know where it is; I prefer to 
come on the day.”  It’s their choice. Erm, and I think, well, that shows 
that they’re not particularly motivated! 
For Rena this was apparently problematic in a student, and it is difficult to see 
that she would not be affected by a student’s initial responses. She went on to 
illustrate how she would know whether a student had this quality. Having made 
reference to a couple of students who had not thought far enough ahead to 
work out how they would arrive at their placement base (and therefore had to 
telephone for directions on the day) she commented
Rena: It was very hard going with those two students, to be honest. It was 
very hard going. But I think that … the motivation, I think is … and the 
interest is the first thing that I assess on somebody. 
This criterion seemed to play a prominent part in this practitioner’s thinking. 
Given that these students had not even appeared yet, early evidence of interest 
was proposed as an important personal characteristic. Interest, enthusiasm, 
motivation – dispositional attributes – were claimed by all participants to be 
possessed by those who would, as another participant, Nina, put it, “go the 
extra mile” both for patients’ well-being, and for their own learning and 
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development. This was about willingness to find something out for a patient, or 
to stay behind at the end of a shift, or to put oneself out in order to access some 
new learning opportunity. The point was caught in another (hospital based) 
participant’s comment.
Mavis: Erm, and then you go on to eagerness to learn. Are they interested in 
what they’re…? Are they there because they have to be there? Are 
they there because they want to be there? And what do they want to 
get from the placement? 
Her point was focused on active engagement with what was available, 
including, for both these practitioners, some pro-active planning to inform their 
learning during the placement period. While a student would not necessarily be 
failed for lacking this quality, it distinguished the good from the satisfactory, or, 
as they would all acknowledge in the course of their commentaries, the merely 
competent. In another conversation, Nina, a hospital based practitioner, pointed 
this out, when describing a merely adequate student she had mentored.
Nina: There was no impetus, and she certainly wasn’t motivated to go and 
see extra things. There was nothing from her to say, “Can I go and do?” 
So you would say to her…erm… “You’re working in this team, these are 
what your tasks are”. She could do that. And she would do it. But… 
there’s nothing extra, over and above that. 
This particular student was deemed no more than adequate, then, on account 
of her doing what was necessary, but no more. She seemed to require 
prompting all the time, in order to encourage her to develop or extend her 
understanding. There was a clear expectation that the student should be taking 
the initiative to remedy, for example, some identified knowledge deficit.
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Nina: I always said to her, “Well, if you can’t remember the name of a drug, 
don’t worry about it - but what should you do?” So, I mean, she could 
tell me –“Go and look it up in the BNF”… 
In this student’s case she was not actually doing this, hence she was judged as 
failing. In the course of this exchange Nina illustrated another, linked facet of 
the good student (and ultimately the acceptable one: greater allowance was 
made for early stage learners, who were judged less harshly following 
identification of any omissions or deficits). Her concern was twofold. The 
student should be taking active steps to rectify her deficit; but she would also 
need, in the end, to show a clear improvement in her knowledge base.
Nina: …you know, you’ve got six zillion things to do – would you be looking it 
up in a BNF on…over every drug? I said, you’ve got … there’s got to be 
some kind of concentration on the important ones… 
The requirement here seemed clear: there should be an incremental change in 
the student’s ability to recall certain items from memory. Nina explicitly 
recognised, in her reference to “the important ones”, that students were not 
expected to remember everything they ever came across, a condition frequently 
cited to acknowledge the impossibility for themselves of ever holding all 
relevant information. While the student’s goal was the achievement of specific 
knowledge according to context, the underlying focus was on her tendency to 
put in the effort to increase what was known prior to the encounter with new 
opportunity. 
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What of knowledge and skills?
A number of participants set off with (for them) the perfectly obvious point that 
students needed to know what they were doing, which seemed to imply some 
pre-set bank of theoretical knowledge. For instance, Mavis commented
Mavis: Oh, yeh! They’ve got to know why they’re doing it, otherwise not bother 
… isn’t it?
K … it’s not sufficient, then… [W …just to do …] that they just get good at 
the skill?
Mavis: No – they’ve got to know why they’re doing it. 
So here she was looking for evidence that the student could articulate her 
reasons for certain actions. However, it quickly became apparent that, in this 
instance at least, this was because it may affect a patient’s confidence and 
well-being, as she explained when encouraged to expand on this.
Mavis: Well, you can’t just do things to patients without knowing why you’re 
doing them! And the patient wants to know what they’re doing, won’t 
they? And why they’re doing it … They need knowledge, don’t they? 
Teach the patients, what you’re doing, and why you’re doing? … The 
patient says, “Why you doing that?”, and they don’t know, they’ve lost 
the confidence in that student then, haven’t they? … So that patients… 
a lot of patients can feel, “If that student doesn’t know what she’s doing, 
why is she coming to me?” 
What appeared at first to be an emphasis on knowing something in its own right 
had now moved to a position where the claim about a certain level of 
knowledge was part of the relationship-building process with patients, because 
it facilitated confident interaction. On this account development of one’s 
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knowledge base is necessary as much to facilitate interaction and confidence 
as to understand procedures, and it remained context-bound, not absolute. This 
shifted the focus back to disposition rather than technical achievement: what 
was required was the means to interact more effectively, in the interest of good 
care. Once again, dispositional quality was given prominence, with the 
emphasis on purposeful engagement. Particular items of knowledge were 
evidence of engagement with people, as was confirmed in the next comment.
Mavis: Well, yes, you…you’ve got to have an understanding of why you’re 
doing it, haven’t you? But whilst you’re doing it, it, sort of, connects 
together, if you like… 
The emphasis was now on involvement, and consolidation and development, 
through practice, a point matched by May, who expected that students would 
have acquired certain abilities, but still needed to refine them.
May: …so by the time they come to me, all they should be doing is practising 
them a bit more, you know. … So … they get competent with them. 
Another hospital based participant was concerned with a baseline level of 
interest, and professional awareness, combined with a tendency to engage with 
people. In building up her picture of the desirable student, Marje explained that 
she expected some basic qualities.
Marje: I would expect basic communication skills – eye contact …like I say, 
not hands in your pockets, and looking at the floor, or in the opposite
direction. I expect them to be attentive to the patient…professional, I 
think. And…it’s our duty to …approach a patient in a certain manner, 
and give the patient a certain amount of control. … and not leaving the 
patient to feel vulnerable or uncomfortable.
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In these comments Marje was concerned with non-technical aspects of nursing 
work. She had already suggested that technical skill per se was inferior to 
disposition in an earlier comment.
Marje: So somebody who’s a good nurse can learn how to give a bed bath –
and you can teach a monkey how to do a lot of the skills that we do, or 
procedures that we perform. And there are things I’ve learnt from 
scratch – I wasn’t born with those skills. I think you can acquire 
communication skills as well, but I would expect them to be… to smile 
and be friendly, polite and that.
Disposition appeared to take priority, in that it must be present first; knowledge 
and skills come later. Comments also demonstrated how, even when there 
appeared to be nothing wrong with what a student did know, or with the skills 
s/he possessed at the time, there was an expectation that in the course of 
learning to nurse, it was important to demonstrate a willingness to extend or 
consolidate knowledge and skills through their application and through 
engagement with others. In the following extracts participants suggested that 
knowledge and skills were developed or consolidated through repeated 
practice, not merely acquired at the first encounter; this was still an active 
engagement with opportunity. 
Mavis: …the good student, if you like, will come and she will do repetitive work 
every day, ’cause that’s part of nursing. Sometimes you do get, you 
know, repetitive things with different patients… But they’ll do it and 
they’ll learn from each time they’re doing it. 
Another participant described a similar means of judging success.
Nerys: The two go hand in hand - you need the knowledge to be able to … 
provide the nursing care, because you need the knowledge to know 
what nursing care you’re going to deliver. But … I find sometimes you 
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get a student that will have an awful lot of knowledge, but…they don’t 
always show that they want to be with the patient. 
In Nerys’s comment it was important that the student show his or her 
willingness to engage, rather than merely that s/he had acquired particular 
knowledge. It was not possession of knowledge, or its mechanistic application, 
but willingness to apply knowledge while engaging with people that seemed to 
matter. That knowledge is developed through contact with patients was then 
made explicit.
Nerys: … I would be happier with the person who wants to be involved with the 
patient, and continue to learn with the patient as well. 
… I think the knowledge is important, but you can gain the knowledge 
as you’re going along as well. But you’re here…we’re all here ultimately 
for our patients, and … You can’t go into a nurse’s role, you can’t go 
into a ward with no knowledge 
In these passages Nerys seemed to emphasise that it was more important to 
make and develop the interaction with the patient, and to apply what one 
knows, to develop it further, than simply to know something. For her, active 
application of knowledge was crucial, but this seemed to show that a student’s 
approach was appropriate. Taken alone the final sentence in the second extract 
would appear to laud knowledge above other elements of practice, but it is 
important to see this as a part of a continuous explanation started in her earlier 
statements.
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May made a similar point about the connection between active involvement and 
knowledge or skill development. In answer to a question about whether 
motivation was enough on its own, she stated, with a little incredulity,
May: …if they were motivated then… why can’t they do anything?! [Laughs]
Her point here was that motivation leads to engagement with opportunity, and 
thus inevitably knowledge and skill development. For her it was not credible that 
someone should have been appropriately motivated, hence engaged with 
learning, and not have gained something. This would only be possible if s/he 
had had no opportunity to develop particular skill or knowledge through contact 
with patients.
An extension of the notion of disposition (or even characterised by it) was the 
need for active communication, not as a technical skill, but as willing and pro-
active interaction with others, both patients and colleagues. The point was 
made emphatically, again by Nerys, when she commented,
Nerys: … I know when I was a student, if I didn’t understand a condition, [it] 
didn’t matter to me - at the time - because the…the patient and what 
they were displaying mattered, and I’d find out what the rest of it meant 
later.
Her emphasis here was on the need for active involvement to develop 
understanding of the functional consequences for individual patients of different 
conditions and disorders. Concern seemed to be with the need to recognise the 
patient’s present state, rather than with knowing the detailed theoretical 
background to the condition, which would enhance decision making later if 
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necessary. This was an interesting point in that it placed knowledge of 
underlying physiology elsewhere – with doctors, perhaps – whereas the nurse’s 
role was with the patient and his or her current experience. This explained more 
adequately the need for appropriate disposition to people, and to learning from 
and through them. 
Further evidence of this orientation was provided by Mavis, who came from a 
different clinical environment from others cited above. She highlighted 
eagerness as a key indicator of acceptability. Of the good student she said,
Mavis: Well, er, she’s asking questions, appropriate questions about patients, 
she’s eager to learn, she’s sort of, at the side of you, “What you doing, 
why you doing it?” She’s learning from her experience, she’s talking to 
the patients, as opposed to got her head in a book, if you like, in the 
office, which some do… 
For Mavis the willingness to become involved in care delivery was apparently 
preferred to developing knowledge in an abstracted way, away from the 
opportunity for its application. Involvement with patients, and with doing 
nursing, was core; her perspective seemed complete when she finished the 
above statement. 
Mavis: …why are they there, do they want to be nurses, or do they want to be 
teachers?
It was active engagement with, rather than detached (theoretical), learning 
which was said to matter, and this was further dependent on willingness to 
apply and extend it. This comment also pointed to another aspect of what 
seemed to characterise good practice in students.
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Situational awareness
On the face of it, the last statement implied that book learning was for some 
other purpose than practical nursing. Vis-à-vis correspondence theory’s link 
between behaviour and presumed intent, book learning may be important and 
appropriate for the student. However, for this practitioner it must be combined 
with awareness that there is a time and place for consulting text-books. 
According to circumstance, there must be some recognition of team 
membership and responsibility – both associated, for Mavis, with 
professionalism – demonstrated by actions signalling membership of and 
responsibility to the team. In this respect a concern with book learning at 
inappropriate times supported the requirement to show engagement. Students 
were expected to show awareness of the demands on other team members at 
particular times, and willingness to contribute to the work. There is an uneasy 
tension in this, since students are technically supernumerary; but students must 
learn to read the situation accurately, and then respond to match this. Mavis 
made this point a little later; when asked if it mattered that a student had 
isolated herself in the office to read a book, she responded,
Mavis: Well, it does if it’s Bella or Best or something! … it depends on the 
workload. I mean, you know what the wards are like, you’re so short 
staffed, and if you see somebody sitting down, we do think why are 
they sitting down whilst we’re running round like fools … But if they’re 
there, to learn on the [type of ward], and they’ve got the time for 
studying books at home, haven’t they? …
There were two issues here for Mavis, also raised by others. She started this 
comment by making reference to recreational reading and distinguished 
between this and work-related reading, apparently recalling some actual 
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observation indicative of inappropriate judgement on the part of the student. 
The point was ostensibly an obvious one; but it pointed to a disposition to act in 
support of colleagues. Her second point was that there had to be an awareness 
of the demands of the particular situation, matched by concordant, supporting 
actions. 
May drew out the nature of this requirement at some length, to capture the 
need to read situations, act appropriately within them, and not allow oneself to 
be distracted. In thinking about this, she had made a reference to common 
sense earlier in our conversation, and had now come to some understanding of 
what she meant by this. This description came after she had acknowledged that 
a particular student was very able academically, but appeared to “lack common 
sense” (her words). As she developed this explanation, it became clear that 
common sense had to do with situational awareness, and involved prioritising 
activities according to the demands of the situation. Her first comment, in what 
was a lengthy continuous passage, set up the situation as demanding on her 
own role when working with a student.
May: So you’ve got to weigh up everything, you’ve got to do the auxiliary’s 
job, you’ve got to do your own job, and make sure the student’s picking 
up on things. So you take people off…to the bathroom, and whatever. 
And we were really busy, and, erm, she’d go off and answer the phone 
… which I didn’t think was very important! 
This had two consequences – one for each of them.
May: So she’d leave me with all the work, and she was cutting herself off 
then.
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She then explained the problem in this student’s actions. The student in this 
instance was seen as failing to see the whole situation, which led to a 
judgement that she may simply have been unwilling to contribute help, which 
would have the consequence of lack of learning development; or she was 
failing to appreciate and develop a sense of responsibility for her own allocated 
work. Her distractibility was problematic, and implied that at best she was only 
responding to things she might be more interested in, or more negatively, in 
order to avoid having to deal with more demanding, less attractive work. She 
continued,
May: Or maybe she was just being a bit lazy, and didn’t want to help me. Or 
the bell’d be ringing for the toilet, and … Whoever took that person, 
you’d listen out for the… bell, and … if it was your toilet going, you’d go 
… to get the patient back. It would save taking anybody else 
from…their other bays... you’d remember that you took that patient in 
there, so that if they were being a bit long you’d go and check on them 
– it was your responsibility… 
Clearly, as for Mavis, the student ought to have shown awareness of, and taken 
some responsibility for, her part in whatever was going on at the time. Failure to 
do this meant that others would be overloaded, or that things would be missed. 
This and other considerations also contributed to judgements about whether a 
student was safe. 
Safeness
A number of participants stated at the outset of their commentaries that 
students had to demonstrate that they were safe. Necessarily, therefore, they 
must claim to know what safeness is. Grace supplied a comprehensive yet 
succinct answer to the general question of how she knew a good, hence safe, 
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student: the initial section of this passage is abbreviated from the original, to 
locate safeness in its wider context.
Grace: Right, she was very approachable … without being cheeky [smiles]? 
She took initiative, again, within her own … boundary, you know; and I 
think that’s very important [… ] She took initiative in getting a 
conversation going […] She was a safe practitioner – obviously, which 
is paramount – and she proved that to me; and … was quick to say 
when she wasn’t happy about doing a procedure, or when she wanted 
to learn a procedure more competently... 
The statement that the student “was quick to say when she wasn’t happy about” 
something made clear that she was not simply talking about correct procedural 
skills. This was very much about self-awareness combined with willingness to 
ask for help, guidance, clarification. This understanding was confirmed later in 
the conversation, when I asked what was meant by safe.
Grace: …acknowledge their limitations…and… they’re keen to … work on 
them, to…develop their skills, really, you know, put theory in that 
practice… 
Here she focused directly on the disposition to check first, and followed it by the 
reference to being keen to develop theory and skills; later again she talked 
about getting it right, and returned to checking actively, on the part of the 
student, as the measure of safety. It was clear, as the conversation developed, 
that she was not talking about a student getting things right as the first measure 
of safeness, though this would matter once someone had taken on a particular 
task. She was concerned that the student would check her understanding first, 
by talking it through, or asking to be observed: this, she said, is what made her 
safe. She then implied that overconfidence reduced the likelihood of prior 
checking, suggestive of potential unsafeness.
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Grace: … I don’t like overconfidence in students. And that’s not…because it 
puts me… makes me feel threatened in any way… 
This quality was illustrated at greater length by Megan, when she explained 
how she would recognise safeness in a student, combining this with cautious 
risk-taking.
Megan: … they will come to you, because it does happen, they will come to 
you, “I feel confident about doing this. Do you mind if I do it, and will 
you check it?” And that’s a plus for them, because it’s building their 
confidence as well to do things. I mean, obviously it all depends how far 
they are in their [training]… But some are more confident than others to 
start with in any case. Without being overly confident, ’cause that’s a 
danger of falling that way again!
While Megan finished this statement with a short laugh – I understood this to be 
because of the apparent contradictions in what she was saying – she was, like 
Grace, pointing to the active role taken by the student in checking things out 
before trying them. Again, being safe was being construed as dispositional, 
inferred from appropriate actions: checking first, acting later. May, in slightly 
different words, illustrated the same point, providing a further rationale behind 
this kind of judgement that failure to check first could lead to negative outcomes 
for the individual as well as the patient.
May: … If they were stuck…if they came across problems, and they were 
asking for help, then yes, I’d say, yes, they were safe to go on and 
qualify. Because when you qualify, you… I keep saying to my students, 
you need…don’t be afraid to ask, you need to ask. You go away doing 
your own, you’re gonna end up with no registration.
I will say more in the next chapter about the concept of safeness as constructed 
by these practitioners. For the present purpose it is sufficient to acknowledge 
that for them, as for the professional bodies, safeness was a key concern. For 
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these practitioners it was identified through the confirmatory behaviour 
displayed by the student, not through technique per se. 
Making allowances 
In keeping with Jones and Davies’ (1965) theory of attribution and 
correspondence considerable allowance is made in any judgement cast, either 
to defer the final decision, or to excuse and accept the individual student’s 
failing in individual elements of overall performance. The kinds of allowances 
illustrated below were widely shared amongst participants. Distinctions were 
drawn between late and early stage students; shyness did not debar someone 
from being judged satisfactory; absence of particularly common skills – those 
that might, in the view of the individual practitioner, reasonably be expected of 
anyone who has been in training for more than a few weeks, for instance – may 
be attributed to poor guidance in the past, or simple lack of opportunity (such as 
particular types of ward). In the next extract, Nina illustrated how she 
differentiated between early and late stage students: the former must show 
interest in learning and engaging with opportunity when it is pointed out to 
them; the latter should show willingness to take things on by their own initiative, 
instead of waiting for permission. The difference was fairly subtle, but was there 
nonetheless.
Nina: Right – what you do see is that in the early stages they will say, “Can I 
come and see? Can I come and do? I want to see this; I want to see 
that”. You tend to find, as they get more experience, they’re into their 
final year, final six months…i…it kind of turns round, and I say, “What 
do you want from me?… But I also expect to see motivation – I want to 
see this, I want you to tell me […] You…in a good student, that’s what 
you’re gonna see. “Can I – oh, I’ve noticed such and such is going on –
I’m going to stay behind and watch it… 
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In a community setting Grace drew out a distinction between displays of 
disposition in different contexts: lack of initiative in interaction, especially early 
in training, did not mean unacceptability in practice. 
Grace: Oh, yes, because a lot of them are very shy – particularly when they 
come out into the community.
Lack of interaction was not a reason for failure provided it was attributable to 
shyness. Following this there was an extensive description of why it was difficult 
for some students to be at their ease in unfamiliar surroundings; Grace was 
very aware of the impact of unfamiliar conditions. In a similar manner, Molly 
commented that students needed time to acclimatise to new colleagues; but 
this was alongside an expectation that they would join in, and be present at 
team gatherings. 
Molly: …we include the students very much in that sort of social side of work. 
And although you may get a student who’s very shy and everything, 
erm, may not want to go with some of the other more, sort of, the louder 
people if you like, yeh, you do make some allowances for that. But I 
think once they’ve been here a couple of weeks they need to make 
sure that, themselves, they’re part of that team. 
She justified this potentially heavy expectation by reference to the changing 
context of nursing and training. Her point here seemed to take something from 
the greater emphasis on individual responsibility prevalent both in wider society 
and in the expectations of current nursing programmes.
Molly: I think if they’re in a… in nursing these days they’ve got to be able to 
take advantage of every opportunity. I think you’ve got to grab the 
opportunity. I don’t think you can sit back and, and not take on these 
responsibilities of opportunities. I do see it very much as a responsibility 
of the nurse. 
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This was distinguished from leaving them entirely to their own devices. The 
expectation was akin to Nina’s earlier reference to taking the initiative in 
learning.
Molly: I think they’re very much, all responsible for their own development, for 
their own training; er, I don’t believe in spoon-feeding. Although I will 
give them the opportunity to do something, it’s very much up to them to 
take that on board. 
Deference to circumstances was strong, and came through frequently, even 
where the reason (e.g. past clinical experiences) was not immediately 
verifiable. The preference for all participants seemed to be to avoid negative 
judgement of a student. Stella seemed to confirm this when responding to a 
question about whether she regarded a third year student, who was failing to 
show full integration into the team, as acceptable or unacceptable. The 
following extract has other implications, which will be explored in the next 
chapter, but here it served to illustrate the active movement between personal 
responsibility for actions and influential circumstances.
Stella: I think it would be non-acceptable, really. In that …[sigh] … depending 
on what they could, I mean if they, if they just weren’t communicating 
well within a team, and they weren’t playing as part of a team – it would 
depend on the circumstances, really. 
The tendency to favour situational factors as the explanation, and the 
reluctance actually to fail someone, was nicely illustrated with her concluding 
statement on this situation.
… because there must be an underlying reason why somebody… 
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The preference to speculate about personal circumstances, rather than fail or 
condemn someone, was also shown by Megan, reviewing her judgement of a 
failing student:
Megan: …he came over to me as a very sad, lonely lad in the long term. I 
wondered if there’s things that had influenced [him]…
CONCLUSION 
From the point of view of attribution theory, then, the analysis pointed to an 
approach to assessment based predominantly on dispositional characteristics 
found in students. Changes in knowledge and skill, or willingness to confirm 
understanding prior to acting, provided evidence of appropriate engagement 
with learning, or of safeness in practice (cf. Jones and Davies 1965). 
Participants were not obviously inclined to talk about or attribute competence, 
understood in its reductive sense, as the leading criterion for acceptability. 
When the concept was raised it was characteristically deployed as a reference 
to minimally acceptable, mainly technical, ability, and was distinguished from a 
student’s overall approach to the work, a much more critical factor. The various 
criteria accessed for judgements of student performance were organised in a 
loose hierarchical relationship: from the evidence adduced so far disposition 
appeared to be considered crucial, while technical gains were used as overt 
indicators of the presence of the more important criteria. Before applying a 
negative judgement, consideration was given to situational characteristics with 
a view to exonerating the student from responsibility for lack of engagement.
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However, for all that the data had led me to this largely rationalistic analysis, I 
recognised, in reading and re-reading the data, that participants were implicitly 
presenting themselves as models of acceptable practice. As I continued to 
engage with their stories it became apparent that these were not merely 
detached, uninterested observations or claims, but that they were doing certain 
work for their owners (Potter 1997), especially in relation to safeness and their 
attempts to explain and accommodate students’ deficits. For instance, Grace 
and Megan were suggesting that they avoided over-confidence and so 
remained safe practitioners by acknowledging what they did not know. 
Likewise, May was aware of what was going on around her, and of her 
obligation to her self, her patients, and others; Nina would when necessary put 
in the extra effort for her own benefit and that of her patients. By implication, 
Nerys was interested in the impact of clinical conditions on her patients; Mavis 
was motivated to get involved when it was busy; Stella and Molly were 
suggesting that they were good team members. 
The analysis to be undertaken in the following chapters will draw out this more 
interested perspective on participants’ practices in assessment. The 
implications of official requirements for their own status, and the defensive 
function of what they presented as their preferred notion of acceptability, will be 
explored. The next three chapters are concerned with the problems of 
knowledge and its construction, the nursing self, and decision-making, 
respectively. They will include a further consideration of the importance or 
otherwise of absolute achievement of pre-determined knowledge and skills; of 
the notion of safeness in practice and how this was constructed by these 
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practitioners; of their construction of multiple nursing identities; and of the 
hesitant nature of their assessment practices. Foucault (2002a, 1977b) 
provides useful insights into the way we understand knowledge production and 
the construction of the self. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) have proposed that 
we, and knowledge, are always in a state of becoming-other. Insights taken 
from the work of Derrida (Edgoose 2001; Derrida and Caputo 1997; Derrida 
1995) will help understand the process and problem of decision-making faced 
by practitioners.
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Chapter 5: The Jugglers’ Discourse 
“You know, we’re very contradictory, nurses, aren’t we?” (Megan)
The last chapter was concerned with the apparently rational process of 
ascribing acceptability to students’ practice according to criteria determined by 
practitioners themselves. In contrast to the technical orientation of current 
policy, the predominant perspective taken was a dispositional one, hence more 
characteristic of what Stronach and colleagues (2002) refer to as the ecology of 
practice. This is problematic from a policy point of view, since it undermines the 
technicised model orientated to a so-called economy of practice (ibid.), 
favoured for its accountability and greater capacity for measurement. However, 
as suggested by Anderson et al (2001) and Potter (1997), the process of 
attribution has omitted a consideration of observer interest in judgements made 
about others. They have argued that observers are active, not passive, in the 
process, especially in relation to the implications of the judgements they make 
for themselves. 
This chapter takes a more discourse analytic perspective on the claims of 
practitioners, and is strengthened by evidence adduced from a second set of 
interviews with a small number of participants. In Foucauldian terms 
practitioners developed their own discourse of practice through the construction 
of statements and enunciations dispersed throughout their stories, creating 
discursive regularities (Andersen 2003; Foucault 2002a). Through their 
elaborations of why disposition was said to be important they produced the 
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warrant for their statements about what mattered. Practitioners have to juggle 
numerous potentially incommensurable factors, and in these interviews 
demonstrated a resistance to the over-arching technical-rational model of 
nursing activity, though they acknowledged its place in practice. Whenever they 
might move beyond the boundaries of what is discursively permitted, they 
seemed to experience uncertainty and so moved back. In effect they were 
moving to and fro at the boundary, recognising that their moves were into 
unauthorised territory. 
THE PRACTITIONERS’ DISCOURSE
Practitioners developed a multi-faceted discourse concerned with the 
continuous process of learning about and doing nursing, first accessing one, 
then another, aspect of knowledge, then moving back to the first, or to yet 
another. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) argue for a rhizomatic conception of 
knowledge and the self which is non-linear yet always connected. They want us 
to understand that knowledge is not dependent on the linear refinement of its 
truth, but that ideas can be picked up and refashioned, yet still belong to the 
same field of understanding. Thus, the limit imposed by a unifying approach to 
nursing knowledge – its rationalistic refinement and inscription in predetermined 
activities or attributes – and its intended internalisation for the purpose of 
control through self-monitoring (Lorentzon 1990; Foucault 1977a) was 
recognised and resisted (Foucault 1977b). 
In effect, participants rejected a conception of knowledge as either/or (e.g. 
rational vs. intuitive), and replaced it with both/and, so working to ostensibly 
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competing alternatives, which they would hold as valid at the same time 
(Foucault 2000). In articulating the complexity of this, several participants 
became aware that to the outsider (or to me, an insider, but from their point of 
view probably a rationalistic one) this would appear to lack coherence. For most 
this was the first time they had tried to articulate their understanding 
deliberatively, so that where they had assumed a relatively straightforward 
procedure, this was revealed as much more fluid and complex than they had 
previously understood. This very point was made by May.
May: … It’s really difficult, this – it’s not as easy as I thought it was going to 
be! ’Cause you’ve got to think! 
The process of evaluating student performance might be described as a form of 
juggling: practitioners need to keep several items in the air, items of different 
size, weight, shape, texture or significance. The responses illustrated in the last 
chapter, together with those to be highlighted here, tell us that these 
practitioners are very aware of the intention that they should measure, and see, 
practice in a particular way. The data also indicated an active attempt to 
circumvent this by a kind of sleight of hand when articulating these judgements. 
The claim that dispositional qualities were the key, in contrast to more concrete 
criteria, would be difficult to reject, especially when presented alongside the 
notion of caring-ness as the core of nursing work. At the same time, technical 
gains were said to be important, but were usually regarded as evidence of 
appropriate engagement with clinical learning opportunities, which, in turn, 
illustrated caring for and about people in its widest sense. In articulating the 
process participants constructed a complex discourse around different aspects 
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of practice, bringing together an overarching, multi-faceted view of practice and 
a complex view of what it means to claim to be a nurse: the juggler’s discourse. 
This was orientated to their own interest, and allowed them to position 
themselves in relation to potentially incommensurable understandings. That 
there might be co-existing discourses in operation is consistent with Foucault’s 
use of the concept: he argues that several discourses can operate in parallel, 
constructed by and in the interest of different groups, with elements of each 
possibly found in others, though used for different purposes (Andersen 2003; 
Foucault 2002a).
The practice knowledge claimed by participants circulated around and within a 
number of aspects of good or acceptable practice, composed of a variety of 
facets, and woven into their understanding of what is involved. Understanding 
here refers to the territory of nursing practice – the kinds of things one might 
expect to find there; it is not suggesting that nursing is definitively either this or 
that. Practitioners were simply utilising more of the possibilities available to 
them in the field of immanence belonging to nursing as they saw it than the 
official discourse would allow (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1994). 
Learning nursing
Practitioners made claims about the dispositional qualities they were seeking in 
students. Disposition as described was concerned with a person’s overall 
approach to learning about nursing. The last chapter showed how attributions of 
appropriate disposition were foregrounded, while absolute achievements in 
knowledge or skills held the status of evidence for the latter for these 
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participants. What was said to matter was, firstly, what a student did with 
learning opportunities encountered; and, secondly, what s/he did to remedy any 
deficits which they, as mentors, or the student in her or his own right, had 
identified. Certainly there was an expectation that the student would be more 
capable by the end of a given period of experience than at its commencement; 
but achievement was dependent on the desire to be involved. The absence of 
particular elements of knowledge or skill was not of itself critical to success by 
this account, a position at odds with the requirements of formal assessment 
documentation, which was in turn regarded as a source of ideas if self-
motivated development was not evident. 
The way these ideas were presented tells us that these practitioners considered 
that they had the qualities they were looking for, otherwise they could not claim 
the authority to make such decisions about others. They were looking for 
evidence in students’ performance that they were occupying certain ground, 
situating themselves in the same territory as the practitioners (cf. Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988). This was couched as a desire to be in nursing (illustrated in the 
last chapter by Marje, Molly, Rena, Megan), and was manifested as wanting to 
be there. 
Maisie: … when I asked him, you know, what …what his aims were, objectives 
for the placement, he’d got them in his mind before he came on to the 
ward, really. He’d done quite a little bit of background… 
Given that the emphasis here was not on absolutes of achievement, but on 
spontaneous, active engagement and attentiveness to learning opportunities, it 
invoked the image of a more natural display of desire to be with, or of interest 
135
in, people, than was evident in the official representation of practice. Megan, for 
instance, made extensive reference to one of her former students.
Megan: I think you, yes, you’ve got to be interested in people … I have seen 
students, and I think, you know, they’d be better in a laboratory doing 
research! … because they just don’t have those people skills…They’re 
highly intelligent people, but they have no social skills whatsoever … 
we all have skills in different things. 
This natural quality, implying something brought to learning by students, rather 
than taught to them, was also emphasised by other participants, for instance, 
Marje, who stated,
Marje: She was a natural communicator; she was relaxed around myself and 
colleagues. 
Reading such qualities in this way implied a concern with dynamic presence, 
epitomised by desire, which would lead the student to be active in learning. 
Toni commented,
Toni: Some students think that, because they’re actually on the course, that 
proves that they want to be a nurse. And it isn’t. 
A few moments later, speaking of the good student, she said,
Toni: And they are eager and they want to learn, and they’re asking 
questions continually. 
The reference was quite clearly to the personal desire to know nursing, by 
engaging with a range of opportunities. Megan continued her own point from 
above, and moved on to emphasise this perspective.
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Megan: I mean they’ve probably had to try nursing – if you don’t try it, you 
know, you’re not going to know, are you? And I think we have a duty to 
tell these students… 
This statement was claiming that certain people are simply not suited to a 
career in nursing: this disposition is not something that can simply be acquired 
through training and education. The point was supported quite explicitly by 
others. Nan, for example, suggested that the purpose of training was to develop 
technical ability. Personal qualities are brought to the project, and have to be 
there to make a difference in practice.
Nan: I don’t think it’s all, in everybody. I think it’s in people’s personalities as 
well. So you may not be able to train somebody to be a good nurse…
The notion of duty or obligation referred to by Megan will be revisited in a 
subsequent chapter, but for the present the function of her statement was clear: 
she was concerned to show compassion; and she stayed with the dispositional 
criterion as necessary to learning, resisting the technical end-point model. Her 
description of the young man referred to (the same one she suggested would 
be better suited to laboratory work) pointed to the likelihood of his being 
perfectly capable of undertaking technical aspects of nursing work, and to 
match this with appropriate knowledge, but she judged him to be failing. 
Megan’s and Nan’s descriptions were similar to that given by Nina when she 
commented,
Nina: You can have the most knowledgeable person, but if their attitude is 
appalling, then I’m afraid skill and knowledge mean nothing to me... 
absolutely nothing. 
137
This view implied that knowledge and skills were important; but it was also 
consistent with the ascription of acceptability based on disposition. Participants’ 
statements pointed to a constant awareness that individual disposition may not 
entirely or adequately explain omissions in performance; equally, technical 
criteria were considered inadequate as a basis for judgement of overall 
satisfactory development. Practice was understood as comprising a more 
subtle form of activity than technical reproduction or deployment could capture. 
The process of attribution indicated what constituted appropriate evidence of 
suitable disposition, but this appeared now to function as a statement about the 
kind of person thought to be suited to nursing as a career, and about the 
process of coming to know what nurses know. These practitioners were 
distinguishing between someone going though the motions of training for a job, 
and the preferred natural quality of wanting to be a nurse: the beginnings of a 
model of the nurse, a move in the gradual construction of what would become a 
multiple and fluid nursing self. From a Foucauldian perspective, these were 
regular statements appearing throughout their descriptions of the assessment 
process. The different terms they used, and the way they constructed their 
declarations about acceptability, came together to express both the kind of 
thing sought in students, and their understanding of nursing practice: this is “the 
enunciative function” of such statements (Foucault 2002a, p. 99), found in the 
relations between them and the “spaces of differentiation” to which they refer 
(ibid. p. 103).
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Contradictory practice
A view widely expressed amongst participants was that skills and procedures 
are easily learned. In chapter four I showed that several participants made 
reference to the possibility of teaching technical skills to monkeys, to convey 
their understanding of the non-sophistication of this aspect of training. The 
claim was striking given the strong emphasis on the competencies-based 
approach of recent policy; there has even been a call for greater use of 
practical skills laboratories (UKCC 1999). For these practitioners skills 
development was something that would come as the opportunity arose; it was 
not definitive of practice or capability. In the same way, the claim was made that 
knowledge per se could be acquired through exposure to opportunity combined 
with actively following up any guidance offered. For instance, when describing a 
student’s response to knowledge input from her mentor, Bron stated, 
emphasising the dispositional once again,
Bron You can give them as much information as you think they need. But if 
you’re getting no response back from them, then you think, why am I 
bothering. I’m wasting my time. 
When asked whether this had to do with acquisition of a defined bank of 
knowledge and whether this was important, she was clear that failing to 
understand something could be corrected, and was therefore not critical.
Bron Because you can correct something wrong, or… you can build on that 
knowledge. 
Technical definitions are evidently too limiting on this account, though this is not 
to say that technical ability does not have its place. For these practitioners,
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there was considerable difficulty in identifying a unified model of practice. 
Megan, for instance, repeatedly returned to the problem of deciding between 
technical and dispositional criteria to determine acceptability. From the outset of 
our conversation she made reference to apparent contradictions in the process, 
ergo in the business of characterising nursing and nurses. She readily 
commented on her uncertainty.
Megan: Now, having said that as well – I’m quite contradictory to myself – but 
there are some students who will ask all the correct theoretical things, 
but… 
Her reservation about such a student concerned the overall approach. Later 
she found herself struggling with the principle of standardisation, of looking for 
particular traits in students as people, and once again illustrated her juggling 
skills. Following this line of constant contradiction, in the next two passages she 
illustrated, first, rejection of the idea of a standard personal profile for nurses, 
and, second, the impossibility of finding all required elements of an assessment 
without there being some contradiction in the search. 
Megan: Because we’re all individuals as well, aren’t we? And I certainly 
wouldn’t want clones – I really contradict myself, don’t I? 
Having herself rejected the idea of competence as the reproduction of a set of 
given criteria, she then returned to it uneasily. Like many others in the group 
she also used a lot of language of emotional judgement, e.g. “if I felt that…”. 
She illustrated the complexity of her nursing self when responding to a question 
about the relative importance of the need for a student to produce a particular 
performance (“come up with the goods”) as opposed to showing appropriate 
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disposition. It was quite clear here that she was not operating to a singular 
definition of what it meant to claim to be a nurse. The passage is quoted at 
length to illustrate her difficulty; indeed, her responses were repeatedly 
punctuated by this kind of hesitation as she wrestled with her discomfort at the 
realisation that there may be no definitive model that she could use. For 
someone with her length of post-qualification experience, this was all the more 
striking.
Megan: … strangely enough… if somebody didn’t come up with the goods as 
well. See, this is how you contradict your… you know, we’re very 
contradictory, nurses, aren’t we? I suppose. Or people… but, no, you 
see, if they don’t come up with the goods, that’s it. That is true enough, 
yeh. You think, “Oh, no, I can’t…”. Having said that, again, they have so 
many good qualities, but it’s this willingness to learn, yeh … [lengthy 
pause] … that would come down… Right! That would come down if I 
genuinely felt that it was, they just couldn’t, did not have that ability to 
increase their knowledge. Yeh? They’d find it really, really difficult –
academically again now…So the academic thing does come into it. 
Cor! I had to think hard about that. And yet you’re doing it all the time. 
This orientation to a model of practice not dominated by technical or procedural 
considerations, and in which the individual brings certain appropriate 
characteristics to the work, seemed to be built around a notion of caring, 
although this was never defined closely by anyone. Repeated references were 
made to a caring profession, caring for others, always implying sensitivity to 
others’ needs.
Competence
Closely interwoven with this unsettled understanding of practice was a view of 
competence. Participants distinguished between good practice on the one hand 
and minimally acceptable – or what some called competent – practice on the 
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other, as well as between acceptable and failing practice. In this, practitioners 
viewed skills and knowledge as (relatively) easily taught, and technical 
definitions of practice as too limiting, and caring as something not easily 
acquired in the classroom. Accordingly, the acquisition and deployment of easy 
achievements constituted minimally acceptable practice – mere competence; 
good practice comprised something additional – personal commitment, 
engagement and so on – that students must bring to nurse training, and which 
developed further through active immersion in practice. No-one suggested that 
knowledge and skills do not have a place; rather, these do not dominate 
conceptions of good practice. This stance has its own logic given the defensive 
deployment of such criteria to be illustrated later in the chapter. 
Nan made the point with some difficulty, that good and competent (adequate) 
should be distinguished. Her view, that competence is a narrow, technically 
defined state, was typical of the whole group.
Nan: But I think I would probably say somebody’s competent based on my 
observation of them performing a skill to a … high standard or a 
recognised safe standard…
Nan: You’re ticking the criteria ‘Can the student do a care plan, yes or no?’ 
‘Have you watched them do a care plan?’ So it is a lot of the 
mechanistic things. 
Between these two statements, at different points in the interview, Nan 
emphasised that she was more concerned with identifying good practice than
identifying technical ability in isolation, repeating this point throughout our 
conversation. She wanted more to be included in her judgements than was 
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available through official record forms. Her next comments performed the 
enunciative function, to establish the preferred understanding, pointing to and 
rejecting the visibility criterion of the current policy orientation, when she 
commented,
Nan: Put it this way, I’ve had, or I’ve met, nurses that are very safe 
practitioners, but I don’t think I’d want my relatives to be looked after 
[by] them, because I don’t think they’ve got any caring aspects. 
… I couldn’t fail them, because the criteria isn’t arranged in such a way 
that you’re taking in those … those aspects. I don’t feel, that the criteria 
is arranged like, because it’s probably more based on … erm, activities 
that a nurse does. 
Another kind of movement around the concept of competence was evident in 
another participant’s responses. Nerys offered apparently conflicting versions of 
what she was looking for. On the one hand she considered competent 
equivalent to safe in terms of correct technique; this seemed to be equated with 
appropriate knowledge and practical skill.
Nerys: If I say that somebody’s competent, what I would be looking at is that 
they are safe … in what they’re doing. They know what they’re doing, 
they understand what they’re doing. And, erm…that they have [sic] able 
to do it, in a safe manner that isn’t causing any harm, erm, to the 
patient. That, I would say, is when they are competent in doing 
something. 
Very shortly after this she returned to the issue, suggesting that, while it was 
important that, if a nurse is to do something, it should be done correctly, 
nonetheless it was willingness to remedy deficits that was equated with 
competence. Nerys was also juggling with the proposition that nurses need to 
be knowledgeable and skilled, while at the same time claiming that lack of 
143
either does not equate to incompetence: a deficit can be remedied, and of itself 
does not mean incompetence. Hence, she was depicting competence as a 
different order of achievement than the presence of a task- or knowledge-based 
criterion.
Nerys: For …you to be competent at a skill, you’ve got to be able to practise 
the skill, and deliver the skill, and be seen that you are doing that in a 
competent manner. Your knowledge, your competence of knowledge, 
in my book, I think that… I don’t know everything, and I’ve been a nurse 
for many years, and I don’t know everything. But that doesn’t mean that 
I’m not competent. … I am…I would say that I am a competent nurse –
if I don’t know something I’ll go and find out. 
For these people, then, competence was conceived of more as a global 
attribute than a specific, skill based one; the latter was readily defined by all as 
competency in something, seen as a locally determined, task specific 
achievement, rather than as a representation of nursing-competence. Given 
what participants said about skills, this was a low level achievement, referring at 
best to minimal acceptability in practice performance; it was heavily based on 
technical ability, rather than on what practitioners viewed as a complete 
concept of nursing. Their own model was reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1994) field of immanence, where all related conceptual possibilities are 
located, and where none dominates the picture, each drawn on according to 
situational need. Global competence included technical correctness in 
situations with which students came into contact. That is, it left the non-
achievement of particular skills outside the boundary of competent practice, but 
not vice versa. That the absence of particular sets of knowledge did not of itself 
imply incompetence was a widely expressed view. May summed it up.
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May: … Just because you may be qualified twenty-odd years, it doesn’t 
mean that you know everything, and you’re always gonna come 
across…I always tell my students that you’ve always got to ask. Don’t 
think, don’t just presume that you know what you’re doing. If you’ve 
never done the task before, you ask..
Safeness
It was no surprise in this context that safeness was an important criterion, and 
there was no question that it was sought by practitioners. What was interesting, 
indeed striking, was practitioners’ construction of the concept. Standard 
representations of safeness are concerned with correct understanding and 
deployment of skills and procedures. This is the purpose of competency 
statements and protocols, adherence to which is seen as safe practice, and 
there was evidence of this kind of awareness in participants’ responses. 
However, participants demonstrated resistance to this conception of safeness; 
for this group at least, it was described as dispositional. I showed in the last 
chapter that it was the tendency to check prior to acting that was used to 
determine a student’s safeness, not correct procedural ability per se. Within 
their own discourse there was considerable movement between the two, as I 
will illustrate below. 
They could not ignore the official version, and appeared to align themselves 
with official demands, by acknowledging that nurses need both knowledge and 
skill. However, in doing this they utilised a range of visible – knowledge- and 
skills-based – behaviours as evidence of appropriate disposition, and 
juxtaposed safeness and the need for future continuing development of 
knowledge and skill. In Deleuzian terms (Deleuze and Guattari 1988) 
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practitioners appeared to be attempting a recovery of the territory of practice 
from policy makers and managers, who have sought to take it over for the 
purpose of measurement and accountability. In doing so, they recaptured the 
territory of practice by locating the technical element within their own
understanding of what made a good nurse. So here was a form of 
transgression (Foucault 1977b) – a struggle with what is discursively permitted 
– in which practitioners’ definition of safeness at work was at odds with the 
official version.
This view of safeness distinguished the safe practitioner from the safe (i.e. 
correct) procedure, and was strongly linked to their more global understanding 
of the notion of competence. It was based on statements about the qualified 
practitioner: the need to acknowledge a deficit, and then to do something to 
remedy this. May spelt out, very early in our conversation, that, for her, 
competence revolved around safeness, but this was not the same as technical 
prowess. She expressed this in terms of disposition; asked whether a skill 
deficit was an important factor, she replied,
May: No, because they’ll learn to do it. It’s when they think they can do things 
– when they go away to do a procedure, and they, you know, they’re 
thinking they can do it, and they’ve never done it before – that concerns 
me. 
A while later she developed this.
May: No, a competent nurse to me, if I look at myself … I think … it’s …it’s 
being a safe practitioner, it’s being safe. It’s knowing that what you’re 
doing is the right way to do it, doing it correctly, and if you don’t know 
how to do something, you ask. You find out, er… That to me is a 
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competent nurse 
In the following extracts Grace showed considerable movement at the boundary 
of what is currently discursively permitted (cf. Foucault 1977b): she seems 
initially to prefer a dispositional understanding – unauthorised territory; then she 
offers a more technical view – discursively permitted. 
Grace: Yeh, that’s paramount really – I suppose it’s that they will acknowledge 
their limitations […] and… they’re keen to … work on them, to…develop 
their skills 
…well, yes, really, to get it right safely. Yes, yeh, and I mean, or at least 
… allow me to talk them through it to a certain extent. I mean, obviously 
…or at least tell me, step by step, perhaps. 
She was once more juggling, struggling with different conceptions. The contrast 
between “get it right safely” and “at least…to a certain extent” shows 
considerable uncertainty about what she can say, having established the more 
dispositional understanding initially. Grace’s construction is fundamentally 
problematic and requires a more fluid understanding than is implied by fixed, 
technically driven statements of achievement. Indeed, if these ideas can be 
held simultaneously, then they are more in keeping with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1994, 1988) notion, wherein all associated aspects of knowledge occupy the 
same space, and non-linear, rhizomatic connections link ostensibly 
incommensurate elements. This kind of understanding seemed to be present in 
these practitioners’ thinking; fixed definitions gave them another juggling 
challenge, since these conflict with their concern with initiative and 
engagement, a point captured below by Bron. The subsequent extract from Nan 
elaborated on this, illustrating the difficulty involved in such judgements –
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balancing self-awareness, willingness to ask for guidance, and confidence, as 
well as correctness when actually carrying out a procedure.
Bron: Because they can be enthusiastic and not be safe. 
Nan: … what I class as a good student, they’ll be confident, but they’ll know 
when not to attempt to do something out of their limitations… […] I’d be 
quite happy for a student to come up to me and just say, “Can I just 
check this out with you, to make sure that I am doing the right 
practice?” before they go off and use their own initiative. I mean, it’s a 
bit of both really. 
Nan developed her view further, exposing her clear variance from the official 
technical version of practice: she equated the latter with mere competence –
necessary, but not equivalent to good nursing. The general thrust of our 
conversation suggested that if a student did something, s/he should do it 
correctly, but did not suggest that this of itself made a good or competent nurse, 
at least not in the more global sense. Here again a distinction was drawn 
between the satisfactory (competent in technique) and the good (globally 
competent) practitioner. 
Nan: … if they’d achieved the… performance level and it’s safe, then I 
couldn’t fail them, but I wouldn’t … wouldn’t give them a wonderful 
report, ’cause I wouldn’t feel that they had the attributes to bring to the 
job. 
Indeed, this shift in focus was commonplace amongst participants: they 
frequently moved away from the question of what made a student’s 
performance competent (according to their own definition, that is) and towards 
what made a student a good becoming-practitioner. On this evidence, then, it 
did not matter whether a student could carry out particular skills correctly, or 
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whether s/he knew and could correctly give a particular theoretical rationale. 
This of itself would not constitute safeness; instead, especially when 
accompanied by overconfidence it implied failure to recognise difficulties in 
what may look like a standard problem. Lack of experience could lead to 
inappropriate application of, say, a particular procedural skill. To be safe was 
said to mean confirming the interpretation of a situation prior to acting on it, and 
taking advantage of any opportunity to develop better understanding and ability. 
Knowledge and expertise
The way these practitioners constructed the knowledge base of their practice, 
then, challenged the given view of practice, and was illustrated further when 
practitioners talked about professionalism, grounded in ideas of mutuality and 
patient involvement, active engagement in building nurse-patient relationships, 
and ethical, confidential practices. There was a constant tendency to refer to 
good practice through reference to non-technical aspects of professionalism 
focusing on the nature of the relationship with patients (i.e. the manner of doing 
nursing). Once again this was based on evidence of personal interest in others, 
and sensitivity to their value as people, or to their vulnerability as patients. 
Abby: And it’s really important that they’ve got good listening skills, and that 
they can do an assessment of the whole person. Especially when 
they’re doing things like rehab, and … seeing patients as individuals not 
just as another patient. 
Sandy made the point quite clearly that sensitivity and concern for the other 
was a key element of good practice, and should not be overwhelmed by 
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considerations of technical prowess. In the following extract she recalled her 
own training experience and judgements of others’ performances.
Sandy: …technically they were good, if not better than good, but just their 
attitudes did nothing to help the … process of, whether it be healing or, 
whatever. I think it is so important, because most patients are 
vulnerable. By the very fact that they’re going for treatment for 
whatever, they’re in a vulnerable position. I don’t mean you want 
somebody who’ll sit and cry with you all day – sometimes you need a 
strong person – but you need a person who can at least try and reach 
out to you. 
For many of these practitioners their understanding of the nature of practice 
showed a preference for flexibility, consistent with the literature reviewed in 
chapter two (e.g. Wade 1999, Ohlen and Segesten 1998). Indeed, the following 
extract is interesting for the very fact that Abby rejected a consideration of 
competence in favour of being good at the job, which was then characterised by 
flexibility and adaptation, not by adherence to a pre-determined technical 
standard.
Abby If I’m thinking of somebody who is good at their job, rather than 
competent, I would think of somebody who is, professional, and 
organised, and doesn’t get phased by things that happen. You know, 
they can go with the flow and they can … deviate from their prescribed 
course without it causing them too much of a hassle.
These practitioners were concerned with the nature of, and means of acquiring, 
nursing knowledge, within which appeared the claim to specialist 
understanding. This was built around the claim that knowledge and skill 
development were inseparable from personal engagement with opportunity and 
with people, and highlighted the manner of their coming to know what they 
know. Participants displayed considerable ambivalence when trying to locate 
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formally theorised knowledge in practice, a tendency comparable to the findings 
of Fish and Cole’s (1998) work, in which they found respondents deferred to a 
personalised form of theory in practice. 
Perhaps the most striking example of this was found in Tina’s debate with 
herself about the idea of gut feeling. In this she was pushing against the policy 
emphasis on evidence based practice. The current policy drive, and her own 
efforts to obtain a full degree in nursing, on-going at the time of the interviews, 
pushed her towards finding solid theoretical evidence for any judgement. Yet 
she also had a certain belief in the value of intuitive knowing – expressed for 
her as gut feeling – which she articulated as somehow knowing something to 
be the case, even though the evidence was not always clear. She made an 
unsolicited reference to gut feeling, which remained at a superficial level 
initially. Because it implied a particular way of knowing, I asked her about it 
explicitly in a second interview. When the issue was raised, her response was 
instant.
Tina(2): [Immediately] I’m glad you’ve said that, because, I must admit, since 
you, and I thought, I’m glad you mentioned that, ’cause that’s bothered 
me. Gut feeling’s bothered me for ages now … because I believed it 
when I said it! I do believe that there is some gut feeling – I don’t know, 
it’s not normal is it, some sort of normal thing when you’re having a gut 
feeling. 
Tina continued her wrestling match for some time, to-ing and fro-ing between 
intuition and rationality – moving to and fro at the boundary of what is permitted 
– and could not easily resolve this tension. Ultimately the two appeared to co-
exist as uneasy bedfellows (cf. Francis 1999, on nursing and post-modernism), 
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with different applications according to the problem to be addressed. Thus, her 
expertise could accommodate two kinds of knowledge, although she felt the 
pressure from the prevailing discourse to provide a rationalistic explanation for 
her judgements.
Tina(2): I would say it to myself – my gut f… - and then I’ve got to work that out. 
There’s got be a reason why that gut feeling is there. You can’t just say, 
“My…oh, it’s my gut feeling.” You’ve got to, there’s got to be a reason in 
there, and when you start putting the reasons down, you start 
backtracking…
But that’s not a gut feeling is it, that was knowledge that was put in my 
head to go and do that. I can’t turn round and say my gut feeling was to 
do CPR on that patient; it wasn’t, it was the knowledge in my head. 
This embodied way of thinking was matched by others in the group, with 
frequent references to ‘feeling that…’ rather than ‘knowing that…’. Another 
participant who was interviewed a second time, when asked how she would 
justify her decision (to college staff) if she were to fail a student, offered the 
following explanation, in which she deferred to her own understanding of the 
demands of the clinical setting.
Mena(2): … you know, if I feel, and I’ve got valid reasons, erm, I don’t really 
mind the fact, if they come back to me, and ask me as a mentor, why I 
made that decision … 
Once again, it seems important to acknowledge the language used in this kind 
of statement – used frequently by Mena in both interviews – to express the 
idea. The reference to feeling knowledge may be a personal style of speech, 
but also appeared to serve to articulate observations which defied rationalistic 
interpretation. That this was found elsewhere in the group is illustrated in these 
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three short extracts from the conversation with Marje, in which she claimed to 
recognise suitability by feeling it, and soon confirmed the validity of this way of 
knowing by tying it to a patient’s view of whether someone is responding 
appropriately. The first two comments were stated early on; much later in the 
conversation she returned to this intuitive view of knowing a student when 
recording her judgement. 
Marje: I think just being there, that you can feel they’re natural…
And a patient will know… will feel whether the nurse is interested in 
them…erm… whether they’re listening to them.
And I do try and word it in the way I feel it.
Like Mena, Marje chose deliberately to change the words used, from knowing 
something to feeling it. These comments turn again to the non-technical 
understanding of professional practice, and a non-rationalistic view of the 
process of learning about nursing; it invoked an image of the student as an 
active agent, not merely someone to whom things are done or given. The 
tension between the disciplinary formation of the aspiring nurse (cf. Foucault 
1977a), exemplified by the demands of formal assessment, and a nurse’s self-
constitution as an active practice, not merely the internalisation of others’ 
preferences, showed through. This is a grounded, not an abstracted, 
rationalistic kind of knowing. Finding the balance between the two was not 
easy, but such responses were typical of how these practitioners claimed to 
know their work, and was matched by the continuous return to a more 
personalised understanding of acceptability (cf. Fish and Coles 1998).
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Self-defence
Potter (1996) has shown that the way people express their ideas does certain 
work for them, and this provides another useful perspective on practitioners’ 
claims. When considered in the round it was evident that there was a defensive 
function in the way judgements of students were expressed. For example, 
Stella seemed very mindful for most of our conversation of my position in the 
educational field of practice, and of our relative status – in her perception –
despite all assurances that no judgement was being made by me. Her initial 
responses seemed to confirm this, in that she spent a considerable amount of 
time showing that she was doing things properly. This conveyed the impression 
that she wished to avoid blame for any failing on the student’s part; her 
responses were strongly indicative of her sense of being under surveillance (cf. 
Pask 1995; Foucault 1977a), in that she made repeated reference to notions 
like standards, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, as here, well into our 
conversation. 
Stella: … I still wouldn’t be happy if…if they were still continuing to work 
shoddily, and not wash their hands, and… No matter how much 
knowledge they could give me and feed to me, if that performance 
wasn’t marrying up with the theory that they were telling me, I’d be even 
more concerned, I think.
Standards of achievement were generally illustrated in terms of knowledge and 
skills – the measurable aspects of practice. However, when asked to expand on 
claims that skill and knowledge per se mattered more than other things, it was 
interesting that the majority of participants retreated from any absolute claims 
on this. It became clear that the specification of knowledge or skill as clear-cut 
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was problematic, and the emphasis changed through our conversations to a 
concern with a more general and active orientation to learning about nursing. 
Several stated readily that technical skills were something that could easily be 
learned, so that this was not an important criterion for acceptability, except 
inasmuch as there was an expectation that, following exposure to any of a 
range of possible opportunities, students should be able to demonstrate that 
they had learned from it. The following statement typified the relatively low 
status accorded to skills per se in relation to the totality of nursing.
Sandy: I say to carers, when I interview them, that I could teach a monkey to 
do most of the techniques but I couldn’t teach a monkey to be a 
nurse… because it’s, this is where the person comes into it – your 
personality, how, er, you’ve got to be, well you’ve got to try to be very 
non-judgemental, about the type of people you look after. 
Some time later Sandy made a connection back to this much earlier statement, 
and showed that she was using joined up thinking; she was concerned with 
demonstration of willingness and ability to adapt.
Sandy: …yeh – I suppose that’s the bit about the monkey – you can teach the 
monkey to be competent, in that he will do a technique, like putting 
blocks in a hole. But can you, if you turn the holes round, will he … 
understand?
Sandy was not alone in making this comparison; another hospital-based 
participant was dismissive of any priority given to technical ability. 
Marje: …somebody who’s a good nurse can learn how to give a bed bath –
and you can teach a monkey how to do a lot of the skills that we do; or 
procedures that we perform.
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Concerning the importance of engagement with opportunities to develop 
understanding, and the matter of techniques not yet acquired, two more 
participants commented,
Megan: …otherwise you give it to a monkey to do!
May: So I’m not worried that they…if they can’t …[do something]… if it’s a 
simple procedure like catheterisation – which I class as simple 
procedure, ’cause I think a monkey could catheterise, right?
This repeated and shared monkey theme was strongly dismissive of technical 
prowess as a primary concern. Despite initial uncertainty, and an apparent 
desire to acknowledge the preferred technically orientated version of practice, 
they eventually came to position themselves as resistant to this. In this case, 
following Potter (1997) for instance, one has to ask what work these statements 
were doing for the speakers. 
Outcomes for pre-registration training refer to the ability to explain, or to bring 
theory and research to bear on, practice activity. If this is the case, then 
practitioners too must be able to demonstrate this quality. However, there was 
widespread acknowledgement of the impossibility of acquiring all the 
knowledge likely to be required in professional practice during the course of 
initial training. Indeed, all acknowledged quite freely that there would always be 
knowledge which they (as qualified practitioners) had not yet acquired, or 
become expert in. By referring to the need to adapt action according to one’s 
judgement of the situation, or to remedy deficits by active engagement, they 
were laying claim to this quality for themselves. They could not reasonably 
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judge students negatively in the absence of particular knowledge or skills, if 
they themselves could not claim mastery of all of these. So a student’s meta-
cognitive skill and disposition, rather than technical ability and mechanistic 
responding, were called upon. 
The point is directly comparable to Anderson et al ‘s (2001) finding, whose 
participants took active account of similarities between themselves – flaws or 
mistaken judgements, for example – as observers and those they were 
observing, prior to making a judgement: they defended themselves against 
charges of stereotyping or being unjust. Similarly, practitioners in this study 
were acknowledging inevitable similarities to their students – incomplete 
knowledge, imperfectly developed skills – but also asserting the justness of 
their approach. For instance, Maisie’s use of the plural pronoun in this extract 
says that imperfection applies to her and her colleagues on occasions, and that 
collectively they want to be fair.
Maisie: … we don’t get it right every time. So…but it’s, providing somebody sort 
of knows if they’ve done something wrong…we don’t expect them to be 
spot on, every time… 
Thus, their model of practice lays claim to greater sophistication than is 
represented in predetermined responses to complex problems, which 
necessarily assume that factors outside of the immediate situation will not play 
a part in individual actions or choices. They were not worried about their own 
lack of particular skills or techniques: these could be learned easily as or when 
required, since, by implication, they already possessed the dispositional 
qualities emphasised in their observations of others. Such statements 
157
importantly – and logically – defended qualified practitioners against technical 
deficits in their repertoire. Rena illustrated the point nicely.
Rena: I came into this area not being able to catheterise a male patient; I’d 
had no instructions on it. I came here as a sister, in charge of the 
group. Now, what I did was identify that I needed to be able to do this; 
got myself trained up… I don’t think that made me a, less of a nurse… 
although I’m the sister, the head of the team. I feel that nurses within 
my team…have more up-date knowledge. And I… I explain this to the 
students…
Rena was clear that this exonerated nurses from charges of incompetence 
based on lack of expertise in any given area, as long as they acted to deal with 
it. The emphasis on active acknowledgement of deficits, followed by suitable 
remedial action, served to preserve her own integrity and status. Other 
contributors agreed. May, for instance, developed an involved argument (which 
was interesting in its own right, since she tended to depict herself as quite 
unsophisticated!), introducing another angle on the matter.
May: … a competent nurse to me, if I look at myself –…it’s being a safe 
practitioner, it’s being safe. It’s knowing that what you’re doing is the 
right way to do it, doing it correctly, and if you don’t know how to do 
something, you ask. You find out… That to me is a competent nurse.
The first thing May did was to point to herself as the example, and then 
describe her responses as a competent [sic] practitioner. An interesting aspect 
of this was her reference to being safe. The reference to “knowing”, followed 
immediately by the need to remedy any identified lack of knowledge, was 
readily understood as being aware of what she knows, and of when she needs 
to increase her knowledge base. Taken together this illustrated the nature of 
her response set, and was consistent with the earlier illustrations of safeness. 
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The value of disposition as a key criterion was confirmed, when she added, 
emphatically, but – with little doubt – defensively,
May: Owning up to your mistakes, as well, not hiding them…to know 
everything isn’t being competent… 
She and her colleagues were now not culpable for any omissions; humility and 
active remedial responding mattered more. 
From another angle, self-defence could be seen in claims for adherence to the 
official standards for practice. Most participants referred to the official 
requirement to demonstrate a sound knowledge base and level of technical 
proficiency. For example, for a substantial part of our conversation Stella 
maintained an emphasis on knowledge per se. Talking about one student who 
had clearly impressed her, she commented,
Stella: I’ve had one, this is going back a long time ago [really] – she came 
back, and she had a lovely file of up to date research on wound care. 
That was lovely to see, that. And we were able [K Had she read it?] to 
discussed it and talk it [mutual laughter] – well, I hope she had: she was 
quite knowledge[able] … she’s done OK.
What was interesting about this comment – not typical of the way others dealt 
with their concern with knowledge – was its emphasis on the collection of things 
to represent knowledge. Although this could have been interpreted as evidence 
of activity in looking out suitable research papers, she did not opt for this 
explanation, but left it instead as an impressive achievement in its own right. 
Stella was looking for some visible evidence that knowledge had been acquired 
for all that this took the form of a file of papers. She seemed to be falling in with 
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the prevailing demand for visibility or measurement; and in this she seemed 
concerned with how she may be judged, in light of the fact that I was known to 
her and located in the educational establishment – for her, probably the official 
presence of standards, part of the panopticon of policy implementation.
In relation to this concern with her own standing, it was noticeable that Stella 
made emphatic and repeated reference to factors pertaining to status, e.g. 
possession of a teaching and assessing qualification to enable her better to 
carry out the role of student mentor. She seemed to see herself as under 
surveillance, evident through the paralinguistic and non-verbal elements in her 
responses. While she presented herself in a way that implied she had a greater 
understanding of what was needed to learn about nursing practice, this was for 
the most part portrayed in technical-rational terms – mere compliance with the 
dominant discourse of practice. Her apparent need to display herself as a good 
mentor and model to students came through very strongly. 
While Stella defended herself by foregrounding technical knowledge, Nina 
performed the same task by emphasising the dispositional qualities at the 
forefront of her judgements. Knowledge was acknowledged but ostensibly less 
important than other qualities. 
Nina: You can have the most knowledgeable person, but if their attitude is 
appalling, then I’m afraid skill and knowledge mean nothing to me... 
absolutely nothing.
In this statement she was clearly claiming that her own approach to nursing 
work was as it should be, and dismissing any suggestion that knowledge should 
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take precedence, no matter how much of it could be demonstrated. Thus, and 
importantly given the emphasis in her statement, she provided a strong defence 
against any charge of gaps in her own repertoire. While, in official documents, 
attitude is acknowledged as important, it is inherently problematic for 
assessment, and is effectively moved into second place when measurement of 
achievement is considered. None of these practitioners was dismissing the 
need for knowledge for practice; they were claiming that without an appropriate 
approach to the totality of practice, knowledge and skills would not develop, and 
practice would be incomplete. Both implicitly and explicitly they were also 
protecting themselves from possible sanctions should they be found wanting in 
the knowledge and skills element.
The problem of the range and complexity of training demands was brought out 
by Maisie, when comparing her own training – a more reproductive model – and 
the present arrangements. 
Maisie: ... when we did our training, we knew where we were … they don’t have 
that any more, I mean it’s an on-going learning process for them, which 
it should be for everybody…
She seemed to be doing two things here; on the one hand, she was claiming 
that current training makes greater demands on students, so they cannot 
capture everything. She was also implying, in her reference to “everybody”, 
that, in the light of current circumstances, she and her colleagues needed to 
continue to learn. Paradoxically support for this was to be found in the rules for 
re-registration, as observed by Bron, and was present in several other 
participants’ responses (e.g. May, Nerys, Bron, Grace) in the last chapter. By 
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tying the claim for the importance of active disposition to learning to future post-
registration requirements, the practitioners’ defence was quite robust. This 
stance was in both practitioners’ and learners’ interests.
Bron You’ve got to still go on. I mean, you’ve got, everybody’s still got to go 
on to learn, haven’t they? I mean, that’s in UKCC and everything else, 
your … PREP* and […].
Power and influence 
The defensive function of the practitioner discourse involved a struggle arising 
from a perception of possible lower hierarchical status vis-à-vis educational 
colleagues, and from the tension between the competing qualities – from 
practitioners’ own and the regulatory versions of practice – expected of the 
developing student nurse. The explicit concern, from some participants more 
than others, with the need to demonstrate personal capability as a mentor-
assessor before going on to talk about how they made their decisions about 
students, supported this understanding. There was, in participants’ responses, 
no self-assured assumption of the right to make decisions without justification. 
As already stated, Stella and Toni went to considerable lengths to set 
themselves up as meeting a number of official standards, and thus as having 
the right to decide on acceptability. Of the latter, my notes made at the time, 
following a second interview, contained the following comment.
This is the most extraordinarily pressured talk, apparently attempting 
to establish her own credibility as an assessor, a manager, a 
professional. […] Much of the content does not appear to develop the 
original ideas, but rather to follow her own agenda of determining and 
displaying her own capability in a number of roles. 
  
* Post-registration education and practice: a requirement for periodic re-registration
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Participants’ claims worked to set them up as just as capable of determining the 
case for acceptability as other, possibly more influential, players. However, 
despite such demonstrations of authority for decision-making, most participants 
showed reluctance to make a final decision on whether to fail a student. 
Foucault (2002a) argues that such claims as appeared in the commentaries 
provided by these practitioners act as statements in the construction of 
discourse. For instance, in a second interview, Tina showed confidence in her 
own judgement, but placed the final decision elsewhere, whenever a decision to 
fail might arise; her contribution and influence would be admitted through a 
dialogue, rather than that one party should dominate the final decision. She 
also made clear the practitioner’s status in the system.
Tina(2):Well…no, I wouldn’t expect them to take my decision to reject it…I 
wouldn’t like them, let them reject it, but I also wouldn’t expect them to 
honour…you know, I would hope it would be a two-way process, and 
the decision that would come out was suitable … Because their 
personal tutors – they probably know them for a lot longer than I do. 
Although Tina claimed that tutorial staff are better placed to make an 
overarching decision, since they have known the student across the whole 
programme, nevertheless she (and other participants) claimed the right to insist 
on a negative judgement where relevant, since it is a context-based one, even 
though they may in the end be overruled; Mena observed,
Mena(2): …it’s got to be a joint decision really, not just all laid on the 
college, because they don’t get to see the practical experience when 
they’re out [...] [but for] the practical experience of their placement, a lot 
of the responsibility’s got to be on the mentor really.
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While this response from Mena may have reflected some uncertainty about our 
relationship in an interview – we had met previously – both she and Tina drew a 
picture of the relationship between college and clinical staff as separate, but of 
the practitioner as authoritative in her own domain; their statements about 
decision-making performed this function. Toni drew up a similar distinction.
Toni(2):…it’s my unit, I’m responsible and accountable for my unit. So I see no 
other outside influence …And I would certainly say to the college I want 
this student off my placement. […] If it was that they weren’t particularly 
showing any interest …I would then say, “Right your attitude needs 
changing, we can work on that”. And I would expect the college tutor to 
take that […] The college tutor really has… ownership of the course –
as to whether they’re meeting the course objectives, and whether they 
should be carrying on. 
The emphasis was that decisions were made on a context-specific basis, 
whereas tutorial staff’s decisions were more global and from a distance. This in 
turn implied that they used differing criteria, and thus identified themselves with 
different values or priorities, according to context. Mena gave an example of a 
disagreement between her and tutorial staff, in which other-defined criteria were 
not available, so she had had to rely on personal expertise, and found herself 
without the winning strategy demanded by the prevailing discourse – lack of 
visibility. 
Mena(2): I was annoyed the college didn’t back us up…[…] I did feel if the 
college would have backed us up, that would have been the end of it 
then.
As she became more relaxed, possibly recognising no censure was being 
offered, Mena stated that her experience told her that colleges tend to regard 
practitioners’ judgements as dispensable, when she wanted to meet on equal 
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terms. She was clear about how she knew this; answering a question revisiting 
how much influence her decisions might have in final judgements, she said,
Mena(2): …I don’t know how much of ours… we don’t get any feedback.
While Mena seemed comfortable with the possibility of authority with
responsibility, others suggested that college staff should have the final 
responsibility for decisions on students; practitioners’ priority was ultimately 
towards patients’ care, as illustrated by Toni’s extensive exposition in her 
second interview, where it became quite clear that her role as educator-
supervisor was secondary to her clinical-managerial one. She commenced our 
second conversation with a lengthy exposition of the local protocols and 
procedures, which would guide her role in charge of the ward. Much later she 
returned to this theme in relation to a student who was proving difficult.
Toni(2):… if we’re saying, “Look we’re having hassle here with this student…” -
it’s hassle that we don’t really need, because we’ve got patients to look 
after, and they come first […] because when you’ve got your ward 
nurse’s hat on, you have to think of your patients. […] So your tutor hat 
is on as well, but …it’s falling off, because you’ve got other things there.
Whether this was a matter of uncertainty in her sense of identity, or of where 
her responsibility lay, she seemed to say educational judgements belonged 
elsewhere. She followed this immediately with another statement which both 
raised the question of whether to accept learners on to the ward, with all the 
demands that this made, and served to distance her from the difficulty that 
others might have. She seemed to want the power to judge students, but 
without the responsibility for decision-making, though, once more, this may 
have had to do with her being in conversation with a tutor!
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Toni(2):… if the tutor hat starts to knock your other hat off, then it becomes a 
burden. And … when I say to my trained nurses, “So do you want me to 
stop students altogether then?”…”Oh, no, I love teaching; I love having 
a student…” 
It seemed that Toni and her colleagues wanted students, but were 
apprehensive about the threat that this might create to their own position, and 
the disruption it caused to their day-to-day work. The threat was not from the 
student, nor from the changes to training and education since they had 
registered, but from the possibility of making a judgement which was rejected –
and so by implication rejecting and devaluing their knowledge and 
understanding of practice – and the possibility of being held responsible for a 
student’s failure. If they attended to a student’s needs at the expense of 
patients’ needs, then they would be responsible and accountable for that failure 
also.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has demonstrated how practitioners constructed their own multi-
faceted discourse of practice, which distanced them from the technical-rational 
view of clinical practice. Their skilful manoeuvring between the two versions 
allowed them to accommodate, yet avoid identifying themselves with, the 
dominant model: practitioners engaged in a form of transgression, whereby 
they moved around at the limit of what is discursively defined and permitted. 
They offered a situated view of practice, in which a more flexible understanding 
was portrayed – and necessary – than is available from the dominant 
discourse. 
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Within their own discourse one of the most striking aspects to have emerged 
concerned the notion of the safeness. There was no dispute about the 
importance of safeness in practice, but what was striking was that this was not 
a matter of being able to deploy skills correctly; rather it was a meta-cognitive 
quality, manifest in behavioural evidence of self- and situation-awareness. 
Demonstrating humility through willingness to admit a knowledge or skills deficit 
constituted safe practice. Competence, inasmuch as it was ever referred to 
explicitly, was associated with safeness, but was presented as a matter of, 
once having recognised deficits, acting to remedy these; competence and 
safeness did not equate to the deployment of knowledge and skills per se. 
The dispositional criteria for acceptability demonstrated in the last chapter also 
revealed a more defensive purpose to practitioner judgements, and was seen to 
move away from the relatively rationalistic view portrayed by following a 
traditional attribution approach. By foregrounding disposition in their 
understanding of practice practitioners protected their own interest and 
standing. Their responses clearly suggested that to pursue absolute 
achievement was to seek to attain the unattainable; pursuit of completion, or 
closure, would in effect set nurses up to fail. As one participant put it,
May: …sometimes, the sister on our ward will come across things that she’s 
never done before, and she’ll ask us.
Finally, these practitioners were engaged in a struggle for influence, which 
pervaded their experience. While they claimed their right to make decisions 
about practice on their own authority, this was seen to be undermined by those 
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with whom they were assumed to be working. At best it seemed that they could 
offer advice on student progression, and on development and achievement; at 
worst their advice could be discounted without compunction by tutorial 
colleagues. For some, there was recognition of the limited opportunity to view a 
student in toto, hence an acceptance of the tutor’s larger view; for others, there 
appeared to be a resignation to the tutor’s de facto power to overrule their 
decisions. This issue will be pursued further in chapter seven. In the meantime, 
the multiple facets of practice will be examined with regard to the constitution of 
practitioners’ sense of who they are as nurses.
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Chapter 6: Multiple selves
‘If everything you say is true…you must be Canby.’  (Juster 1962, p.142)
As the previous chapter has shown, practitioners constructed a disparate and 
diverse view of their knowledge of practice, but this was an interconnected 
disparity, sometimes technical, sometimes intuitive, in which different 
understandings appeared for different purposes. Their understanding 
demonstrated a rhizomatic, that is, non-linear connection between different 
elements in their practice (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1988). These elements are 
inseparable yet variable in nature, apparently incommensurable, but, on 
Foucault’s account, these are contradictions which must not be squeezed into 
an artificial show of unity (Foucault 2002a). This construction of practice was 
strongly reminiscent of the Deleuzian notion of fields of knowledge, in which all 
related possibilities are present, drawn on according to circumstance to guide 
day-to-day action (Deleuze 1994; Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 1988). Any 
attempt to redefine the territory of practice for organisational or managerialist 
purposes, and thus to unify its representation, omits the contradictions and 
apparent inconsistencies, as well as the unmeasurable, in the interest of an 
economy of performance at the expense of the ecology of practice (Stronach et 
al. 2002). Within this construction practitioners could roam freely (cf. Drummond 
2002), placing and identifying themselves within its variability. The analysis now 
turns to the constitution of practitioners’ nursing selves: this account of the data 
renders it impossible to capture a unitary identity, given the rapid and frequent 
movement in the articulation of their practices. 
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The quotation at the head of the chapter is taken from a children’s fantasy in 
which a young boy, Milo, and two travelling companions encounter a perplexed 
individual who asks if they can tell him who he is. When asked to describe 
himself, so that they might help, he describes a series of personal 
characteristics, each accompanied by a change in his appearance to illustrate 
his meaning: he is as tall as can be, as short as can be, as clever as can be, as 
happy as can be, and so on ad infinitum. After some discussion the three 
travellers conclude that the strange man is Canby, since he can be anything he 
chooses to be. His name, of course, locates all these possibilities in the one 
person: the fantasy has a striking resonance with practitioners’ depictions of 
themselves in this study.
ASCESIS AND SELF-CONSTITUTION 
Indeterminate selves
I will borrow the idea of fusional multiplicities from Deleuze and Guattari (1988) 
as a means of thinking about this; by this term they want us to understand 
people as fluid and responsive, rather than as a unified, once-for-all, stable 
identity. Indeed, they repeatedly suggest that people are always in a state of 
becoming other than they are at any given moment. As with their understanding 
of acceptable practice, participants were seen to move about on a plane 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 1988), making non-linear connections to construct 
and reconstruct themselves according to circumstance. To borrow another 
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Deleuzian metaphor, they were finding their “Body without Organs…populated 
only by intensities”, rather than by absolutes (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, p. 
153). With this concept Deleuze and Guattari propose a version of the self 
which is unstratified – free from fixity, a result of “fusional multiplicity that 
effectively goes beyond any opposition between the one and the multiple” (ibid.
p. 154).
That nurses work with multiple practices has been identified by Stronach et al.
(2002). I want here to illustrate that this extends to practitioners’ sense of who 
and what they are, and that, by association with the terms they use to ascribe 
acceptability to students, they project a view of themselves as complex, fluid, 
and adaptable. In aligning themselves with an alternative version of practice 
participants performed a considerable amount of work on their own behalf; in 
describing what they said mattered in student performance they were 
necessarily describing themselves, or what it is to claim to be a nurse. They 
were, in Foucault’s terms (Foucault 2000), writing themselves. For Foucault, 
self-constitution does not result in a singular notion of the person: one’s identity 
is an ever-shifting, ever-evolving concept. Participants spoke of themselves as 
different kinds of people at different times, according to context. For instance 
Sandy spoke of the need to be strong and directive on one occasion but caring 
and supportive on another; but she was who she was. Thus, it is more 
appropriate to talk of multiple selves. The manoeuvring performed by 
practitioners developed their talk into a practice, which was always about 
something still to come. As Deleuze maintains (Deleuze 1994; Deleuze and 
Guattari 1994), self is in a state of constant flux. Accordingly what follows is not 
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intended as a hierarchical sequence; it merely depicts aspects of this fluid self, 
discernible in participants’ accounts. There may of course be others.
This constant reconstruction was probably best illustrated in the marked 
hesitation displayed by Megan when constructing her answers. She frequently 
seemed to pose her own questions, of the type, “what kind of people are we?” 
Indeed, perhaps more than any other participant, her performance was 
punctuated by hesitations, apparently in pursuit of clarity about her own 
(previously unexplored) view. Others, such as May and Nan, commented 
spontaneously that the interview – that is, the process of thinking through what 
it was that they considered important, and thus how they saw themselves – was 
more difficult than they had thought it would be. There were, in effect, no ready 
answers, no fixed sense of what kind of person they were, upon which they 
could draw in their judgements of others. 
It seemed important for Megan to be clear about what exactly she was doing –
even though she was never able to draw a single conclusion – when making 
judgements in clinical situations, as the following comment confirms.
Megan: [Continuing pause] It’s not a hard question at all – I’m just trying to think 
how did I…? [Pause]
Very quickly, and in one very hesitant statement, the multifaceted – or 
Deleuzian – nature of nursing’s identity emerged very strongly. Megan came to 
recognise that she used (and expected of students that they should also use) 
formalised knowledge-skills to underpin her actions, as well as more embodied 
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forms of knowledge. She clearly highlighted her awareness of this uncertainty, 
now understanding that both technical and dispositional qualities would matter, 
for different purposes, and at different times, in the person of the good nurse. 
The following passage was cited in chapter five to illustrate the difficulty 
inherent in nurses’ expertise, but is reiterated here to emphasise the centrality 
of this in nurses’ indeterminate sense of self.
Megan: …strangely enough… if somebody didn’t come up with the goods as 
well… See, this is how you contradict your… you know, we’re very 
contradictory, nurses, aren’t we? I suppose. Or people… but, no, you 
see, if they don’t come up with the goods, that’s it. That is true enough, 
yeh. You think, “Oh, no, I can’t…”… Having said that, again, they have 
so many good qualities, but it’s this willingness to learn, yeh … [lengthy 
pause] … that would come down… Right! That would come down if I 
genuinely felt that it was, they just couldn’t, did not have that ability to 
increase their knowledge – yeh? – they’d find it really, really difficult –
academically again now. […] So the academic thing does come into it. 
Cor! I had to think hard about that. And yet you’re doing it all the time.
Moral selves and the other
Such tensions were also present in Nan’s responses reported in chapter five, 
but combined with morality when she emphasised, through her own definition, 
her preference for good (incorporating a wide range of technical and non-
technical elements) over competent (technically adequate) practice. All 
participants agreed that active engagement, and a show of initiative, was 
important in their judgements; but this would not be at any cost. For instance, 
Nan and May made clear that the need to show initiative (a good thing) and 
safeness (also a good thing) must be seen in context, and considered for their 
relative good, since they may operate in conflict with each other. This 
consideration places impediments in the way of ability to make decisions in 
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assessment. Adhering to one criterion – even one of their own – without a 
consideration of their broader conception of nursing may lead to an 
inappropriate outcome.
Nan: …I mean, they might be very keen and feel I want to go and prove this 
to my mentor, that I can work independently… [But] if it’s at the price of 
the patient, that’s what you have to look at, if it’s gonna actually affect 
the patient in any way… 
May: Whereas before, on the other ward, I was happy to let them sort of … 
go off, because there was a routine on the ward, I’m not so happy for 
the students to go off on their own...because it’s so intense, it’s 
admissions – anything could happen
Sandy made a similar point when asked how she recognised competent 
practice (again, her own definition). She distinguished between global and 
specific use of the term: someone could be technically capable, but still not 
good enough. For her, technique was a facet of nursing, but there was more to 
being a nurse than this. So she was faced with another problem: how to 
decide? One criterion says yes, while her own says no, to acceptability. It was 
clearly problematic for her that technical achievement alone could allow a 
positive outcome. She was thus making a statement about what it is to claim to 
be a nurse, and how she wanted to define herself in relation to practice, through 
a complex of qualities.
Sandy: … I mean you can’t really, erm, if he passes his exams and what not, 
you can’t really do much about it, but…he’s not what I would term 
would be a good nurse.
I argued in chapter three that there is a moral driver in such open-ended 
choices (Bauman 1999, 1992; Derrida and Caputo 1997; Deleuze and Guattari 
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1988). Sandy and others were claiming that nurses have an obligation to act for 
the good of the other in their relationships. May demonstrated the moral basis 
of her choices, when she emphasised patients’ welfare rather than operational 
efficiency. Here she wanted students to consider the relative value of different 
activities.
May: you can’t get stuck up in task things, ’cause that’s not what you’re there 
for, that’s not what you’re there to do…You’re there to look after the 
patient – not that your ward’s tidy.
As Sandy continued her illustration of this complexity, she revealed different 
aspects of nurses to be accessed according to the demands of the situation. It 
is incumbent on nurses to adopt different personae: at times compassionate, 
sensitive, yielding; at others firm, technically and procedurally driven; on yet 
other occasions, supportive yet vulnerable. Nurses are not, according to this 
account, compassionate, kind, sensitive as a fixed identity; neither are they 
practical, or technically knowledgeable in the same fixed sense. The complexity 
of Sandy’s understanding, typical of participants in the study, was captured by a 
pair of examples, in which there was a deliberate use of her different, parallel 
selves. First she pointed to the need to weigh urgency against emotional state.
Sandy: …if it is desperately important the blood’s done there and then, 
because this patient could die otherwise, if we don’t find a reason – it’s 
gotta be done, even if they’re in distress. But if it’s something that, well, 
it’s, erm, it’s a six-monthly lithium level, and it’ll do tomorrow, and 
they’re getting really upset, and that – well, it’ll do tomorrow …
Later she showed awareness of individual difference, and that she could not 
take her prior experience as definitive of appropriate human responding.
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Sandy: I mean, it’s like, erm, when you’ve suffered a death of somebody very 
close to you, you know how you behaved in that situation. You’ve got to 
be careful that you don’t expect everybody to behave in the same way 
[…] you've got to be very careful not to impose your judgements and 
your beliefs, and how you behaved, because the way I behave might 
not have been the right way to have behaved…
These examples are important in several ways, and develop the movement 
contained in Megan’s response. First, they illustrate how Sandy constituted 
herself through what she knew, and what she did (Foucault 2000). The 
illustration showed that different and opposing ways of thinking and being were 
always in her as options. She is always the same person, but chooses, and 
looks different, according to context. Second, despite having a personal model 
of responding available, based on her own intimate experience, she showed 
that she must actively recognise her own position as other, despite the 
ostensible similarity between the situations referred to, and allow the other to be 
him or herself. Third, her immersion in the nursing as distinct from the personal 
situation meant that she could not readily light on one response in preference to 
another – she must avoid adopting a unitary understanding – because both 
options are possible. 
Accordingly she and others had to choose from a range of possibilities, and 
choose morally, and weigh these against the particularity – including the other’s 
knowledge and experience – of the present situation. Different options for 
responding – hence different versions of what it is to claim to be a nurse – are 
accessed at different times for different purposes. Whether reproduced or 
reworked, such choices demonstrate the simultaneous occupation by 
competing elements of the field of knowledge. The equal validity of alternative 
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versions of knowledge and of self, in contrast to the singularity of the 
competency-based view, is consistent with Foucault’s argument (Foucault 
2002a) that certain forms of knowing and being are privileged over others only 
by virtue of their having been appropriated by powerful interests for particular 
purposes. What mattered in these instances was acceptance of difference 
according to context. 
The constant movement between different positions was illustrated further in 
the following comment, again from Megan.
Megan: …because in the everyday run of things, ’cause you’re assessing them 
all the time, aren’t you, all the time you’re jumping from one thing to the 
other.
The absence of a singular, universally applicable view of the nurse renders any 
situation, other than those which can be technically defined, impossible, since 
there is no universal understanding of the nurse’s self on which to determine 
the other’s acceptability. The imposition of the economic model of assessment 
and purportedly definitive reference points reduces nursing practice (Stronach 
et al 2002; Derrida 2002), hence, nurses and people, to programmable entities. 
These practitioners rejected this understanding in favour of morally informed 
judgement of each situation as it arose. 
Contrasting understandings were captured again when Sandy described her 
own experience, in which she had adopted a more directive persona on some 
occasions but a compassionate and emotional one on others. There was, for 
her, no contradiction in this. Her claim was that each had its place, as one of 
177
several possible ways of being, but would not necessarily be active at the same 
time. The same individual can be different things at different times, but is 
always the same individual: flexibility counts, not adherence to a fixed notion of 
what it is to be a nurse.
Sandy: you’ve got to adapt it and find a different way. I think nursing is about 
flexibility and adapting.
… When you go into houses and people are dying, the family’s with you 
– it can absolutely break your heart. But you haven’t the luxury always 
– you’re there, to do something for them. And then you go home in the 
car, and you cry the whole way home…
Such a practice, then, offered differing manifestations of self for the individuals 
involved, written for their own purposes. Practitioners’ rejection of the technical 
as an adequate representation of nursing practice, and by implication nurses’ 
identities, illustrated the possibility of parallel planes, “doubles” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988, p.166) which may mistakenly be substituted for more authentic 
images when thinking about a practice which incorporates, rather than allows 
itself to be dominated by, the technical. Participants mobilised subtle 
judgements to differentiate between desirable and undesirable characteristics in 
others – “the emptied or cancerous doubles” of the “other plane” (ibid.) – given 
the purpose for which their judgements were made. 
Expert selves: ambivalence and transgression 
Another aspect of participants’ fusional selves was demonstrated by their 
willingness and ability to work with the dominant technical version. Beyond 
concern with the importance of context there was an additional concern 
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apparent in Tina’s talk, for instance, focused on the different status of 
knowledge in contemporary training compared with that of her own generation. 
Hers was an expertise based on practical know-how with a sophistication 
derived from years of experience, whereas the new generation of students are 
more focused on formal propositional knowledge. This seemed to be perceived 
as holding higher status than she did, raising another form of crisis for Tina. 
The question of status was pursued in a second interview. 
Tina(2): I think it’s just because you never get recognised for that… I think it was 
just that the system has made me feel like that, because you just, 
they’ve not respected the people that were already here. They brought 
all these new ideas but they’ve forgot about the people that are left 
there. 
She was pointing to the different forms of knowledge available to nurses, and 
again by implication the constitution of the nurse herself – technically or 
intuitively orientated, for instance. The re-shaping of one form of knowledge or 
way of being only implies the development of its articulation over time; it does 
not diminish its value or relevance – another parallel with the ideas of Foucault 
(2000) and Deleuze and Guattari (1988). Tina’s own background was immersed 
in practice-based learning, with very little emphasis on the (formal) theoretical. 
In her account this softer form of knowledge, hence her way of being a nurse, 
has been lost in the modernist pursuit of the essence of practice – its 
articulation in scientific terms, clarifying things by reference to the visible and 
elemental – yet these practitioners seemed to constitute themselves by 
reference to this softer perspective. 
179
Tina was strongly aligned to a more intuitive sense of self-as-nurse. She had, in 
her first interview, made explicit reference to gut feeling as a basis for action, 
and wanted to uphold this way of knowing, but struggled with its opposition to 
propositional knowledge. As the movement in the following extract showed, this 
was part of her way of being a nurse.
Tina(2): I don’t think I would do that now, I don’t think I would actually say, “My 
gut feeling is this.” I would say it to myself – my gut f… - and then I’ve 
got to work that out. There’s got be a reason why that gut feeling is 
there. You can’t just say, “My…oh, it’s my gut feeling.” You’ve got to, 
there’s got to be a reason in there, and when you start putting the 
reasons down, you start back-tracking, thinking, “Oh maybe that’s not 
quite right, that’s not quite right…!” [Amused by own thoughts] So I’m 
back to my original now, I don’t think there is a gut feeling. 
On the face of it Tina (who was undertaking a ‘top-up’ undergraduate nursing 
degree at the time) was being re-socialised into accepting that professional 
action must be backed up by formal theory, or evidence – others were 
effectively territorializing her known field of knowledge – but was unsure exactly 
what this theory might be in many instances. Her judgement of situations was, 
in her view, appropriate and accurate, based on a kind of knowing that students 
would have to obtain if they were to achieve similar expertise. Nonetheless, her 
identity as expert has been challenged; she has had to align herself, at least 
publicly, with the contemporary discourse, despite her difficulty in doing so. 
However, she explained her reason for this apparent alignment (distinguishing 
rational and intuitive as professional and personal).
K What do you mean, “Evidence”, then? Is that personal preference or is 
a professional preference?
Tina: Professional! [Laughs] ’Cause you get sued left right and centre, if you 
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[don’t have some] evidence, yeh! 
Her struggles with the problem of gut feeling vs. propositional knowledge as 
equally valid forms, and her rejection of the limitations of the rational model, 
showed her transgression of the boundaries of the dominant discourse 
(Foucault 1977b). Returning within the discursive limit had a protective value for 
her, and alleviated the discomfort of her transgression. Her tussle suggested 
that she wants the right to make her own versions of knowledge and self, while 
acknowledging the range of alternative ways of construing the world (cf. Derrida 
2002). Within the complaint that her version of knowledge has been demoted is 
awareness that the current model removes her right to choose, and to inform 
practice from her own extensive understanding. Quite clearly her 
acknowledgement of the technical-rational approach had a pragmatic value, 
rather than being embedded in her way of thinking or being, implying a 
continuing identification with the alternative. One can clearly see the discursive 
psychology of Potter (1997) and Anderson et al (2001) in Tina’s weighing of the 
implications of the judgement involved. She was aware of the current climate; 
but this is a view of nursing concerned with organisational liability rather than 
good nursing care, and one has to protect one’s vulnerability. Consequently, 
Tina and others might claim to formulate themselves pragmatically according to 
this alternative model, in their own interest if for no other reason. In effect, 
identification with the dominant preference was just one amongst a number of 
possibilities for self-constitution: when faced with formal enquiry she was a 
technical-rationalist; in her own familiar clinical area, she was an intuitive 
practitioner. 
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Self as always-becoming-other
The claim that disposition is the key criterion for judging successful 
development marries well with contemporary thinking about professional 
practice: new registrants must be orientated to lifelong learning. All of my 
participants were clear that it was unrealistic to expect all relevant skills and 
knowledge by the end of the training period, and I showed in the last chapter 
that this choice had a self-defensive function. More constructively, however, 
they were simply depicting themselves in a situationally appropriate light. 
Backed by the current demands of professional practice and policy, there is 
always and necessarily a need for continued attention to development of 
knowledge and skills. Thus they constituted themselves as always becoming 
other than they are; they readily acknowledged that deficits might exist in their 
own repertoires, but they could still claim that they were capable practitioners. 
Nerys: … I don’t know everything, and I’ve been a nurse for many years, and I 
don’t know everything. But that doesn’t mean that I’m not competent. … 
I am…I would say that I am a competent nurse – if I don’t know 
something I’ll go and find out.
Rena made a similar point; competence is the willingness to recognise one’s 
own incompleteness and to act to rectify this. It is not an absolute state.
Rena: Now, what I did was identify that I needed to be able to do this; got 
myself trained up…
Even the most discursively conscious participant, Stella, made no claim to have 
acquired a complete state of knowledge and skills. Even early in the 
conversation, when she was concerned to establish herself as a good model by 
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repeated reference to standards, a determinable body of knowledge, and 
mastery of given procedures, she was clear that she must continue to develop 
herself. She openly pointed to her lack of completion, and the need for 
adaptability according to circumstance.
Stella: Yes, I think it’s always, I think every…everything needs to be reflected 
on – because I’m not perfect in practice, and I do things, and I think 
afterwards, I should have done that differently... 
That knowledge, and the ability to access and utilise it appropriately (ergo what 
it is to claim to be a nurse), is never complete was explained in the following 
extract. In a model reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) knowledge 
plateaux, practitioners moved around actively, picking up knowledge from 
different locations, choosing elements according to their situational relevance, 
constantly expanding the field of knowledge and re-making themselves rather 
than refining it or themselves to some essential understanding.
Sandy: you will continue to gain more knowledge, right through your career –
it’s not something that you learn, and that’s it, end of story. You’re 
constantly learning, and as you’re learning, it’s bringing a new 
awareness, on top of the awareness you already had. 
The final point in this observation is important: that new material is gained “on 
top of the awareness you already had”. Nothing is rejected, or pared down; the 
field of knowledge is merely expanded, one’s identity developed and built on, 
and new options introduced rather than used to replace others. 
The assessment practices deployed, then, imply that practitioners were not 
concerned with assessing the presence or absence of a state of completion 
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implied by the achievement of competence, and by this means they were also 
projecting an image of themselves. They were anticipating the demands on 
their own and others’ future practice, making judgements about something yet 
to come. Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze 1994; Deleuze and Guattari 1988) 
argue that things are never static – even when apparently repeated, they are 
never quite the same: the same thought, the same action, the same intention, 
the same entity – and are always in a state of becoming other than they are 
now. In the process of assessment practitioners are asked to determine 
whether someone has reached a pre-determined standard, when their 
preference seems to be to look to the future, a process which involves much 
more than simple reference to given, static components of a rationalised 
version of practice. By invoking an assumption that current behaviour will 
continue into the future, active engagement with learning indicates recognition 
of this state of always-becoming-other. Where acceptable technique was 
displayed, or where particular knowledge or attitude was identified, these were 
regarded, for the time being, as snapshot examples of change from a previous 
state, or alternatively as a state to which the individual can return when 
relevant.
CONCLUSION
Practitioners’ responses show that the ground on which they stand is 
continually shifting and reconstructed. This moving around writes and re-writes 
their notion of a nursing self, which turns out to be a plurality of selves, not an 
easily captured, singular identity. The frequent connection and reconnection 
with different points of reference in deploying their judgements sits well with 
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Foucault’s ascetic construction of self (Foucault 2000). Foucault has argued 
that ascesis operates through self-examination in terms of thoughts, feelings, 
and actions, to arrive at an understanding of who or what we are. That 
practitioners moved around looking for different qualities at different times, 
frequently pointing to themselves as working examples and claiming to act 
accordingly, projected a view of themselves, in terms of what they claimed to 
seek in others, as constantly adapting. 
For this group of practitioners the actions through which they would be known 
to themselves and others were never fixed, constantly having to adapt, so the 
nursing self could never be complete, and would never be identical to others. 
Achievement of a predetermined state at the point of qualification was not 
considered appropriate within these accounts. Deficits were not indicators of an 
incomplete self; they merely implied a need to change beyond the present limit. 
Thus, individuals would always be changing – practitioners and students alike, 
and only in this sense were they the same – drawing on a multiplicity of sources 
and perspectives. The fusional multiplicity of nurses’ self offers an alternative to 
the closed image of a competency-based model: a Body without Organs 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988), one in a constant state of flux.
The concerns illustrated in these three chapters – what to look for, their 
combination as an alternative discourse of practice, how to describe oneself as 
a nurse – leads to a state of affairs in which judgements are profoundly 
problematic for practitioners. The next chapter will consider the problem of 
decision-making per se, using insights from Derrida’s (1995) notion of 
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undecidability. What practitioners know, how they use it, and their manoeuvring 
to deal with the impossible demands made of them by assessment protocols 
and their multiple selves bears comparison with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
distinction between the virtual and the actual (Deleuze and Guattari 1994), as 
different ways of thinking the event of nursing (Drummond 2002). 
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Chapter 7: Decisions, justice and authority
I have shown that assessment of student performance, at least for these 
participants, was far from the rational process implied by the identification of 
competencies. Instead it formed part of a complex practitioner discourse, which 
in turn revealed a number of nursing selves, better thought of as a fusional 
multiplicity than as any singular nursing identity. Through their own discourse 
practitioners projected a fluid model of practice and of the practitioner, against 
which they would judge the development of others. They were also shown to 
protect their own interest with respect to judgements of students’ practice, 
through their rejection of a complete state of development, implied by 
competence, as unattainable: they and their students were in a state of always-
becoming-other. 
UNDECIDABILITY
Consequently a tension arose between guidelines applying to all and 
judgements of particular individuals in particular situations, rendering decisions 
about students’ progress at best difficult, or, at worst, impossible. Derrida 
(Derrida and Caputo 1997; Derrida 1995) calls this state undecidability, a 
condition in which decision-making becomes a hesitant affair if it is to achieve 
justice. General rules – in this case official criteria for assessment, or even on 
occasions those from practitioners’ own construction – must first of all be 
recognised and acknowledged; but these must be suspended temporarily, to 
allow the characteristics of the presenting situation, and the consequences of a 
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particular decision, to be properly evaluated. Then comes the need to make a 
decision, which carries the possibility of being right and wrong simultaneously, 
since it will always involve rejection of either the general rule or the particular 
individual and circumstances. 
In addition, as they articulated the process of decision-making it became 
apparent that practitioners felt a responsibility to the other in the relationship. 
This was linked to their perception of their status in the decision-making 
process: not only were they faced with problems of justice vis-à-vis individual 
students, but they also revealed some uncertainty about their status in the 
system, hence right to make a decision in the first place. Responsibility to the 
other provides the starting point for this chapter; subsequently I will deal with 
the aporetic decision-making process itself; and finally there will be a 
consideration of the problem of power and authority in coming to a decision, 
especially where this concerned progression or continuation. 
Responsibility to the other
Derrida (1995) tussles with the problem of the other, expressing the problem in 
the ambiguous phrase tout autre est tout autre (p.82, ibid.): every other is 
wholly other, both different and separate, hence never entirely knowable. 
However, without some similarity to the self or the known, communication 
would be impossible, and he suggests, again somewhat ambiguously, that the 
other in any relationship is both known and unknown to the observer: known by 
virtue of similarities to the observer; unknown by virtue of an inner self, always 
invisible to the observer. This understanding owes something to Levinas’ view 
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of the other, based on the face-to-face encounter (Levinas 1969). Levinas 
argues that the face is only ever known superficially, and thus, one is obligated 
to act cautiously in order to act justly. He wants us to understand that merely by 
virtue of our encounter with another individual, we acquire a responsibility to 
that other; for things to be otherwise always implies potential injustice.
Consequently the other can never be judged absolutely. While practitioners 
were conscious of the need to accommodate professional requirements in 
assessment – universal criteria implying sameness and knowability – they were 
very mindful of the problem that this presented in judging individual students, 
since they only ever had a snapshot view of them: applying criteria 
mechanistically may not do justice to the individual. Throughout the data 
practitioners showed a moral concern for the student, and that they were not 
simply concerned with the technical-rational interest, though this was a part of 
their judgements. Part of what repeatedly interfered with making a definitive 
decision, whenever this question was put to them, was the desire to avoid 
condemning a person for his or her inadequacies in situations which 
represented only a small part of their total experience. Additionally, there was a 
concern that there may be other, unexposed impediments to progress, part of 
that invisible otherness identified by Derrida. The problem was well illustrated 
by Stella, who was very uneasy about declaring someone unsuitable. 
Stella: … because there must be an underlying reason why somebody… 
Although she had not yet found one, she wanted to find some other reason for 
inappropriate behaviour. Her ambivalence contrasted starkly with her early 
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extensive exposition, referred to in chapter five, of the need to promote 
appropriate standards, provide a suitable role model, and judge performance 
against these. This had seemed easy to do at the time, at a distance from 
particular instances, but was now difficult to apply to an identified individual. 
Despite having spent a considerable amount of time on a technical-rational 
characterisation of what she sought, she was compelled in the end to make 
further allowance for a student who was failing to live up to her model of 
practice. Indeed, she acknowledged that she could not know all about this 
individual, since she could not explain her observed behaviour; to have judged 
her unfavourably, it seemed, could be to do the student an injustice.
A more direct illustration of this sense of responsibility came from Megan, who 
painted a picture of nurses as compassionate and caring, an impression 
conveyed consistently throughout our conversation. Obligation to the other was
nicely captured towards the end of the interview when she emphasised 
avoidance of condemnation, once it had become clear (to her) that someone 
would not be suited to a nursing career. Her comment displayed the competing 
elements quite succinctly.
Megan: …a great brain, but no common sense*. But it was more than that – no, 
he had no… It worried me, because I certainly didn’t want to destroy 
him, because he came over to me as a very sad, lonely lad in the long 
term. I wondered if there’s things that had influenced [him]…
  
* This term was defined for present purposes by another participant in Chapter 4 as a function 
of situational awareness.
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As in Stella’s comment, Megan was evidently considering the possibility of 
wholly unknown aspects to the individual, through which it would be 
unacceptable to dismiss his personhood. However, her understanding 
appeared to have moved a step beyond simple allowance for unseen 
circumstances, in that she was clear that this person was unsuited to nursing, 
but could legitimately occupy some other role. Although Stella had not explicitly 
moved outside the realm of nursing practice, it was evident that her discomfort 
was similar in nature.
A further angle on this obligation to the student as other, though this time in 
terms of the known, in the sense that students occupy the same professional 
space as their mentors, was brought up by Bron. Students as people may be 
wholly other, but must demonstrate the same professional attributes as their 
qualified colleagues. An aspiring nurse must be orientated to continuing 
development. In chapter five I used the following statement to demonstrate its 
protective function for practitioners; but it also served to recognise that 
students, like qualified practitioners, are expected to engage in continuous 
learning post-qualification, and so must show this orientation from the outset. 
The comment is from a sequence in which Bron was rejecting the possibility of 
ever obtaining a complete set of knowledge or skill.
Bron You’ve got to still go on. I mean, you’ve got, everybody’s still got to go 
on to learn, haven’t they? I mean, that’s in UKCC and everything else, 
your … PREP and […].
PREP requirements seemed to present Bron, and others, with a problem. This 
view was present in several participants’ responses (e.g. May, Nerys, Bron, 
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Grace), all of which, knowingly or unknowingly, highlighted the paradox of 
training which could insist on some notional closure by the point of registration, 
but then tell all that they can never be complete. On this basis, failing a student 
for not achieving closure would be an injustice in the face of active 
engagement. It would seem that if this requirement applies to practitioners, then 
it must logically apply to students as becoming-practitioners.
General vs. local rules
Practitioners demonstrated Derrida’s three aporias (Derrida 1995): recognition 
of the universal rule and its immediate suspension; consideration of the 
particular situation and recognition that this does not fit easily – arising, 
amongst other things, from the obligation to the other; and finally the need to 
make a decision. For instance, having established that compassion was
important, Megan would then return to the notion of technical knowledge, as the 
basis for care delivery and decision-making. However, she returned frequently 
to what she called basic nursing care – in context, an apparent reference to 
dispositional qualities of engaging with and caring for people – and was 
confident in declaring this to be core to good practice. She would then declare 
that technical knowledge and skills (basic or otherwise) were important after all. 
She had difficulty in reaching this conclusion, as it seemed important for her to 
clarify her own thinking on what exactly she was doing when making her 
judgements. Eventually Megan came to recognise that she used, and expected 
of students that they should also use, formalised knowledge-skills to underpin 
action, but in doing so she highlighted her considerable uncertainty about how 
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definitive this might be: suspension of the general rule in favour of a 
consideration of the particular. I return once more to her most telling statement. 
Megan: … if somebody didn’t come up with the goods as well. See, this is how 
you contradict your… you know, we’re very contradictory, nurses, aren’t 
we? I suppose. Or people… but, no, you see, if they don’t come up with 
the goods, that’s it… You think, “Oh, no, I can’t…”. Having said that, 
again, they have so many good qualities, but it’s this willingness to 
learn, yeh … [lengthy pause] … 
This extremely hesitant statement, and through it the fragmentary nature of 
nursing’s knowledge base, showed the problem inherent in decision-making for 
these practitioners. As Derrida (Derrida and Caputo 1995) would have us 
understand there is an important distinction between programmable decisions 
and judgements. Applying a singular perspective to the measurement of 
student development was impossible for participants; they repeatedly invoked 
additional criteria according to the situation and the individual involved. 
Throughout our conversation Megan was concerned with the problem of 
disposition counterbalanced by technique or knowledge. Both were part of the 
set of rules, but potentially at odds with each other. Decision-making was 
difficult if she was to avoid dismissing either the individual or the professional 
interest. By the end of the interview she concluded that potential harm to the 
individual, following a judgement of failure, was undesirable. Any definition of 
competence as an absolute state was resisted, since she (like, for instance, 
Sandy, May, Rena) regarded technical skills, though necessary to everyday 
practice, as fairly low level achievements. They were, therefore, in any 
judgement of acceptability, capable of being suspended in favour of concern 
with the person.
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Tina illustrated another kind of problem in practice. In the following extract, she 
was trying to decide whether she would insist on failing a student, or would 
leave it to others to make a final decision. Her difficulty arose from the need to 
acknowledge that her observations may only be part of a continuing story – in 
effect, she saw students as always-becoming-other (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 
1994) – and therefore she was not always in a good position to make a 
definitive judgement. Within the wider context of training, she recognised the 
possibility that her own view was incomplete. She wanted to avoid being unfair 
to the student, and was mindful of the distinction between isolated instances of 
poor or unsafe practice and enduring patterns of performance in which 
weaknesses were constant.
Tina(2): [Pause] … I think it depends on the situation again. Erm, but … 
because it’s such a short period it might just be a weakness that person 
has got all the way through.  Therefore me telling them [the college] is 
yet another person telling them that this person’s got a weakness. Or it 
just might be that that person’s just having a bad 7 weeks, which is, 
which does happen… so… you know, there’s stresses and whatever.
Tina had previously made clear that if a student’s actions constituted dangerous 
practice, then she would have no hesitation in reaching a decision to fail the 
student. She defined this in terms of deliberate inappropriate action or careless 
omission, something over which the student would be expected to have some 
control, and distinct from lack of engagement with learning, say. On the face of 
it this would remove any hesitation from decision-making. However, where such 
a condition might apply, then in Derridean terms it ceases to be a matter of 
judgement, and becomes a programmable decision (Derrida and Caputo 1997). 
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What makes Tina’s assessment of the student undecidable is the uncertainty 
involved in judgement of the student as a developing practitioner; the student’s 
performance over time may differ from the particular instance, and any deficits 
be remedied. There was, throughout Tina’s story, a desire to be just to the 
student.
This was a common theme, illustrated further by Mena, when she built up the 
picture of a repeating pattern, within which something also happens to change 
the nature of the problem.
Mena: … if I have failed a student… well, you can usually see how it’s 
unfolding really … I mean, every couple of weeks we have a chat and 
go over things. And I write things down, so I provide the evidence on 
such and such a date – what they were doing, or how I tried to explain 
to them really that, you know, that’s wasn’t on, and they couldn’t really 
do that […] And even if I do see some improvement, but if they’re still 
unsafe – that’s the word I always use for this, for their own, 
safe…people … not, obviously, naming the patient but saying what they 
were doing with such and such a person, or how I tried to explain, 
bringing it in that, they wouldn’t listen, or that they couldn’t understand if 
you go over it again.
This kind of decision using the universal rule illustrates the distinction between 
undecidability and programmability (Derrida and Caputo 1997). The safeness 
premise is that certain actions are unambiguously classed as dangerous, and 
therefore there is no need for deliberation: decisions are pre-determined, 
especially for registered practitioners. However, these practitioners are dealing 
with students at different stages of training. In Mena’s example, some identified 
activity militated against safeness, and therefore was considered unacceptable. 
However, even here she resisted the immediate application of the rule, allowing 
for the particularity of the student and the situation. What developed 
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subsequently was that the student failed to change sufficiently, and to engage 
effectively with advice. What was especially interesting about this example was 
that even the technically-based rule of safeness, seen in terms of direct action, 
was context-dependent. Indeed, Mena made the point herself, that it was not 
the decision that mattered, but the conditions under which it would take place.
Mena: The context, I think, matters more than the judgement, because you’re 
explaining, sort of trying to get an overall picture as to why, not just the 
judgement, as to why things haven’t quite gone right, or where the 
problems are…
Whose rules count?
Throughout her conversation with me, Molly spent considerable time setting up 
disposition as the crucial component of good practice: it was the first thing she 
lighted on, and she did so with clear enthusiasm for its importance. Thus, it 
appeared initially to be her overarching model for practice, her own version of 
the universal rule. Nonetheless, she then showed considerable hesitation using 
this to judge a student’s performance in particular situations: that is, where 
others would suspend the given rule, Molly was found to suspend her own rule, 
when the situation in hand demanded attention to the technical.
Molly: … when it comes to things like, er, physiology and things like that - not 
applying that to their practice. Erm, knowledge of drugs, pharmacology, 
things like that. You’ll sort of sit down and you’ll talk to them, and say, 
‘Well, you know, these are the drugs the patient is taking…Do you 
understand what an ACE inhibitor is?’ … particularly the ones that are 
degree level, they’re doing the physiology at that level, you know they 
should really understand that physiology. 
She now appeared to suggest that knowing ‘x’ was important, and was moving 
away from the dispositional, with which she opened her story. She now seemed 
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to prioritise a technical version of practice, having passed beyond the 
dispositional criterion. In effect, she was moving around, like Megan, trying to 
find a place to settle. According to her earlier claims, by staying within the policy 
version of knowledge for practice, she would be wrong with the individual; by 
moving outside it in the situation she had now described, she would also be 
wrong. In order to render the problem more decidable – more programmable, 
that is – she temporarily dismissed the preference for applying what you know, 
even though a short while earlier she was at pains to establish that knowledge 
per se was not the crucial quality sought. Eventually she resolved the dilemma, 
and arrived at the compromise of expecting particular knowledge in light of 
particular opportunity: particular knowledge would be important in the 
presenting situation, which was there to be dealt with, rather like Mena’s 
example above. In response to my suggestion that her focus at that point
K seems to be more on the level of activity that the student shows in 
relation to learning about new things … engaging with, with patients, 
and opportunities … rather than about an absolute state of knowledge 
… – is that right? 
she replied, 
Molly: Yes, definitely, definitely, definitely is. But if I know that they’ve had that 
experience, they’ve had the opportunity to learn that, I would expect 
them to learn that.
Vacillation between one position and another was a constant feature of 
participants’ accounts of the process of decision-making, finally allowing 
circumstances to guide what was needed, without deferring to absolutes: 
technical gains, while important, were context-dependent. As the following 
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extract showed, while students would need the technical elements of 
knowledge, they should become more than that, and that is what makes 
decision-making difficult: as several participants pointed out, technical prowess 
will keep things ticking over, but practice is more sophisticated.
Molly: … we’ve got, er, nurse, erm, nursing auxiliaries now doing bloods and 
things like that. You can teach anybody to take blood; you could teach 
anybody to do a dressing; but it’s communicating with the patient: how 
does this wound affect the patient? What is the patient’s symptoms? 
How’s it affecting her daily life, her activities of living? And that really is 
what nursing’s all about – is improving that for the patient, maximising 
the patient’s potential, and that’s what the students should be doing, not 
just doing a technical skill.
May’s story also made the point that acceptability was not merely based on 
technical achievement or on disposition in isolation. For her, there was a 
connection between motivation and willingness to be involved and actual 
knowledge and skill development, which rendered the judgement difficult. Like 
others, she seemed sure in the end that enthusiasm, whilst crucial, was not 
sufficient on its own, and that it should have led to some change. The presence 
of particular, predetermined knowledge and skill was not the key issue – these 
simply provided evidence that the student had applied him or herself. The 
relationship between the two is a complicated one, involving judgement, not 
programmed decision-making, according to the demands of the situation, as 
well as the stage of training of the student. When asked whether motivation 
without discernible achievement would suffice for a positive judgement, May 
commented,
May: It’s not OK…if they were motivated then… why can’t they do anything?! 
[Laughs]
198
The message was conveyed here, within the laugh, that this was such an 
obvious point, it rendered my question silly, but it is an important point to draw 
out. So much emphasis was placed, by all participants, on active engagement 
with learning about nursing that the initial analysis set aside concern with gains 
in knowledge and skill. May made it clear that there was an expectation of 
change, but that this change was dependent on opportunity, not on some 
preconceived knowledge and skills. Molly had shown the same difficulty in 
holding the two up to scrutiny, even though this might be for slightly differing 
reasons. Their judgements were clearly more sophisticated than programmed 
decision-making (cf. Derrida and Caputo 1997). It seems clear that the 
individual should not be sacrificed on the altar of technical rationality; as Derrida 
(1995, p.95) points out, “a decision always takes place beyond calculation”.
Safeness: an easier matter?
So far, then, in addition to concern for the person, there were at least two 
dilemmas which impeded decision-making. First, was the student engaged with 
learning? If not, yet knowledge and skills were present, should this particular 
student be judged favourably? Second, was there some change as a result of 
engagement? If not, yet the student was accessing opportunity and enquiring 
appropriately, was this sufficient, especially since there may be some 
development over time? Additionally, judgement of a student’s safeness 
presented a third dilemma. While practitioners constructed a non-technical 
version of the concept, based on disposition rather than procedural criteria, the 
problem was that it is impossible to judge this absolutely. A number of 
practitioners understood that there was always a degree of risk involved. 
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Requiring students merely to demonstrate correct procedure, or correct 
theoretical explanation, was not held as the same as requiring a student to 
demonstrate awareness that on occasions procedure may need to be 
suspended or modified. 
Thus, safeness was explained as a situated judgement, couched in terms of the 
individual’s disposition. While carrying out certain procedures incorrectly may 
be unsafe, practitioner enunciations pointed to safeness as the tendency to 
confirm the accuracy of observations and understanding first, and act later. 
Once again, the judgement is fluid, and requires the identification of a pattern of 
behavioural tendencies rather than a decision on discrete skill or knowledge. A 
student may have an incomplete understanding of a particular problem or 
procedure, yet may still be considered safe. For example, Grace knew safe 
practice when she saw it, illustrating this as follows.
Grace: …She was a safe practitioner – obviously, which is paramount – and 
she proved that to me; … was quick to say when she wasn’t happy 
about doing a procedure, or when she wanted to learn a procedure 
more competently... 
Paradoxically, safeness in this version was demonstrated by the absence of 
action rather than its concrete presence! What mattered was the tendency to 
recognise when skill or knowledge was insufficient, and to hold back from 
acting. The problem with this, of course, is that it runs counter to the preference 
for the visible; it is more difficult to record. The difficulty of facilitating a student’s 
knowledge and skill development, while protecting others from danger, 
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inevitably involves risk – another paradox in the face of the need for safeness. 
Nan made the point nicely with a reference to guarded risk-taking.
Nan: I’d be quite happy for a student to come up to me and just say, “Can I 
just check this out with you…?” before they go off and use their own 
initiative… You have to let them do a certain amount of things on their 
own, otherwise they’re not gonna gain that confidence. So it’s all, it’s 
assessing that particular individual. 
Here she made the critically important point, supported through the ubiquitous 
reference to the need to discriminate between individual and situational factors 
amongst participants, that all judgements use particular as well as global 
criteria. A comment from Megan illustrated the problem of safeness as a 
technical construction. When asked whether the absence of technical skills was 
a problem in applying a favourable judgement to someone’s practice, she 
responded with
Megan: … I think you’re, you know, people have to have a little bit of humility to 
say, “Oh, just a minute, I don’t understand that.” Or, “I don’t know 
exactly how that works.”… 
When asked immediately following this whether that would mean the student 
was safe, she appeared to be in no doubt. 
Megan: I think it makes them a damn sight safer than somebody [laughs] who’s 
going to say, “Yeh, I can do that!”
What was especially interesting about this statement was that, as Grace had 
implied, paradoxically it was the absence of action, rather than its presence, 
which demonstrated safeness. Abstracted technique can be tested for 
accuracy; without a particular context, however, it appears to lack meaning. To 
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judge practice as safe therefore meant judging an individual’s situated 
performance; to do otherwise was effectively an injustice.
Decision-making, power and authority
For most participants the problem of undecidability for particular situations 
combined with responsibility to the other. Some also expressed reluctance to 
accept the final responsibility per se, even where poor practice had been 
identified; though they appeared happy to make definitive judgements within 
their own (clinical) domain, taking the final decision on progression was 
problematic. Several (e.g. Toni, Mena, Tina) said they experienced a sense of 
distance from ultimate decision-making, and spoke of making suggestions or 
recommendations, rather than definitive judgements, to tutorial colleagues. Two 
possible explanations presented themselves: colleges were seen to own the 
programmes, so practitioners experienced a lack of authority to make final 
decisions; alternatively practitioners were not fully signed up to the modernist 
model of knowledge, so did not have the authority to decide. 
An example of the latter position came from Stella. Although she went to 
considerable lengths to present herself by association with the contemporary 
discourse, she subsequently showed considerable reluctance actually to take a 
decision. Despite her use of approved terminology, she gave the impression 
that she was not totally committed to this way of deciding on the standard 
achieved: her non-verbal behaviour conveyed apprehension about getting it 
wrong and, in the context of her interview performance, being seen to get it 
wrong. Throughout the interview it was difficult to obtain examples of actual 
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decisions made, and the basis for these. The brief extracts below are taken 
from extremely lengthy responses, in which Stella seemed more concerned to 
establish her own credibility in the view of others, and according to others’ 
prescriptions of what mattered, than with any decisions of her own. 
Stella: …I usually begin, when I have students with me, to ensure that they’ve 
actually observed me in practice, to see the sort standards that I feel 
are acceptable, and that we’ve reflected on things…
…you need to say to the student, “OK, you take control here. You do 
the communicating, tell the patient what you’re gonna be doing. And I’ll 
stand back, and I’ll critically analyse you…
What stood out in these statements was the formal language, typical of current 
policies and approaches to initial and continuing nurse education programmes. 
This includes the terms “standards”, “reflected”, “critically analyse”, terms which 
Stella deployed throughout the interview when describing her approach to 
facilitating appropriate learning. That the latter term was used inappropriately in 
this context indicated that she was not entirely at ease with this model of 
learning, but chose to demonstrate that she was aligned with it. No doubt her 
uncertainty was exacerbated by finding herself being interviewed by (in her 
perception) someone representing the official position. Thus, she seemed to be 
strongly influenced by powerful others in expressing her ideas, but lacked the 
conviction to commit herself to a definitive decision. The territorialization 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988) of nursing practice and knowledge by powerful 
others made Stella uncertain of her ground; consequently her ability to come to 
a clear decision was impaired: she seemed to see herself as lacking the 
authority to make one.
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It is worth recalling from previous chapters that several participants construed 
their judgements in terms of “feeling” knowledge rather than in discrete 
cognitively defined elements. For instance, the following comment came from 
Mena, who was confident, when asked about it in a second interview, that she 
could justify her decision to fail a student.
Mena(2): … you know, if I feel, and I’ve got valid reasons, erm, I don’t really 
mind the fact, if they come back to me, and ask me as a mentor, why I 
made that decision …
Such statements articulated observations which defied rationalistic 
interpretation, and opposed the contemporary definition of practice, so 
potentially reducing her influence alongside managerialist notions of 
competence/ies. While some practitioners, like Stella, wanted to be seen to 
identify with the rationalistic camp, others wanted their views to be accepted as 
valid in their own right. As a consequence they were finding themselves at a 
disadvantage when conveying their decisions, even though they had 
confidence in their own judgements. While most also spoke of the desire to 
share, rather than dominate, decisions, such confidence was quickly qualified 
by allowing that tutorial staff may be better placed to make an overarching 
decision, since they would know the student across the whole programme. 
Counterbalancing this to some extent, Tina claimed the right to make a 
particular judgement where this concerned a clinical issue, even if she could not 
necessarily insist on its being carried through to ultimate failure of a student. 
Tina(2): I can only base it on what I’ve seen here. But, like I said, if it was 
204
serious enough then, yes, I would in[sist]…
Shortly before this, Tina had characterised the relationship between clinical and 
college staff as separate and equal, each with their own authority, rather than 
as inferior-superior, and this was evident in the way she described her decision-
making process. She emphasised that her decisions were made on a context-
specific basis, whereas tutorial staff’s decisions were made more globally. If her 
decision were accepted, it could be defended as situationally important; if not, it 
could be understood as an aberration in the student’s overall performance. On 
the matter of authority to decide, this was confirmed with the comment.
Tina(2): It really does depend on the situation… if the student has done 
something… which is against the law then, yes, I would insist on it, 
because I’d seen it, and that’s that. But if it’s … a practice that could be 
improved on, or they just hadn’t had the experience to do it, then that’s 
different.
Here, then, she appeared more certain of her position, when it might invoke a 
programmable decision (Derrida and Caputo 1997), based on the law – a 
ready-made criterion, necessarily shared between observers regardless of 
location. Previously she had proposed that judgement was based on context-
dependent expertise. Earlier, application of the general rule would be unjust 
when applied to the particular; now, however, judgement of the particular may 
not do justice to the general, at least for the individual concerned. Accordingly 
vacillation prevailed; a little time later she said,
Tina(2): [Pause] Well, I think again, it’s because it’s just a short period that 
they’re here for … because it’s such a short period it might just be a 
weakness that person has got all the way through.  Therefore me telling 
them [college staff] is yet another person telling them that this person’s 
got a weakness. Or it just might be that that person’s just having a bad 
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7 weeks, which is, which does happen… 
Her explanation neatly performed undecidability: for her, both decisions were 
possible. Despite her attempts at clarification there was obvious uncertainty 
about whether she had the authority to declare a student as failed based on her 
own observed evidence. In the current context this should have carried 
considerable weight, but she was also apparently acting with deference to a 
more authoritative judge, however indeterminate the latter’s authority might be
over a particular instance. 
Toni made similar points in a lengthy, virtually uninterrupted exposition during 
her second interview. On this occasion she laid great emphasis on her ward-
based role, and thus the view that her ultimate responsibility was to the 
patients, and to her employer vis-à-vis management of the ward and its 
resources. Accordingly, she reserved the right to dominate any decisions 
concerning unsatisfactory practice – issues to do with appropriate application, 
involvement with patients, poor practice – but willingly deferred to academic 
judgement on theoretical matters. Overall decisions should be left, in her view, 
to tutorial staff, because they have ownership of programmes, whereas 
practitioners do not. In this extract, “paperwork” appears to symbolise this.
Toni(2):…it is our responsibility then to tell the tutor. The tutor then deals with 
the paperwork. That’s the link I think. I think we’ve both got a joint 
responsibility for identifying whether that student is safe and competent. 
But the fact that the college tutor holds the reins in regards to the 
paperwork, so she actually would, say, fill in the paperwork, and say, 
“No, we’re taking this person off the course.” We don’t have that…that 
authority…
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Toni(2):They have an ownership of the course: the student is shared, and 
together I think the college and the practitioner decide on the student’s 
competence. But it would actually be the college that removes the 
student from the course, not the practitioner. 
This was an interesting response, in that she acknowledged her right to decide 
on unacceptable practice, whereas removal (the ultimate consequence of 
failure) was someone else’s responsibility. She was clearly saying that she 
would always have the authority to exclude someone from her clinical area in 
the interest of her patients, but returned to the avoidance of condemnation of 
the student seen in terms of responsibility to the other. In addition, and 
consistent with these claims, in the following comment she also seemed to 
suggest that she herself needed no understanding of theory, apparently 
rejecting the emphasis on formalised rationalistic knowledge as a basis for 
initial preparation. This claim effectively removed her authority to assess 
“theoretical” knowledge, even in practice.
Toni(2):Yeh, and I … can tell who’s going to make a nurse within a very short 
time: how they interact with the patients… Because, some nurses don’t 
gain their diplomas and their degrees and their masters ’til they’re in 
their 40s and 50s. So I would see it, I see th... the theoretical side you 
can nurture over time. But the actual practical side of it has to be there 
before they qualify.
Once more here was evidence of contradiction but of a different kind. Earlier 
she had stated that she considered herself academically weak; nevertheless, 
although she claimed authority in practice, she was willing to allow others to 
make the decision to exclude. For her, as for others, the problem may be one of 
insufficient confidence with a newer form of expression, despite her extensive 
experience. She did not appear willing, as it were, to put herself on trial by 
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making an overarching decision to fail a student. It was in effect the 
propositional, theorised version of nursing knowledge which excluded her.
A third participant interviewed a second time was Mena. Like Tina, she showed 
confidence in the validity of her own judgements, but was less certain about the 
extent to which they would drive final decision-making. Her view was similar to 
those of Tina and Toni in this respect, but she highlighted as a particular 
concern the general lack of feedback experienced when a student had been 
reported as failing, as this left her not knowing how her judgement had been 
taken. She did not know whether her views had been dismissed, used as a 
basis for remedial action, or led to discontinuation. It was clear that she saw 
herself as a de facto outsider to this process, apparently lacking the (gift of) 
authority to make final decisions. She was also, like Tina, in favour of sharing 
decision-making, but did not see much evidence of this in practice. She 
reported a lack of feedback on any negative decisions she and her colleagues 
had made (see chapter five). Hence, this comment points to the imposition of 
responsibility to monitor without authority to decide.
Mena(2): …it’s got to be a joint decision really, not just all laid on the 
college, because they don’t get to see the practical experience when 
they’re out [...] [but for] the practical experience of their placement, a lot 
of the responsibility’s got to be on the mentor really.
Her point was that despite her own acceptance of responsibility for decisions 
about practice, her willingness to engage with the process was not 
reciprocated, and judgements might, therefore, be subject to some other 
criterion than safe or acceptable practice. She speculated on how this might 
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occur, and it was clear to her that college staff were the preferred option for 
students when any disputes arose. She suggested that the tutor was seen as 
the student’s friend in the learning project, whereas the practitioner might be a 
problem! 
Mena(2): … it’s their [the students’] backbone, I think; they don’t know me. 
And their personal tutor, they’ve got very close to, and might have built 
up 12, 18 months, erm, good relationship with the person – and I think 
the college always tells them, too, if there’s any problems, come back 
to us! [laughs at this]
This situation poses a particular difficulty for clinical staff. It would appear from 
Mena’s experience that tutorial staff’s relationship with the student is developed 
at the expense of a similar relationship with practitioners. The non-proximity of 
the other in the relationship between practitioners and tutors contrasts with the 
face-to-face quality (cf. Levinas 1969) of the relationship between tutor and 
student depicted by Mena, and allows decisions to be made in the mutual 
interest of tutor and student.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has considered the kind of dilemmas – aporias, to use Derrida’s 
term (Derrida 1995) – experienced by practitioners when making their 
judgements. Rules of practice behaviour and performance, whether 
practitioners’ own or the given assessment criteria, only ever provide a guide: 
the practitioner is called upon to make judgements rather than programmable 
decisions. The instances cited in this chapter are consistent with the 
background of uncertainty about the nature of their knowledge base, and the 
way they constructed their own discourse of practice and their own identities, 
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explored in previous chapters. They were caught between the technicised 
version of practice promoted in policy and the obligation to the others in their 
relationships within practice. There was a moral interest in this, a responsibility 
to the student as always-becoming-other. There was also an obligation to the 
profession and its regulatory body. If they deferred to the official discourse of 
practice, they omitted a consideration of the student as an individual. They are 
called on to make comparable decisions about students, implying a 
standardised outcome, yet their practice is a situated one. Neither students nor 
practice are standard; this rendered directly comparable judgements 
impossible. 
They also struggled with their authority actually to make decisions. This brought 
into question the legitimacy of their own models for practice: whether to work to 
these or to defer to the powerful interests, ergo the interested authority, of 
professional others. The lack of authorisation to make decisions, in some 
accounts at least, seemed to be linked to what they saw as their de facto
exclusion from the process of decision-making, but could also be explained as 
a consequence of their lack of familiarity, hence confidence, with the language 
of contemporary representations of practice knowledge. By articulating their 
understanding in more dispositional or intuitive terms they would lose ground in 
the face of the managerialist discourse of current policy and programme 
outcomes. Many also talked in a way that implied that their decisions, especially 
to fail someone, might reflect the quality of their input as a mentor-assessor in 
practice: some participants were not entirely at ease with me as the interviewer, 
seeming to see me in an inspectorial role. 
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There is a reflexive moment underlying both the process and the outcome of 
decision-making – an obvious awareness of the range of practical (situated) 
and discursive (approved) considerations which must be accommodated, and 
of others which must be avoided; of the incompleteness of data available to the 
individual observer; and of practitioners’ own vulnerability in taking a decision to 
pass or to fail. Practitioners’ own discourse of practice has shown the 
impossibility of applying a universal set of rules to particular instances of action 
and circumstance. Here, then, is the impossibility of decision-making leading to 
the suspension of any putative given, whether officially or personally defined. 
Given the complexity of the practitioner’s view of practice, there are so many 
legitimate alternatives for making a decision, that – at least in some instances –
practitioners (would) prefer not to make one at all.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and recommendations
INTRODUCTION
I suggested as a starting point for this study that there may be some conflict 
between, on the one hand, the model for assessment of students’ developing 
practice promoted by policy, and how practitioners themselves account for their 
judgements, on the other. Differences were subsequently illustrated through my 
analysis of the stories given by participants. A more mutually acceptable model, 
hence a possible reduction in concern expressed about apparent 
inconsistencies so widely reported throughout the preceding decade, would 
necessarily involve acceptance of the legitimacy of differing kinds of 
understanding. In particular the practitioner perspective must be seen as 
situated, not absolute, and as responding to the demands of different contexts. 
Indeed many of the situations in which they are called upon to make 
judgements were found to be undecidable (Derrida 1995).
I showed through my analysis of associated literature that there is considerable 
congruence between the development of nurse education policy – a centrally 
driven model imposed on the individual – and the model of policy development 
described by Bauman (1999), despite appearances to the contrary. Bauman 
considers that we have experienced the loss of an effective public forum – the 
agora – for debates about policy formation and refinement, where differences 
and challenges to thinking can be worked out. Indeed, one might question 
whether nursing has ever really experienced such an arena. The approach to 
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assessment, and thus the model of practice to be adopted, was ostensibly 
developed through an open, inclusive debate. However, chapter two 
demonstrated that this was dominated by the managerialist interest, and that 
aspects of practice which do not conform to the dominant measurement and 
visibility model were effectively excluded from consideration. 
Taking insights from Foucault’s writing (Foucault 2002a) I argued that a 
positivistic understanding of nursing work, articulated as so-called 
competencies, came to dominate thinking about professional practice. 
However, the concept of competencies was rejected as inadequate for 
describing nursing work. I also argued that this positivistic understanding 
misses the point that the notion of competence is better regarded as what 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a virtual concept, distinguishing this from its 
functive counterpart. Functives, as Drummond (2001) has argued, are 
unsuccessful attempts to actualise virtuals as concrete states of affairs. 
Accordingly I adopted the term acceptability to refer to the purpose of 
practitioners’ judgements. 
While professional work has come to be equated with visibility, Strathern (2000, 
p.309) has argued that this is no more than a “tyranny of transparency”, 
manifested in the claim by powerful others to the authority to make the invisible 
visible (cf. Foucault 1973). Such claims are justified by the need, for instance, 
to ensure public safety – the primary raison d’être of the governing body – by 
removing variability and uncertainty from professional judgement. Concerns 
about the risk to safety in such variability were countered in this study by 
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practitioners’ own discourse, which emphasised a concern with safeness, as 
well as their own interest and credibility, and with promoting good rather than 
merely adequate practice. The kind of judgements articulated in the accounts 
explored here are necessary, otherwise professional training becomes mere 
preparation of rule-bound technicians, with implications for both clinical and 
nurse-educational practitioners. Without them, any claim to expertise, hence to 
professionalism, is lost, despite the subtlety of practitioners’ practices.
FINDINGS OF THE PRESENT STUDY: A SUMMARY
My initial approach to analysis arose from a relatively rationalistic starting point, 
and a desire to make explicit the criteria on which judgements were based. This 
showed how practitioners appeared to use a rationalistic process, understood 
through attribution and correspondence theory, when ascribing acceptability to 
students’ performance (Jones and Davies 1965). This choice was an initial 
attempt to understand how participants linked evidence – in the form of visible 
behaviours – to what seemed to be the principal criterion, disposition, 
highlighted in their accounts of assessment. Incremental gains in knowledge 
and skill were expected, but were consistently explained as resulting from 
behaviours seen to be the consequence of appropriate disposition combined 
with opportunity. That is, assessment appeared to be concerned with the 
approach to learning about nursing work rather than with absolute 
achievements in their own right. Only where the absence of appropriate actions, 
or lack of knowledge gain, could not be explained by reference to 
circumstances would a fail decision be considered.
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However, further examination of participants’ accounts helped me to see that 
they pointed to more than the simple selection and application of preferred 
criteria. Their accounts were performing certain work for them (Potter 1997). It 
became evident that they were conscious of the impact of their decisions on 
those they were judging, and of the implications of their decisions for their own 
status. That is, they drew comparisons between themselves and those they 
were observing when formulating a judgement, and were conscious of being 
watched by me (cf. Anderson et al 2001). Their acknowledgement of knowledge 
and skills gains as part of their considerations neatly accommodated the 
technical-rational model of practice lauded by current policy, and appeared 
initially to be secondary to disposition. 
This took me to the next phase in the analysis, in which I was able to recognise 
a less rationalistic process operating. Insights from Foucault’s work (e.g. 
Foucault 2002a) allowed me to see that participants were constructing an 
alternative, multifaceted discourse of practice. This replaced the technical 
model with a convincing yet uncertain picture of their world. Their accounts 
resisted straightforward decision-making, acknowledging the variable but 
legitimate possibilities in any situation under observation. I came to see the 
initial rationality of practitioners’ attributions – for instance, that a student’s 
active engagement with opportunity was evidence of satisfactory disposition 
ergo development – as apparent only: judgements were neither simplistic and 
mechanistic, nor straightforward and unconsidered. Claims for a preference for 
dispositional over technical criteria was seen to allow greater movement in their 
judgements, justified on the grounds that it took more account of unpredictable 
215
circumstance; it also allowed them to position themselves actively in relation to 
the prevailing discourse. Their model of practice was remarkably fluid, and they 
appeared to move rapidly along the rhizomes in their field of knowledge 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1988), making a plethora of different connections, so that 
judgements were always linked to the situation at hand, and never 
predetermined abstractions.
It was clear that practitioners considered safeness a primary concern; by 
highlighting self- and situational awareness, and linking these to the tendency 
to take appropriate action, they changed the absence of particular knowledge or 
skill into something to be addressed, rather than claiming it as a reason for 
failure. Disposition could be linked to the need for continuing development 
throughout one’s career. Thus, their accounts indicated that they were 
anticipating future practice capability not merely present achievement: I 
eventually saw this as a concern with something-still-to-come. The emphasis on 
self- and situation-awareness matched to appropriate action preserved the 
importance of safeness, though this was much less dependent on correct 
deployment of technique than on the demonstration of sufficient humility to 
confirm judgements and understanding prior to action. Indeed, to my own 
surprise, it was rarely referred to in technical terms.
However, the choice of disposition as a key criterion also served to protect 
participants against charges of incompetence in their own practice. If deficits 
were a reason for failure, then any deficits in their repertoires, viewed against 
some arbitrarily defined indicator, could lead to charges of incompetence, and 
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thus undermine their own status, as well as their right to make such 
judgements. Concern with self-protection was understandable given that their 
accounts revealed that they experienced a strong sense of surveillance and 
distrust. Exclusion from final decisions on progression and continuation, and the 
absence of feedback on the outcome, when students had been judged 
negatively, seemed to provide confirmation of their alienation from the 
educational process. Indeed, lack of trust is illustrated nicely by the interesting 
paradox in professional training. Although nurses are trained to make complex 
decisions in clinical practice on a day-to-day basis, the increasingly explicit, 
reductive guidelines for assessment suggest a reluctance to accept that 
practitioners can make similarly complex judgements about another’s approach 
to the same work. 
Practitioners’ discourse resisted the technical-rational model of practice, 
constructing knowledge about it differently, and judging students’ performance 
according to situational demand and opportunity. Participants made a strong 
claim that one can never actualise the totality of practice, and that nurses are 
different things at different times. Consistent with this they constructed a 
remarkably mobile model of their nursing personae from which judgements of 
students were derived. The interviews provided an opportunity for these 
participants to construct themselves through the process of ascesis (Foucault 
2000), often acknowledging that they had not previously been aware of their 
own multiplicity. The model they constructed bore comparison with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1988) Body without Organs, an un-predetermined identity, variably 
constructed and reconstructed from related elements in their field, allowing 
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them to define themselves by association with an apparently immiscible 
mélange of knowledge, abilities, and attributes.
There was also a strong sense of moral responsibility towards the student as 
other in their relationship. As well as building a defensive function into their 
accounts, practitioners showed keen awareness that any judgement they made 
had consequences for the individual to whom it was applied, and a strong 
aversion to condemning him or her for any apparent failing. This was illustrated, 
for example, by the suggestion that someone might be better suited to another 
career, since each has her or his own strengths as well as weaknesses. The 
process by which they evaluated a student’s performance showed marked 
similarities with the results reported by Anderson et al (2001) findings in relation 
to attributions of responsibility: they were clearly aware of the similarities 
between themselves and those they were judging.
Added to all other considerations it was then no surprise that decision-making 
was at best difficult, at worst impossible. A fixed criterion for determining 
acceptability – that is, judging the other according to a unitary model of the 
practitioner or of practice – could not take account of the variable quality of 
clinical situations or settings, nor of the variable qualities inherent in nurses’ 
personae, and so was suspended to allow an assessment of wider personal 
and situational factors. Participants’ accounts indicated a concern with 
something in a state of flux, with something still to come, an example of the 
Deleuzian notion of individuals as always-becoming-other (Deleuze and 
Guattari1988; Deleuze 1994), rather than reaching a fixed state of identity; to 
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determine acceptability using a fixed model for comparison would be unjust 
(Derrida 1995).
Hence, on one level, practitioners utilised attribution and correspondence 
principles (Jones and Davies 1965), and appeared to be complying with a 
rationalistic model; but insights from postmodernist writers such as Foucault 
(2002a, 1977b), Derrida (1995; Derrida and Caputo 1997), Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994, 1988), Potter (1996; Potter and Wetherell 1987) and others 
have shown that there is marked resistance to a unitary and rational model. 
Participants constantly anticipated something-still-to-come – judging potential, 
perhaps, rather than absolute achievement – but were nevertheless concerned 
with safe, appropriate, and professional practice. Indeed, by judging something-
still-to-come they demonstrated the non-closure of the Deleuzian distinction 
between virtual and functive concepts; completion is an aspiration not a state of 
affairs which can be actualised (Drummond 2002; Deleuze and Guattari 1994).
Since practice, for this group of practitioners at least, was explained as a 
situated phenomenon, hence variable in its operation, so situated accounts of 
their judgements allowed them to claim a more authentic, more dynamic 
understanding of student development than lists of acontextual behaviours 
permit. Pre-specified action was held as inappropriate; indeed, wherever the 
commonplace caveat ‘appropriate’ is associated with any assessment criterion, 
there is already an invitation to use judgement rather than programmed 
decision-making. In practitioners’ accounts lists of competencies provided, at 
most, only a guide to the kind of achievements to be sought in students’ 
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practice. Such lists remain an impoverished representation of a complex, 
context-bound practice, and propose an inappropriately standardised 
understanding of what counts as acceptable. 
Reflections: research and personal development
I commenced this study thinking that it would be useful to identify what the 
notion of competence might mean to practitioners. This, of course, implied a 
realist view of the practitioners’ world, and that something fairly discrete and 
definable could be found. It came as something of a revelation that they did not 
seem as concerned with a technical, rationalistic model, as I had expected; 
indeed, I was struck by the indeterminacy and tentative nature of their stories. 
In thinking through this I had to recognise first of all that our relationship in the 
interviews, hence how they chose to respond, was influenced by their 
perception of me, regardless of how I saw this. However, I also had to 
recognise that I had possibly been working with certain assumptions, about how 
practitioners might understand practice capability or account for what they do in 
assessment, which I had not properly acknowledged. In retrospect, I had been 
assuming an impracticable schism between knowing and doing and being a 
nurse in different contexts. This may have arisen from what I perceived as a 
profound difference between their area of work, general adult nursing, and my 
own field, mental health nursing; this was – to me at least – a much more 
obviously indeterminate area of activity than its companion. 
This was interesting to me, in that, even prior to this undertaking, I had not been 
comfortable with a policy which seemed to promote an approach to education, 
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in which my role as teacher was a kind of production technician, dealing in 
given explanations for what are always situated events. Despite the relocation 
and restructuring of nurse training introduced in the 1990s, it seemed to me that 
the opportunity for a genuinely critical approach to nursing knowledge was 
being lost in the pursuit of professional status, equated for the time being with a 
rationalistic understanding. I had moved into what I now recognise as that 
uncertain territory at the boundary of discursively approved knowledge, in which 
transgression is performed as a struggle between resistance and retreat. It was 
exciting to find an ally in practitioners’ own articulation of their work, especially 
given that they came from a different area of clinical practice from my own 
background.
Finally, explaining situated judgements required a shift of thinking on my part, 
and was evident in the change of approach to analysis. Initially, I saw the data 
relatively straightforwardly as a more relevant version of what mattered to 
practitioners. However, the significance of the constant movement in their 
stories became more apparent, through a combination of influences: 
challenging questions from my supervisor(s), to which I had to respond; my own 
reading, which disturbed more conventional thought; staying with the data, and 
remaining open to the possibility of alternative options presenting themselves. 
The process has developed my appreciation of what in another context is called
the uncertainty principle, in the pursuit of good quality practice and justice to the 
individual in assessment. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF PRACTICE
On the basis of these accounts practitioners’ claims are more sophisticated and 
adaptive than the approach promoted in policy; indeed they more closely match 
the so-called holistic model of practice promoted through both education and 
policy, since they actively take account of all available factors. Practitioners 
described their work as necessarily situated, ergo contingent, and 
demonstrated ability to evaluate student performance in terms of 
professionalism in relationships, appropriate application of knowledge and 
skills, and safeness. The use of a rhizomatic form of knowledge, invoked 
according to the demands of particular situations, showed that pre-specification 
is too limiting in such assessments. Predetermined outcomes lead to 
inconsistency precisely because they are predetermined yet must be applied in 
variable contexts (cf. Edgoose 2001). Practitioners require freedom to roam 
(Drummond 2002) in assessment, to report performance on their own terms.
Assessment based on narrative reports reviewing situated performance 
therefore needs to replace competency-based statements of outcome. These 
and their euphemistic substitute, proficiencies (NMC 2004), must be rejected as 
an inadequate characterisation of practice. The specification of outcomes did 
not facilitate practitioners’ search for what they described as good, safe 
practice. Beyond the domain of applied practice, participants readily deferred to 
the right of tutorial staff to determine achievement in the academic domain. 
However, participants pointed to their own practice in which knowledge was 
translated and drawn upon according to its application. Assessment is 
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concerned with a student’s ability to select and apply understanding 
appropriately – held to be part of nurses’ day-to-day practice – and is better 
captured through narrative, open assessments. 
In the interest of good practice, then, nurse education policy needs to replace 
the politico-economic emphasis on a sterile, product-orientated model with a 
focus on professionalism based on adaptive responding. This has two 
consequences. It enables nurse educators to adopt a process orientation, and 
to promote the development of knowledgeable and skilled but self-aware, self-
motivated individuals who will work with the uncertainty of complex problems, 
building their knowledge base as they encounter new experiences. It also 
recognises practitioners’ expertise by acknowledging their understanding of the 
practice context, instead of subjugating this to artificial, managerialist 
definitions. This equalises the relationship between clinical and educational 
practitioners, facilitates a healing of the academic-practice division, by removing 
the power differential – perceived or otherwise – between the two camps, and 
enables a more egalitarian dialogue where failure is to be considered.
Nonetheless, an important purpose of assessment is to distinguish the 
acceptable from the unacceptable. How, then, does a student fail? Participants 
identified the interdependence of engagement and incremental gain, without 
predetermining what would be gained, except inasmuch as it related to 
particular encounters. This is not refusal to discriminate, but recognition of the 
fluid nature of practice situations, which have to be judged individually. Such 
judgements are central to practitioners’ involvement and cannot be determined 
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in advance. If certain discrete elements can be prescribed, as some participants 
indicated, then these may be specified and assessed independent of context; 
such (technical) elements are unproblematic, as programmable decisions. 
However, where repeated judgements of practice as a situated activity do not 
lead to appropriate engagement to rectify any identified deficits, then, 
importantly, a cumulative decision to fail will result.
Practitioners’ situated perspective should lead practice-based judgements, in a 
way that makes their expertise in the application of knowledge genuinely central 
to decisions on capability (cf. WNB 1997; UKCC 1999), rather than merely 
appearing in the rhetoric of programme design. Visibility may be a political 
necessity, but we cannot disguise the indeterminacy of clinical situations in any 
but the most straightforward of these. Exemplars derived from practitioners’ 
accounts of assessment in situ need to replace current outcome specifications 
as a guide for assessment, but without predetermining it. Combined with 
practitioner accounts of individual student performance these offer a more 
appropriate basis for comparability and demonstration of equivalence – witness 
the examples cited by practitioners in this study – while recognising the fluid 
nature of professional judgement. However, we should be clear that these do 
not provide a reason for censure of the assessor, nor limit the articulation of 
professional work to a fixed range of options. Practitioners must have, and 
know that they have, authority as well as freedom to judge according to need 
rather than context-free specification, recording judgements in contextualised 
narratives.
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The model of professional identity proposed by participants in this study, in 
which they actively constituted themselves as incomplete multiplicities, is 
consistent with the un-predetermined approach needed for assessment of 
performance, and provides a central plank for programme design. Analysis of 
clinical situations in their totality requires nurses to draw on different ways of 
being in order to find a suitable response. This Body without Organs (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1988) does several things. It promotes an understanding of nurses 
and nursing as not belonging to one category or another, and so retains a focus 
on flexible, discretionary responding (cf. Wade 1999); it supports continuous 
personal and professional development; it promotes good nursing based on 
judgement of individual need, by emphasising the need to address more than 
technical aspects of a problem. Narrative reports based on situated 
performance promote continuous development, whereas lists of prescribed 
outcomes, since these cannot predict all possibilities, encourage the perception 
and pursuit of absolute achievement as a once for all event. 
The development and inclusion of exemplars necessitates a greater degree of 
engagement with the process of programme development than was evident 
from the accounts reported here. Policy already requires involvement of 
practitioners, but there are difficulties with this, which leave it currently at the 
level of rhetoric. I demonstrated in chapter three the considerable difficulty I 
experienced in obtaining participants for this study: availability is subject to 
strong organisational and personal pressures. These same pressures must 
apply to participation in planning, so that involvement of practitioners to date 
has been peripheral. Second, I showed that participants were comfortable in 
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their own clinical domain, but uncomfortable with the academic orientation of 
training programmes (though this does not deny their understanding of the 
clinical context). Programmes are written in terms familiar to education 
establishments, but which are not in clinical practitioners’ terminology; planning 
committees tend to be dominated by academic representatives, and so do not 
always provide the most comfortable forum for expression of dissent.
A less territorial approach to programme development, which goes beyond the 
mere geographical location of the planning process, is therefore necessary. For 
instance, link tutors or lecturer-practitioners, who already have a presence in 
clinical areas, could provide the forum (cf. the agora: Bauman 1999) for 
discussion on means and ends in practice learning, and replace reliance on the 
impracticable option of identifying a separate time and space for this purpose. 
Absence (hence de facto exclusion) from planning meetings has led to 
practitioners being faced with impracticable – sometimes incomprehensible –
options when assessing progress. The approach proposed here strengthens 
appreciation of practitioner expertise (cf. Fish and Coles 1998), aiding the 
productive exercise of judgement, rather than perpetuating more defensive 
ploys for fear of censure. If practitioner perspectives can be obtained by other 
means, then a more authentic, hence meaningful, understanding can find its 
place in formal documentation, increasing practitioners’ sense of ownership of 
assessment processes. It is then a relatively straightforward matter to invite 
practitioners to approve or modify the documents they will be expected to use in 
practice.
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For policy makers there will be concerns about participants’ evident hesitation 
in making a firm decision on a student’s performance; policy has a legitimate 
concern with safeness, a major factor driving the specification of outcomes. 
However, hesitation does not jeopardise safety where a fiduciary relationship 
exists, both between nurse and patient or client, and between policy-makers 
and practitioners. The hesitation seen in this study arises in part from 
practitioners’ perceived vulnerability – for instance, in failing to facilitate 
successful learning, or indicting themselves vis-à-vis knowledge deficits. More 
positively, it derives from the particularity of situations encountered, and the 
need, prominent in participants’ commentaries, for safety combined with justice. 
Practitioners’ own preparation and status provides the impetus for judicious 
decision-making: participants would not jeopardise their own position through 
incautious pronouncements. Policy-makers must accept that pre-specified 
outcomes create two paradoxes. First, there is an increase in hesitation, since 
outcomes check practitioner as well as student performance; second, outcomes 
potentially lead to unsafe practice, since, when viewed as a once for all 
achievement, they can discourage continuous and repeated evaluation in the 
student. It is necessary therefore to allow practitioners to make situated, un-
predetermined judgements, and to refrain from imposing abstracted criteria, 
precisely in the interest of safeness.
It has been proposed that clinical and educational practitioners engage in a 
dialogue as the basis for assessment (MacAleer and Hamill 1997), and is 
recommended in policy guidelines as good practice. However, this presents a 
logistical problem, in that people need to be present to each other for dialogue 
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to occur; numbers of students, multiple locations, and resource limitations mean 
that this is unlikely to happen. The possibility therefore remains that 
practitioners’ judgements can be overruled in response to other pressures; 
following Levinas’ (1969) notion of responsibility to the other, it is the face-to-
face encounter which removes this possibility. In the absence of a direct 
encounter between tutorial and practice staff, the condition arising between 
practitioner and student will not emerge; so decisions are as likely to serve the 
interest of external pressures as to support practitioners’ judgements on 
acceptability. 
Once more, this necessitates trust in professional colleagues’ judgements as 
the basis of decisions on progression, and a shift of authority in their favour. As 
an example, practitioners in this study showed that failure to apply or develop 
practice knowledge through engagement can be read as unacceptable or 
unsafe, since it has implications for both present and future practice capability 
and security. Where deficits were identified, concern turned to whether a 
student responded appropriately to remedy this. Such examples, incorporated 
into assessment reports as proposed above, provide evidence to support the 
judgement; this preserves the visibility criterion required by policy makers and 
managers by making explicit the rationale for final decisions. Because the 
concept of practice, as opposed to procedural elements of it, can only properly 
be understood as a situated phenomenon, there cannot be fixed criteria for 
decision-making. To limit practitioners’ options presents them with an 
impossible task, itself unjust, which should be removed from the process.
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Final comments
If it is to be used at all, the notion of competence in practice should be 
reclaimed – de-territorialized, in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988) terms – and 
restored to its global meaning, recognised as a virtual not a functive concept, 
concerned with overall capability, a much more fluid condition than implied by 
prescriptive outcomes. While assessment is based on putatively discrete, 
measurable, objective outcomes of learning, nursing denies the fluid nature of 
its own practices, and leaves control in the hands of politically motivated others. 
Educational practitioners are well placed to encourage this more fluid 
understanding, since it fits the open, questioning approach traditionally 
promoted by higher education. An alliance of clinical and educational 
practitioners provides a broad base from which to challenge the technical-
rational perspective of managerialism. Though recently the two camps have 
been separated by the modernist pursuit of knowledge and its representation, 
the data here suggest that they have more in common with each other, than 
they have differences with a managerialist perspective. The relationship 
between policy-makers and education providers has required that nurse 
teachers somewhat uncritically implement the wishes of powerful others, 
despite their professional status. Acquiescence to the modernist preference 
both misrepresents a non-rationalistic practice, and places an impossible 
burden on educationalists and clinical practitioners alike. A more productive 
alliance vis-à-vis the nature of nursing knowledge and its deployment in 
practice opens the way for a (re)awakening of the debate about the purpose of 
educational practices: to emancipate or reproduce. Nurse teachers, in my view, 
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have a professional obligation to promote criticality; recognition of uncertainty 
does not equate to unsafe or unprofessional practice. A new alliance promises 
to redress nursing’s power-invested relations in favour of practice, both 
educational and clinical.
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Appendix A: Initial interviews (guidance notes)
State: “When you, or any of your colleagues, are assessing a [pre-reg.] student, 
you are being asked to judge whether that student’s practice is reaching an 
acceptable level [for continuation or registration]. In doing this you have to 
make sense of a wide range of different things, and then record a judgement 
about whether that student’s practice is acceptable.” 
Emphasise: “I am making NO judgement about rightness or otherwise of 
statements / actions.”
State: “Can you think about students you have had contact with as far as 
possible – rather than hypothetical ones. What made you decide what you did 
about that student? If it helps, you might want to think of 3 possible ‘students’; 
you could think about them separately or altogether, whichever suits you 
better.”
Prompts (if participants have difficulty in getting started):
1. A good student who will make a good nurse:
· What was s/he like?
· What made you decide s/he was OK?
· What was the most obvious aspect of her/his performance?
· Was this important – and, if so, why?
· Is this something you would record explicitly?
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· Were there any supporting elements / evidence for your judgement? 
· Were there any conflicting aspects of performance?
· (If relevant or arises in response) Is this what makes someone  
competent (or moves them towards it)?
2. Someone you did not wish to “pass” / see progress.
· How did this person differ from the first? What was the problem?
· What evidence did you use / look for?
· What would have been needed to change your judgement?
· Were there any aspects of performance which were OK? Why did [the 
identified element] override others?
· Why is [the identified element] important here?
· Where does this come from?
· How does it link to the idea of competence?
3. Someone you were unsure about.
· What was the problem?
· What did you decide? What evidence did you use?
· Why is this important? Where does it come from?
· Would your colleagues have made the same judgement? How do you 
know?
· How does this relate to your idea of good / acceptable nursing practice?
· How does any/all of this connect with the idea of competence in 
practice?
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4. How are things / judgements recorded?
· Whose language do you use – your own or “official” / given?
· How authentic are recorded statements?
· Do you have any preference for how you record judgements? (Are 
there any differences between, say, checklists and more narrative 
forms?)
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Appendix B: The participants
Abby, health visitor
Qualified 15 years, now at degree level, a registered nurse, midwife and health 
visitor. Student supervisor and assessor for most of that time. Invited as a one-
off to allow for a possible ‘outsider’ view, since health visitors only get early 
stage students, and for short periods of experience. Tended to emphasise 
mainly communicative ability, and building relationships. Clear that she saw a 
distinction between being competent at something in particular, and being a 
competent nurse as more global. 
Bron, district staff nurse
13 years experience since qualification, with additional community qualification 
at Dip HE level. She had also started her career as an enrolled nurse, and 
obtained first level qualification later. Worked alongside, and acted as student 
assessor for over 5 years. Appeared a little apprehensive about my purpose 
and initially her responses were rather hesitant and brief, requiring more 
prompting than previous interviewees. Nonetheless, she became more relaxed 
subsequently and was better able to expand on responses as time went on. 
Grace, district sister
Having started her career as an enrolled (2nd level) nurse, she had upgraded 
her qualification to first level some 12 years ago, now holds a community 
nursing degree, and was recently appointed to a sister grade. Regularly worked 
with students for several years in her current role. Appeared a little nervous, 
possibly as to the purpose of the research. Facial gestures during the interview 
seemed to indicate that she was looking for reassurance that she was 
responding in the appropriate way; nevertheless, she settled into developing 
her views about the points she raised.
Marje, staff nurse
Qualified 3 years to DipHE level, and working towards degree qualification. 
Assessing students regularly for past 2 years. On initial contact seemed 
nervous about recording of interview, and sought assurance about the 
informality of the style of the interview. Appeared self-conscious about her initial 
nursing qualification as diploma, rather than degree. Identified the approach to 
assessment as her own, based on her conception of “good practice”. First to 
raise the idea of her “feel” for knowledge.
Maisie, staff nurse
Qualified 9 years, in pre-Project 2000 scheme; studied various short clinical 
modules relevant to her work, and has been a student supervisor for 2 years. 
Quite diffident in expressing ideas, and found it difficult to extend her responses 
without explicit prompting. Did not seem to be a supporter of the current form of 
training, with reduced time in practice. Seemed on edge throughout our 
conversation, and relieved when it was over.
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Mavis, staff nurse
Qualified for 13 years, in pre-Project 2000 programme, but has not continued in 
formal education, other than related clinical training. Has supervised students 
for 5 years. Appeared confident expressing her ideas, but gave the initial 
impression that she felt the interview was likely to be a ‘test’ of some sort. 
Seemed keen to emphasise concrete aspects of performance early on in he 
interview, but moved away from this and seemed confident in expressing ideas, 
though ambivalent about the theoretical element.
May, staff nurse 
Qualified 3 years with Dip HE, now regularly involved in assessing students 
over the last 2 years. Quite nervous about being recorded, and requested some 
reassurance at the start. Recognised the difficulty of defining the “everyday”, 
but settled into her own views, and appeared to stay with her own ideas, as 
opposed to trying to guess mine. Did not use sophisticated language or jargon 
like some others; despite this some of her comments were eloquent in their 
simplicity and apparent honesty, and she provided a useful definition of 
common sense.
Megan, ward sister
Over 30 years experience since qualification, and involved in student 
development and assessment for many of those years. Had undertaken 
updating training, but held no higher qualification. Very thoughtful throughout 
the interview, frequently taking time out to formulate ideas before expressing 
them. Found that this was not as straightforward as she had expected. 
Spontaneously suggested a colleague who might offer an alternative view, 
having been trained much more recently – an interesting anticipation of the 
presence of difference in nursing knowledge and practice.
Mena, staff nurse 
6 years experience following initial diploma level qualification; followed this with 
various additional clinical modules. Very involved with student learning and 
assessment for over 3 years. Seemed a little apprehensive prior to interview, 
and may have felt some pressure initially to participate. Showed surprise when 
½ hour had passed, and she still had more to say. Quite able to explore ideas 
without much prompting, and was confident abut the basis of her own 
judgements. Invited for re-interview following her comments about lack of 
feedback and lack of feeling involved and valued by academic colleagues.
Molly, district sister 
20years experience in practice following initial qualification. Now holds degree
in her specialist field, with several years experience of supervising pre- and 
post-registration students. Very easy to engage with the process of exploration, 
and appeared confident and open about her perspective on desirable qualities, 
attributes, and achievements in students and how she would know these, but 
gave no sign of dismissing others’ perspectives on this. Located her comments 
explicitly in a community setting. Sometimes came over as giving an interview 
performance. 
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Nan, staff nurse
Qualified 6 years with an initial diploma, now working towards a full degree, and 
keen to continue working with and assessing students as she has for 4 years. 
Discovered the difficulty of articulating the “obvious” and everyday, but seemed 
to find this personally interesting. Once she had identified her own ideas, she 
talked spontaneously of the complexity of judgements, which were always 
context-dependent. Drew a clear distinction between competence as minimally 
acceptable and technical, and good practice as more rounded performance.
Nerys, senior staff nurse
Qualified 9 years, achieved immediately prior to introduction of Project 2000 
programmes. Involved with student assessment for over 5 years. Very edgy 
about being recorded, but seemed to talk quite freely once started, and 
demonstrated a clear understanding of the purpose of the enquiry. Conveyed a 
view of assessment as complex, and of “good” students as more than 
technically able, readily using herself as a model to illustrate her view of 
practice.
Nina, ward sister
Qualified for 27 years, now to degree level, with several additional professional 
qualifications, currently working towards a masters degree. Routinely received 
and supervised students through her ward for over 10 years. Contacted through 
my colleague, though stated that she had intended to respond to my original 
circulated letter. Quite self-assured, keen to participate in the project, willing 
and able to talk and explore issues. Came to recognise that articulating what 
she sought in students was not as easy as she had thought, and insisted on the 
complexity of judgements involved. 
Rena, district sister
20 years experience in practice, and qualified subsequently with DipHE in 
community nursing. Regularly had students for several years studying at both 
degree and diploma levels. Very willing to talk, locating her views in a 
community context. Freely acknowledged that her time out of hospital was a 
possible source of difference between her own and others’ perspectives. 
Slipped into “you know” commentary on a number of occasions, apparently 
assuming my prior understanding of her view. Seemed quite secure, and 
sought no reassurance throughout our conversation.
Sandy, nursing home sister
Qualified 11 years, pre-Project 2000, now studying towards an initial Dip HE 
award; the only participant currently working in mental health care. Has been a 
student mentor-assessor intermittently for most of that time. Very pleased to get 
involved, an open and expansive talker! Located her ideas in the context of her 
particular working area. Came up with one or two useful characterisations of the 
demands of good practice (she was first with the monkey analogy for skills 
acquisition). Presented an interesting balance of technical and personal 
considerations quite explicitly according to context.
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Stella, district sister
10 years experience post-qualification, 6 in community nursing, actively 
pursuing further studies now working towards her degree. Possibly the most 
discursively conscious participant; throughout the interview she seemed keen to 
establish that she was “on the right lines”, using a considerable amount of 
formal jargon. A change of tone was noticeable towards the end of the 
interview, which seemed to reveal a more personal, less discursively driven, 
view.
Toni, ward sister
Qualified 23 years, also a midwife, and subsequently obtained degree of MA. 
Now with a managerial role in her hospital unit; started her career as an 
enrolled nurse. Has supervised students for over 10 years. Easy to get talking, 
and keen to set judgements in her own context. Picked up on any prompts quite 
freely, but seemed very concerned to cover all possible angles. Second time 
around had a clear managerial orientation: chosen for re-interview particularly 
following her apparent concern with accountability on the first occasion.
Tina, ward sister
Qualified 14 years, another participant who started her career as a second level 
nurse, converted later, and now completing degree level study. Supervised and 
assessed students for 9 years. Though generally she seemed quite confident in 
expressing her view of good and poor practice, she made some interesting, 
ambivalent references to different kinds of knowing (evidence-based vs. gut 
feeling), and was invited for re-interview for this, as well as her deference to 
college staff’s authority to decide finally on students’ continuation or otherwise.
